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ABSTRACT 
 
The US shale energy boom of the late 2000s and 2010s has brought both 
economic growth and negative externalities to communities undergoing extraction. 
Building on previous research on fracking landscapes – as well as geographies of energy 
and natural resources and case studies of environmental subjectivity in extractive zones 
– this dissertation employed a suite of qualitative methods to examine the discourses and 
ideology used to support and oppose fracking-led development in North Dakota’s Bakken 
Shale.  
The dissertation consists of three substantive chapters. The first employs key actor 
interviews and participant observation to examine how pro-oil ideology is advanced by 
economic and political elites in North Dakota. This chapter concludes that elites frame 
support for oil as an extension of existing conservative ideologies prevalent in the state. 
The second substantive chapter consists of content analysis of coverage of oil-
related events in state-level newspapers, specifically concentrating on a 2014 
conservation ballot measure and the Keystone XL pipeline. This chapter concludes that 
pro-oil writers are more effective in their messaging due to focusing on economic and 
emotional appeals. 
The final substantive chapter uses interviews and focus groups to gauge fracking 
opinions of residents of Minot, a key city in the Bakken Shale. This chapter concludes 
that residents find cultural changes related to oil and gas development of greater 
consequence than political or economic changes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Study topic and goals 
 Hydraulic fracturing (hereinafter fracking) has emerged as the premier method for 
extractive oil and natural gas from hydrocarbon-bearing shale deposits. The process 
involves injecting a mixture of water, chemicals and solids such as sands and salts 
(referred to as proppants) into a drilled well in order to create and enlarge fractures in the 
shale, thus allowing oil and gas to be released and more easily collected. Fracking is 
frequently combined with horizontal drilling, thus allowing for large geographical areas to 
be successfully harvested with a minimum of vertical wells needing to be drilled, thus 
reducing surface-level oil infrastructure such as pumpjacks (Texas Oil and Gas 
Association, 2018). The expansion of fracking from the late 2000s to the present has 
allowed the United States to nearly double its crude oil production (from ~5,000,000 to 
~9,300,000 barrels/day) and increase natural gas production by nearly a third (from 
~63,000,000,000 to ~100,000,000,000 cubic feet/day) since 2008. Indeed, the United 
States’ total petroleum production increased from third place worldwide in 2008 to first in 
2013, a position the United States had not held since 2002 and had not held for more 
than 1 consecutive year since 1996 (United States Energy Information Administration, 
2018b). Research from the National Bureau of Economic Research (Gilje, Ready, & 
Roussanov, 2016) has estimated that the total effects of fracking (lowered energy costs, 
lowered manufacturing costs, increased employment, etc.) were worth $3.5 trillion to the 
United States economy between 2012 and 2016. 
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 However, fracking has inspired significant controversy. Despite inconclusive 
evidence, scientific studies have raised concerns about fracking’s impact on the 
environment, particularly in regards to water and air quality and the role of fracking 
wastewater injection in causing seismic disturbance (see Chapter 2.3 for a more complete 
review). Scientists have argued that the environmental benefits from replacing coal with 
natural gas may be less than projected, and that such a strategy will do little to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change (Howarth, 2014). 
Additionally, both popular and academic literatures have demonstrated the negative 
externalities such as increased crime, infrastructure damage and housing competition 
that have plagued communities in shale production areas (known as shale plays) (see 
Chapter 2.3). 
 The major goal of this dissertation is to understand how ideologies and 
subjectivities related to support for the oil industry are created in North Dakota, which is 
the center of production for the shale play known as the Bakken Formation. The 
dissertation then examines how these subjectivities effect Bakken residents’ 
understandings of the present oil boom and resulting development. While much is known 
regarding perceptions of fracking in other US shale plays in states such as Colorado, 
Pennsylvania and Texas, comparatively little such attention has been paid to the Bakken. 
Additionally, existing studies are divided between macro-scale, non-ethnographic 
analyses of fracking policy and micro-scale case studies of fracking externalities in shale 
plays, with findings from each approach rarely being used to inform the other. To address 
these gaps, this dissertation examines three key thematic areas related to fracking in the 
Bakken, each involving the use of discourse: 1.) the ways in which elite level discourses 
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supportive of fracking are created and disseminated; 2.) how discourses about fracking 
are used by newspaper editorial writers to support both pro- and anti-fracking arguments; 
and 3.) how permanent residents of the city of Minot, North Dakota (a key administrative, 
financial and transportation hub for the Bakken) understand and interpret the fracking 
boom and how discourses affect these interpretations. 
 This introductory chapter begins by outlining the major research question, data 
sources and key findings from the dissertation’s substantive chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 
6). Second, this chapter introduces the dissertation’s study area and explains its 
importance to overall domestic oil production. Finally, this chapter concludes by reviewing 
the dissertation’s key aims, as well as previewing the dissertation’s literature review and 
research design chapters. 
1.2 Overview of substantive chapters 
 This dissertation consists of three substantive chapters, each of which are 
connected through the themes of discourse and values. The key findings from the 
chapters will be discussed in the following paragraphs and are also summarized in Table 
1 (p.4). 
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Chapter Research Question Data Sources Key Findings 
Homo Dakoticus 
(Chapter 4) 
- How do oil and gas 
elites promulgate pro-
oil discourses and to 
what policy ends are 
they dedicated? 
 
- Interviews and 
participant 
observation with 
oil and gas elites 
- Elites combine 
pro-oil rhetoric with 
existing 
conservative 
ideologies 
 
Editorial Analysis 
(Chapter 5) 
- Which discourses are 
prominent in 
newspaper editorials 
on key oil and gas 
topics and how do 
writers employ them? 
- Editorials in 
North Dakota 
newspapers on the 
topic of Measure 5 
(M5) and the 
Keystone XL 
pipeline (KXL) 
- Pro-industry 
writers viewed 
issues in terms of 
economic gains 
and losses and 
focused on 
emotional appeals 
 
Minot Resident 
Opinions 
(Chapter 6) 
- How do longer-term 
residents understand 
and experience 
fracking and what role 
do discourses play in 
their interpretations? 
- Interviews and 
focus groups with 
Minot residents 
- Residents were 
unwilling to directly 
criticize the oil 
industry for 
externalities 
Table 1: Research Questions, Data Sources and Key Findings from Substantive 
Chapters. 
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1.2.1 Chapter 4 overview 
 Chapter 4 uses a combination of key actor interviews conducted with North 
Dakota-based oil and gas elites (politicians, regulators, lobbyists and allied business 
people) and observation of elites at oil and gas conferences. This chapter builds on 
research that has examined the role of elite-created subjectivities in extractive zones, a 
literature that has ignored fracking. The major research question this chapter addresses 
is: How do oil and gas elites promulgate pro-oil discourses and to what policy ends are 
they dedicated? This chapter argues that elites have integrated pro-oil rhetoric into 
conservative ideologies that are already prominent at both the state and community levels 
in North Dakota, building on earlier work (Loder, 2016b). Three discursive themes are 
particularly prominent in the public and private statements of oil and gas elites: 1.) The 
North Dakota Way; 2.) North Dakota exceptionalism and resiliency. 
The North Dakota Way is an existing code of conduct that emphasizes patriotism, 
self-sacrifice for the collective good and a consensus-based politics that avoids 
contentious debate. This ideology is conservative, emphasizing traditional moral values, 
community self-reliance and a disdain for governmental interference in private decision 
making. Thus, support for oil and gas, which is framed as a capitalist, pro-national security 
project grafts well onto the North Dakota Way. Second, North Dakota exceptionalism is 
the belief that North Dakota is a state blessed with productive surface (farming) and sub-
surface (oil and coal) capacity and that its residents are harder working, more diligent and 
more moral than their counterparts in other states (especially liberal states on the East 
and West coasts). By appealing specifically to North Dakota exceptionalism, elites seek 
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to flatter residents about their roles in supporting oil and gas (framed as the main driver 
of North Dakota’s economy), thus creating a personal connection between residents and 
the oil and gas industry. In the North Dakota context, resiliency refers not to the ability to 
recover from environmental disasters, but to the notion that North Dakotans are mentally, 
emotionally and physically tougher than other Americans due to their mythologized history 
of being hardy peasants who have survived all obstacles to thrive in the unforgiving 
landscape of the Great Plains. Elites specifically invoke the resiliency discourse to 
persuade residents that they are more than capable of withstanding negative externalities 
related to fracking in order to reap the eventual gains from the practice. This discourse 
was especially prominent during the post-2014 oil price slump, as elites sought to argue 
that North Dakotans were doing an excellent job of “not bailing on the Bakken” despite 
job losses, budget shortfalls and increased crime that had occurred in many Bakken 
cities. 
The three major findings from this chapter are: 1.) Elites combined pro-oil rhetoric 
with existing conservative ideologies and discourses in order to convince the public of the 
industry’s value in North Dakota; 2.) Elites made the oil industry personal to North Dakota 
residents by placing them within historical narratives that inflate the importance of 
residents in local, state and national processes such as economic development and 
national security; and 3.) Elites depicted oil as both natural and desirable, thus making it 
acceptable for state residents to embrace as they have other productivist ventures such 
as farming. 
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1.2.2 Chapter 5 overview 
 Chapter 5 analyzes editorials published in five North Dakota newspapers (four of 
which are published in Bakken cities) on two major topics: Measure 5 (M5) and the 
Keystone XL pipeline (KXL). This work specifically builds on previous research on 
newspaper analysis of fracking, but seeks to broaden this approach by both introducing 
the Bakken as a topic of analysis and by focusing on editorial coverage, which has been 
neglected by scholars. Editorial writers were separated based on whether they took a pro-
industry (opposing M5 or supporting KXL) or anti-industry (supporting M5 or opposing 
KXL) position. The major research question this chapter addresses is: What are the 
prominent discourses used in these arguments and how do writers employ them to 
support their opinions? This chapter argues that pro-industry writers focused on making 
emotional appeals, whereas anti-industry writers focused on logical appeals. It is posited 
that pro-industry writers were better able to craft a successful narrative around their 
positions, thus making them more appealing to a broader range of readers. 
 M5 was a 2014 statewide ballot amendment that would have allowed the state 
government to use a portion of collected oil production tax to fund conservation projects. 
Although the measure ultimately failed by a four-to-one margin, it was the most debated 
topic in an initial sample of more than 1,500 articles. Both groups of writers sought to 
situate their arguments in terms of the effects the measure would have on North Dakota’s 
rural heritage, private property rights and agricultural economy. Pro-industry writers 
argued that M5 would destroy rural North Dakota by allowing well-funded 
environmentalists to purchase large tracts of land, thus pricing most North Dakotans out 
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of opportunities to farm and recreate. In contrast, measure stated that M5 would provide 
more choices for land owners interested in conservation, while helping to improve 
environmental quality. Opponents, however, expended energy rebutting conservative 
rather than forming a counter-narrative, thus it is posited that their arguments were not 
seen as persuasive based on the lopsided electoral outcome. 
 KXL is a proposed expansion of TransCanada’s existing Keystone system, which 
transports oil sands from Alberta to refineries on the Gulf Coast. KXL was seen in 
dramatically different terms by pro- and anti-industry writers. Pro-industry writers argued 
that the pipeline was a project that would provide many benefits to the US in terms of 
economic growth, reduction in foreign oil and in strengthening the country’s relationship 
with the nation’s closest ally and trading partner, Canada. Supporters argued that the 
pipeline posed no environmental or economic risk, thus making opposition to it irrational. 
Moreover, supporters argued that the pipeline would explicitly benefit the Bakken due to 
~1/10th of North Dakota’s crude oil production being added to carried sands to reduce 
their thickness and toxicity (the veracity of this claim is described in more detail in Chapter 
5.3.2). KXL opponents, however, felt that KXL posed not only the traditional 
environmental risks of oil pipelines, but that these risks were enhanced due to carrying 
sands, which opponents argued were more difficult to remediate in the event of a spill 
and a greater driver of greenhouse emissions than other types of oil and gas. Additionally, 
opponents felt that KXL was an attack on private property rights and tribal sovereignty, 
due to landowners and Native American tribes having little recourse to oppose their land 
being seized for construction. 
 9 
 
 The major findings from this chapter are: 1.) Pro-industry writers viewed issues 
largely through the lens of economic gains and losses; 2.) Anti-industry writers were more 
concerned with making logical appeals and viewed issues through an environmental lens; 
and 3.) Pro-industry writers were more successful in crafting persuasive narratives in 
which they could situate their arguments. 
1.2.3 Chapter 6 overview 
 Chapter 6 employs a combination of interviews and focus groups with non-elite, 
longer-term residents (defined as permanent residents of more than five consecutive 
years) of Minot, North Dakota in order to gauge their opinions of the fracking boom as it 
has occurred in their city. This chapter specifically builds on previous such studies in other 
shale plays, however, integrates concerns of ideology and subjectivity alongside analyses 
of local impacts. Minot’s current boom and bust cycle is situated within the city’s hundred-
year history of industrial booms and busts. The major research question this chapter 
addresses is: How do longer-term residents understand and experience fracking and 
what role do discourses play in their interpretations? Three major thematic areas are 
addressed: 1.) The boom’s impacts on housing and recovery from the 2011 Souris River 
Flood; 2.) The boom’s impact on crime and the purported decline of moral values; and 3.) 
How the economic gains from the boom can be leveraged to modernize and diversify 
Minot’s economy for an eventual post-oil future. This chapter argues that residents view 
negative externalities not as the fault of the oil industry, but as extensions of long-standing 
political and cultural issues that have plagued the city. 
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 First, housing was viewed as being severely impacted by the flood due to 
increased competition from in-migrants drawn by oil-related jobs. This competition was 
viewed as exacerbating housing problems following the 2011 flood, which destroyed one 
third of the city’s housing stock. Residents, though, largely blamed these problems on the 
city government and landlords for prioritizing the needs of the oil industry over those of 
longer-term residents. Second, the boom was viewed as causing a massive cultural shift 
in which Minot’s traditional moral values were disrespected and a permissive attitude 
toward crime had taken hold. Residents felt that these issues were a function of the poor 
values of out-of-state newcomers and an increased sense of entitlement among Minot’s 
local youth. Third, residents uniformly felt that the Bakken boom would expire sooner than 
the decades’ long predictions made by oil and as elites, arguing that the city government 
needed to use existing oil revenue to modernize the city in order to prepare for the time 
when oil was no longer a major economic driver. Residents were particularly concerned 
that not enough money was being spent on education or attracting non-oil jobs, thus 
making it unlikely that the city’s younger residents would desire to remain in Minot as 
adults. Thus, ultimately residents felt that while certain problems came from the oil boom, 
the benefits – both present and future – outweighed the drawbacks. 
 The major findings from this chapter are: 1.) Residents were unwilling to directly 
criticize the oil industry for externalities; 2.) Residents found cultural changes to be more 
upsetting than economic changes; and 3.) Residents believed oil could be both a short- 
and long-term positive for the city if wealth were directed towards modernization. 
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1.3 Study area 
The Bakken Formation is a hydrocarbon rich shale in the Upper Great Plains that 
covers approximately 200,000 square miles of North Dakota, Montana, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, with potential hydrocarbons underlying a portion of South Dakota (see 
Figure 1 (p. 12)). The vast majority of oil and gas recoverable through fracking and 
horizontal drilling is contained within Western North Dakota, Eastern Montana and 
extreme Southern Saskatchewan (Gaswirth et al., 2013). Oil production using fracking 
and horizontal drilling began at the shallow Elm Coulee Field in Eastern Montana in 2000 
and in the deeper, older North Dakota portion of the Bakken at the Parshall Oil Field in 
2006. Oil output has increased from ~100,000 barrels/day in January 2009 to a peak of 
~1,400,000 barrels/day in June 2015. Production as of December 2017 is ~1,000,000 
barrels/day. For comparison, the Niobrara (Colorado and Wyoming) and Eagle Ford 
(Texas) plays produce ~400,000 and ~1,300,000 barrels/day, respectively, while the 
Permian Formation (New Mexico and Texas) – which is split between traditional oil 
production and shale production – produces ~2,000,000 barrels/day (United States 
Energy Information Administration, 2018a) (see Figure 2 (p. 15)). Fracking in the Bakken 
and other major plays has had a major impact on total US crude production, with 
production rising from ~ 5,200,000 barrels/day in January 2009 to ~9,400,000 barrels/day 
in December 2017 (an 80% increase), the highest level since 1972 (See Figure 3 (p. 14)). 
Since approximately 1890, the surface of the Bakken has been used for dryland 
farming of wheat, soybeans, sunflowers and flax. Population density is low (~1,200,000 
persons at 5.6 persons/square mile compared to ~330,000,000 persons at 89  
 12 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Major US shale plays (Bakken highlighted). Map adapted from North 
Dakota GIS, 2018. 
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Figure 2: Crude oil production from major US shale plays, 2009 - 2017. Graph created 
from data contained in US Energy Information Administration, 2018b. 
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Figure 3: Total US crude oil production, 2009 – 2017. Graph created from data 
contained in US Energy Information Administration, 2018b. 
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persons/square mile for the US as a whole) (Raimi & Newell 2016). Within North Dakota, 
primary oil activity is centered in the northwestern portion of the state (known as the “oil 
patch”), which contains several protected areas including Theodore Roosevelt National 
Park and Little Missouri National Grassland. The National Parks Conservation 
Association has designated these protected areas as threatened by oil and gas 
development (National Parks Conservation Association, 2013). Primary cities in the 
region include Minot (48,743, 2016 est.), Williston (26,426, 2016 est.) and Dickinson 
(23,400, 2016 est.) with no other towns greater than 7,000 people (see figure 4 (p. 16)). 
Minot (the study area for Chapter 6) has historically been the major retail, financial 
and transportation hub for the Bakken region, while also being home to a large Air Force 
base. This role has continued during the Bakken oil boom, as the local headquarters for 
many national oil and gas businesses are located in Minot. The city doubled the size of 
its airport between 2013 and 2017, making it the largest in the state despite Minot being 
only the fourth-largest city in North Dakota. Population in the region grew ~19% from 1960 
- 2000 (a period of general stagnation, see Chapter 6.2), whereas the population has 
grown by the same rate from 2010 – 2016 alone (US Census Bureau, 2017). Rapid 
population growth has generated challenges to housing, infrastructure and crime and 
deviance (see Chapter 6). 
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Figure 4: Key cities and environmental features in North Dakota (Bakken 
highlighted). Map created from data contained in North Dakota GIS, 2015. 
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1.4 Overall aims and preview of remaining chapters 
 The overall goal of this dissertation is to examine the opinions of North Dakota 
citizens regarding key aspects of the Bakken oil boom. The three major populations 
examined were oil and gas elites (Chapter 4), editorial writers in North Dakota 
newspapers (Chapter 5) and longer-term residents (Chapter 6). This dissertation seeks 
to answer three major questions related to the overall goal: 1.) Examine how elite-level 
policy makers created discourses surrounding fracking and how these discourses were 
used to advance specific political goals; 2.) interrogate how elite and ordinary actors 
employed these discourses in state-level print media to debate the merits of specific 
boom-related policies; and 3.) study how longer-term oil patch residents understand 
fracking and to ascertain how and to what degree these media discourses effect such 
understandings. Building on data from preliminary research conducted in summer 2014, 
this study began with the hypothesis that the lives of longer-term residents were mediated 
both through their daily, direct experiences with the effects of the boom as well as through 
formal discourses about the boom created by the policy maker group, which are then 
filtered down to the “ordinary” population through print media. Thus, this dissertation 
sought to explicitly connect findings relating to ideologies from Chapters 4 and 5 with 
localized realities in Minot in Chapter 6. 
 In addition to the substantive chapters, this dissertation also includes a review of 
relevant literature (Chapter 2), a chapter on research design (Chapter 3) and a conclusion 
and discussion (Chapter 7).  
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Chapter 2 examines the three major literatures which the study contributes to: 1.) 
Geographies of energy and natural resources; 2.) Social science studies of fracking; and 
3.) Case studies of energy and extraction employing subjectivity frameworks. The major 
gaps in these literatures that this dissertations addresses include: lack of case studies of 
fossil fuels, poor integration between geopolitical analyses and local extractive case 
studies and the low use of subjectivity theories in case studies of fracking landscapes. 
Chapter 3 examines the major research questions for the dissertation and also 
describes the data collection and analysis procedures for the substantive chapters. 
Respondent data for the chapters were collected from a combination of interviews, focus 
groups and participant observation, while editorials were collected from online versions 
of newspapers published in the state. Data were analyzed using ATLAS.ti qualitative data 
analysis software using a hybrid coding style borrowing from critical discourse analysis 
(CDA), patterned-meaning analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and Manuel Delanda’s 
conception of assemblages (Delanda, 2006). This chapter also includes a reflection on 
positionality issues related to my family history in Minot and the Bakken region. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the dissertation’s key findings, reviews the dissertation’s 
contributions to the existing literature and reflects on future research directions. The major 
overall finding from this dissertation is that oil-related economic transformations in the 
Bakken have relied upon social and cultural arguments, playing on specific North Dakotan 
themes that have placed the oil industry outside the realm of possible political 
contestation. 
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2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This dissertation examines the political economic and cultural effects of the 
fracking boom in North Dakota’s Bakken Shale using the insights of three major bodies 
of literature: 1.) Geographies of Energy and Natural Resources; 2.) Social science studies 
of fracking; and 3.) Environmental subjectivity in natural resource production landscapes. 
The strength and weaknesses of each of these literatures are reviewed in this chapter, 
with a focus on literatures that are most directly relevant to this dissertation. Major gaps 
in these literatures as a whole are: 1.) Ethnographic studies of fossil fuel production 
landscapes in North America are limited, especially in geography proper; 2.) With some 
limited exceptions, most case studies do a poor job of linking local outcomes with either 
dominant discourses and ideologies or larger scale economic and political realities that 
may condition them; and 3.) Many case studies either do not substantially engage with 
social theories or are rely uncritically on specific frameworks such as boomtown 
sociology, thus often limiting opportunities for synergies with other bodies of work. The 
conclusion to this review (Chapter 2.5) will address the specific ways in which the 
empirical analysis in the body chapters of this dissertation (Chapters 4-6) serve to remedy 
some of these particular weaknesses and advance this literature. 
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2.2 Geographies of energy and natural resources 
Resource control, access and use have long been core concerns within human-
environment geography. Erich Zimmerman (1951) posited that the fundamental challenge 
for the world in the latter half of 20th century would be balancing the ever-greater need for 
natural resources, especially fossil fuel energy, with the rapidly shrinking bases of these 
resources. A resurgence of interest in energy and resource issues occurred in the 1970s, 
a period dubbed “the energy decade” due to a renewed focus on population growth, 
unchecked economic growth and energy shortage following the 1973 oil crisis (Yergin, 
1982). However, contra the Neo-Malthusian views of the time (Ehrlich & Holdren, 1971; 
Hardin, 1968), seminal texts such as Earl Cook’s Man, Energy, Society (1976) and Tim 
O’Riordan’s Environmentalism (1976), argued that such crises were the result not of 
overpopulation, but of resource maldistribution, particularly the overconsumption of 
imported energy by wealthy nations that robbed poorer, producer nations of the ability to 
develop their own economies.  
As concerns about scarcity faded during the period from the 1980s to the early 
2000s, so too did much of the research on natural resources, especially in an energy 
context. An exception is the edited volume Geographical Dimensions of Energy 
(Calzonetti & Solomon, 1985), which was one of the first attempts to summarize the scope 
of energy geographies as a subdiscipline, as well as to include case studies of energy 
landscapes. One of the major flaws of this book, though, was that it largely eschewed 
politics in favor of narrow technical or policy solutions to energy problems. Geographers 
such as Emel and Peet (1989) and Wescoat (1991, 1992, 1993) argued that an explicitly 
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political approach linking global processes to place-specific outcomes, such as the 
nascent political ecology, was needed in order to respond to increasingly global problems 
such as climate change, geopolitical restructuring (i.e., breakup of the Soviet Union) and 
the role of resources in violent conflict. Wescoat specifically argued that a greater focus 
on case study approaches, especially of extractive industries, was needed to address 
questions of social justice that were largely ignored in apolitical and/or policy-oriented 
studies. 
Although many political ecology-influenced case studies on local resource conflicts 
and use were conducted during the 1990s and early 2000s, the research largely focused 
on struggles related to subsistence resources such as water, food and firewood and their 
connection to extraterritorial economic processes (see Bridge (2002) for a critique of this 
approach), with specific research on energy largely non-existent.1 Indeed, it is only 
recently that geographers have studied resources as important subjects beyond their 
entanglement in broader economic and environmental debates (Bakker & Bridge, 2006). 
For example, Bridge (2009) argues for place-specific approaches that examine how 
resources come to be incorporated within social and cultural systems, furthering arguing 
in a later paper (Bridge, 2011) that energy-related case studies are particularly important 
in light of renewed concerns over energy shortage and climate change during the 
Anthropocene era.  
                                                 
1 Some exceptions can be found in the work on local manifestations of the resource curse by Auty (1995, 
2001). This work, however, largely does not examine resources as energy. 
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Yet most recent research within resource geography has focused on global 
geopolitics and policy. A major topic, building on the Anthropocene theme, has been the 
so-called carbon economy, or the economic policies around carbon emissions, especially 
those concerned with reducing emissions to combat climate change. Although 
geographers have pointed out the potential benefits of decarbonization, most research 
on this theme has emphasized how such mechanisms are used to support “business as 
usual” energy and economic agendas in industrialized nations. Bumpus and Liverman 
(2008) and Knox-Hayes (Knox-Hayes, 2010; Bansal & Knox-Hayes 2013) have argued 
that carbon offsets (i.e. the capture of carbon in one place to mitigate its emission in 
another) allow wealthy nations to create a “spatial fix” in which they continue to pursue 
carbon-intensive lifestyles while encouraging offsets in developing countries, potentially 
stifling development. Critiques of decarbonization narratives have been extended to the 
oil and gas sector, with critics demonstrating how theories of peak oil and climate change 
(historically championed by the environmental left) have been co-opted by right-wing 
governments in order to push authoritarian, anti-environmental policies under the notion 
of there being no meaningful sustainable alternative pathways (Bettini & Karaliotas, 2013; 
Barr & Pollard, 2017). However, a more optimistic view of decarbonization is advanced 
by Bridge, et al. (2014) who in their analysis of the UK government’s transition policy 
argue for the emergence of multiple, potentially positive, futures for a low-carbon 
economy. Thus, despite the disparate nature of this globally focused scholarship, the 
major theme uniting it is that resource policy is determined in discursive arenas that are 
increasingly spatially and politically distant from sites of production, distribution and use, 
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the implication being that there is little room for direct contestation on the part of people 
living in those landscapes. 
Other geopolitical approaches have examined the relationship of oil and other 
mineral resources to the global political order, specifically as it relates to political 
outcomes. Smil (2011) and Huber (2013) demonstrated the complete embeddedness of 
oil within American ways of life and the political discourses that have continued to keep 
the United States both embroiled in global military conflicts and lagging behind their 
European and Asian peer nations in renewable and energy-efficient technologies. Huber 
specifically argued that such conflict and inefficiency are fundamental to American 
ideologies of individuality and prosperity, which emphasize consumption (particularly of 
automobiles and other high-energy machines) and consumer choice (no matter how 
costly this may prove to the environment, the overall economy or the rights of others) as 
the bedrock of American-style freedom. Therefore, according to Huber, Americans 
believe they are entitled to the “cheap energy” that underpins their lifestyles, thus 
providing political justification for the continued exploitation of labor, environmental 
destruction and perpetual foreign military entanglements that are seen as maintaining the 
energy status quo. 
In the broader international sphere, Watts (2005) and Bridge (2008) showed that 
the particular organization of the oil industry (international transnational corporations in 
partnership with state-run oil companies in nations with autocratic governments) leads to 
conditions of chronic underdevelopment in third world exporter nations and the 
persistence of technological and fiscal inefficiencies in wealthier receiver nations. 
Similarly, Philippe Le Billon demonstrated (Andrews et al., 2017; Le Billon & Cervantes, 
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2009) that extractive resources are not only the catalyst for corruption, violence and 
human rights abuses in poor countries, but that the political restructuring of these sectors 
during post-conflict recovery periods deepens the divide between political elites and the 
poor. 
However, the geopolitical studies rarely use ethnographic case studies. Therefore, 
such case studies are largely bifurcated between two major areas: non-energy extractive 
landscapes and renewable energy production landscapes, thus leaving a major research 
gap for place-based studies on fossil fuels. On the non-energy side, a critical literature 
has emerged around the integration of new, non-extractive economic activities within 
former or diminished extractive landscapes. Research on indigenous mining (LeClerc & 
Keeling, 2015; Cameron, 2015; Schlosser, 2013) and fishing (Silver, 2014) landscapes in 
the US and Canada has demonstrated how the enrollment of “wastelands” within the 
broader economy has violated local residents’ deeply held traditions of community 
cohesion, common property and local knowledge. In a non-indigenous context, recent 
research in Newfoundland by Mather (Mather, 2013; Foley, Mather & Neis, 2015) has 
argued that the switch from relatively unregulated wild fishing to “scientifically” managed 
fishing and aquaculture has significantly damaged traditional fishers who have neither the 
capital nor technical knowledge to compete against agribusiness. Finally, scholars such 
as Liesch (2014) and Hein and Funyufunyu (2014) have shown that attempts to preserve 
industrial heritage sites as monuments for the descendants of former extractive workers 
have little resonance among their target populations because residents are unable to 
conceive of such spaces outside of the logics of growth and accumulation. In summary, 
the cross-cutting thread in this literature is that the re-invigoration of “unproductive” 
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landscapes is as much about changing the cultural logics of local populations as it is about 
merely introducing new economic infrastructure.  
Renewable energy case studies have largely focused on the struggles between 
groups implementing energy projects (who frequently come from outside of the 
community) and local populations that may be skeptical of them. Recent studies on 
biofuels have concluded that large-scale enabling discourses about climate change, 
green energy and development do not adequately address the struggles inherent in on-
the-ground production, leading to a scalar mismatch between global and national 
perceptions and local realities (Gillon, 2010; Kedron & Bagchi-Sen, 2011; Baka, 2017). 
Studies on topics as varied as wind energy (Brannstrom, Jepson, & Persons, 2011; 
Pasqualetti, 2011; Devine-Wright, 2009), agricultural and forest resources (Newberry, 
2014; Taylor et al., 2011) and hydroelectricity (Dusyk, 2011; Armstrong & Bulkeley, 2014) 
have demonstrated that support or opposition to local energy production is rooted in 
specific cultural values and place-based experiences, rather than a lack of understanding 
about the need for sustainable development or simple opposition to any development 
within one’s own community (referred to as “not in my backyard” or NIMBY). Indeed, in a 
recent study that serves to summarize these themes, Fast et al. (2016) have argued that 
community members base their support of renewable energy projects on four key 
variables, none of which relate directly to sustainability or proximity to development: 1.) 
health and wellbeing; 2.) equitable distribution of financial benefits; 3.) meaningful 
engagement with project managers and stakeholders; and 4.) stakeholders 
understanding and appreciation of landscape concerns. Thus, support or opposition to 
new technologies is far more complex than narrow political or economic concerns, but is 
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strongly tied to notions of place that stakeholders may perceive as being violated by 
outside developers. 
This strong work being done to situate renewable energy within broader economic 
and political contexts, relatively few scholars similarly link local and global processes to 
fossil fuels. Ethnographic studies of fossil fuel energy consumption, which have focused 
on energy consumption at the scales of the household (Cupples, 2011; Harrison & Popke, 
2011; Petrova et al., 2013), community (Llewellyn et al., 2017; A. Smith et al., 2016)  and 
state (Kuby et al., 2011; Walker et al., 2016), tend to be either too locality-centric or fall 
into the oft-lamented trap of labeling local outcomes as manifestations of global neoliberal 
processes (Bridge, 2002; Bakker, 2010; Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010). However, 
recent studies on electricity provision in Europe (Colell & Neumann-Cosel, 2016; 
Bouzarovski & Herrero, 2016) demonstrate how local energy outcomes, both positive and 
negative, can be directly traced to specific policies implemented by governments at the 
continental, state and local levels. 
Outside of the nascent body of case studies of fracking landscapes (to be explored 
in detail in 2.3), fossil fuel production case studies in geography have been limited in 
number. As with non-fossil fuel extractive studies, this research is also bifurcated between 
two major approaches: a more traditional approach examining community level effects on 
labor and economic development, largely in wealthy countries, and a more theory-
oriented approach (known as post-neoliberalism/neo-extractivism) that explores the 
relationship between global political trends and local outcomes in extractive communities 
in the developing world. For the former approach, a small number of case studies examine 
the impacts that economic restructuring in former coal mining regions in China (Hu & 
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Hassink, 2017) and Appalachia (Woods & Gordon, 2011; Douglas & Walker, 2017) has 
had on areas such as employment, economic growth and quality of life. Work on 
traditional oil production landscapes has been similarly sparse, with only a few notable 
examples such as the effects of pipeline construction on indigenous wellbeing in Russia 
(Dallmann, et al., 2011; Yakovleva, 2011) and the long-term effects of oil and gas 
production on a coastal community in Nigeria (Bayode, Adewunmi, & Odunwole, 2011). 
However, an emerging set of authors have begun examining knowledge practices among 
various workers associated with the oil industry and how they rationalize their role in 
perpetuating exploitation of petroleum in light of the effects these have on topics as varied 
as the climate crisis (Asdal, 2014), the wellbeing of their friends and neighbors (J.M. Smith 
& Smith, 2018) and the broader destabilization of the labor movement (Ince et al., 2015). 
Indeed, such questions about the role of official knowledge and its connection to policy 
outcomes is specifically relevant for Chapter 4’s analysis of the role of oil industry 
discourse in selling fracking to North Dakota citizens. 
The second approach to conventional fossil fuels has focused on the growth of 
post-neoliberalism and neo-extractivism. Neo-extractivism supports the deliberate 
exploitation of domestic resource bases in order to avoid the pitfalls of an unstable global 
economy biased against developing countries and is particularly associated with Latin 
American mineral development (Yates & Bakker, 2014; Ruckert, Macdonald & Proulx, 
2017; Bebbington & Bebbington, 2011). Geographers have applied this frame to oil and 
gas in South America, seeking to show how neo-extractivism is simultaneously an 
authoritarian, state-run strategy being used to prop up resurgent left-wing nationalism, 
but also a vehicle through which both extractive workers and anti-petroleum protesters 
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voice their grievances against these very same development narratives (Kaup, 2010; Kohl 
& Farthing, 2012; Valdivia, 2015; Pellegrini & Arismendi, 2012). These multi-faceted 
layers of the neo-extractive paradigm provide a new way forward for geographers seeking 
to describe the relationship between the state, business elites and the ordinary population 
in co-producing the extractive economy.  
In summary, research in geographies of resources and energy provides multiple 
ways to address the connections between resource extraction at the community level and 
larger-scale economic processes. However, each of these sets of literatures has their 
strengths and weaknesses. Geopolitical research on energy has provided a conceptual 
model for examining how the interactions of various elite actors and the policies they put 
in place affect political outcomes across vast physical (and conceptual spaces) and 
among territories with diverse political systems and institutional capacities. Yet one of the 
major problems with these approaches is that they rarely seek to test the veracity of these 
findings using ethnographic case studies that would help to elucidate how policy 
implementation differs across spaces, places and cultures. A model for examining 
fracking landscapes is provided by existing research in renewable energies and certain 
studies on fossil fuel productive and consumptive landscapes. However, one of the major 
pitfalls of these two bodies of literature is that they often fail to link local outcomes to extra-
territorial concerns, or do not convincingly demonstrate how local and global processes 
interact and are modified across spaces and scales. These linkages have been better 
addressed by two other bodies of literature on non-energy extractive landscapes and 
studies of post-neoliberalism in Latin America, both of which pay close attention to the 
ways in which political and policy interventions produce specific outcomes at the 
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community and individual levels. However, as neither of these literatures has yet 
addressed hydraulic fracturing, and with the latter body of literature being largely divorced 
from the political and cultural milieu of first world resource extraction, it is clear that 
applying these approaches to hydraulic fracturing in the Bakken will require a synthesis 
with the positive aspects of the literatures on global geopolitics and case studies of non-
fracking energy landscapes. 
2.3 Social science studies of fracking 
 Hydraulic fracturing has become an increasingly important research topic in both 
the natural and social sciences. Indeed, for the years 2010-2018, Web of Science 
indicates that there were over 33,000 published papers that mentioned “hydraulic 
fracturing” in either their titles, abstracts or keywords, with over 6,800 of these falling 
under the social science category.2 However, geographically this coverage has been 
highly uneven with American shale plays such as the Marcellus (PA/NY) and Barnett (TX) 
each being mentioned in more than 900 total papers and more than 200 social science 
papers, whereas the Bakken has been mentioned in only 324 papers, with 86 of these 
under the social science heading. The Bakken has even received less attention than the 
UK shale deposits, despite the fact that no commercial production has occurred as of 
March 2018 (see Table 2 (p.30) for a complete list of statistics). Themes have developed 
regarding the growth of fracking as a phenomenon and its potential effects on the  
  
                                                 
2 A cursory examination of results under the social science category demonstrates that many articles are 
largely not social-science-based, thus for all searches of hydraulic fracturing and social science, the total 
is likely to be significantly smaller. 
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Academic Articles on Shale, 2010-2018   
Shale Play No. of 
Articles 
No. of Social Science Articles 
Bakken (MT, ND) 324 86 
Barnett (TX) 930 274 
Eagle Ford (TX) 261 70 
Marcellus (NY, PA, OH) 1,206 445 
Netherlands 52 20 
Niobrara (CO, WY) 294 95 
UK 474 142 
Table 2: Academic Articles on Shale 
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economy and environment. This section will briefly review the major strands within the 
fracking literature, concentrating chiefly on social science applications, followed by an 
examination of specific social science studies on the Bakken. This section will then 
conclude by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the social science literature. 
 The vast majority of this literature is either in the fields of petroleum geology, 
engineering and environmental sciences. Within this latter field, fierce debates have 
raged over the safety of hydraulic fracturing for both people and the environment. Among 
the most prominent topics in this field have been concerns over water contamination, air 
quality and the seismic implications of fracking wastewater injection. Although a complete 
review of this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, several key findings from 
highly-cited papers in the field help to condition many of the points of entry for social  
scientists studying fracking. In the former category, the team led by Avner Vengosh 
(Osborn et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2013; Harkness et al., 2017) has been the most 
prominent academic and public source of knowledge (being featured frequently in the 
press and in several television features on fracking). The Vengosh group finds that wells 
located nearer to fracking pad sites are at greater risk for methane contamination. The 
group argues, though, that such contamination cannot be directly linked to the fracking 
process, with accidental spills of wastewater being the most likely culprit. On the air quality 
question several prominent scientific groups have sought to discover whether fracking is 
disproportionately responsible for emissions. Of particular significance are studies by the 
group led by Anthony Ingraffea (Howarth, Santoro, & Ingraffea, 2011; Caulton, et al., 
2014; Howarth, Ingraffea, & Engelder, 2011), which have argued that natural gas 
produced via fracking may have far worse long-term climatic impacts than either coal or 
 32 
 
traditional oil and gas due to a significantly greater methane releases. As far as the 
connection between fracking wastewater disposal and earthquakes, several scholars 
looking largely at disposal sites in Oklahoma have independently found that wastewater 
disposal, in combination with this region’s high existing seismic activity, create large-scale 
seismic activity arising in parallel with the growth of fracking and disposal (Ellsworth,  
2013; Keranen, et al., 2014; McGarr, et al., 2015). 
 While much social scientific research examines fracking within the context of 
broader environmental problems facing populations, the connections to the above-
mentioned natural science studies can be seen in the various issues social scientists have 
focused on in studying fracking. As was the case with literatures on the geographies of 
resources and energy (see Chapter 3.2), social science research on fracking has been 
divided between: 1.) studies on policy, politics and discourses related to fracking and its 
place in the broader political economic landscape; and 2.) place-based studies that focus 
on the effects of fracking-related development on the well-being of local residents. 
Despite this obvious divergence in focus and approach, there are many connections that 
can be drawn between these two groups of research, particularly in their attempts to 
understand how people come to understand fracking and how their feelings about it 
develop over repeated experiences. 
 Policy and political studies are divided into two major camps: 1.) studies examining 
how fracking policies and laws have been enacted; and 2.) studies analyzing how 
discourses impact public opinion. In the former group, much of this work has been focused 
on the discontinuities between fracking-related laws at the federal, state and municipal 
levels. In studies analyzing how various states have amended their laws in response to 
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increased fracking and related externalities, Barry Rabe (Rabe & Borick, 2013; Rabe & 
Hampton, 2016) has argued that the majority of state laws have prioritized the expansion 
of fracking at the expense of the environment. As many of these states are conservative, 
low-tax and spending-averse, attempts to deal with environmental and social externalities 
are dealt with only after mitigation funds can be raised through oil and gas-related taxes. 
This pattern of fracking first, environment second has also been found at the local levels 
by scholars working in areas such as British Columbia (Stephenson, Doukas, & Shaw, 
2015), the Barnett Shale in Texas (Fry, 2013) and Colorado (J.J. Cook, 2015), all of whom 
have described powerful actors connected to either the oil and gas industry, various 
branches of government, or both, being able to dominate the decision-making process 
due to their stronger relationships with policy-responsible elected officials and 
bureaucrats. However, noted exception to these rules can be found in studies on the 
negotiations over strict setback distances in Dallas, TX (Fry, Brannstrom, & Murphy, 
2015), the fracking ban in New York (Dodge & Lee, 2017) and environmentally-focused 
rule-making in the Netherlands (Metze, 2017), all of which found that cultures of greater 
participation by the public, which largely took an anti-fracking stance, ultimately swayed 
lawmakers to adopt policies generally opposed by the industry. 
 Given these major controversies between oil and gas laws across scales and 
spaces, scholars have also undertaken comparative studies examining the discontinuities 
and controversies that such differences have created. J.J. Cook’s studies comparing 
policies among Wyoming, Colorado, Ohio, New York and Louisiana (J.J. Cook, 2014; 
Rinfret, Cook, & Pautz, 2014) have found that regardless of political character, states 
where independent public service regulators have greater influence over rules 
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propagation have less stringent and less environmentally-minded fracking policies, 
whereas states with stronger participation from governors and state legislatures tend to 
adopt rules designed to protect the environment. Similar studies looking at the provinces 
of Canada (Carter & Eaton, 2016; Carter, Fraser, & Zalik, 2017) and the differing fates of 
post-socialist Poland and Bulgaria (Goldthau & Labelle, 2016) have argued that the 
marshalling of strong pro-extractive narratives has allowed for the growth of hydraulic 
fracturing and the withering of environmental protection, regardless of which government 
bodies or regulators have the greatest amount of power, with the opposite being true in 
states with weak narratives or strong anti-fracking activism. All of these conflicts over 
values and regulatory authority have led scholars in the field of energy federalism to argue 
that effective, harmonious regulation of fracking is impossible, due to the existence of 
overlapping, often contradictory, laws and rules that create a complicated legal and 
operational environment for government, industry and activists alike (Rabe, 2014; Warner 
& Shapiro, 2014; Davis, 2014). 
 While policy studies have examined the views and roles of various governance 
actors, media analysis and public opinion studies have examined what non-involved 
individuals and groups think about fracking and how they discuss it in public forums. 
Media analysis, focused chiefly on newspapers, demonstrates which actors (elite and 
general public) dominate and control debates and how specific discourses come to 
dominate. Research from national-level newspaper and public relations campaigns in the 
US and European context has found that debates are dominated by media and political 
elites, with these actors seeking not to impart scientific knowledge about fracking, but 
instead reporting facts selectively and emphasizing specific ideas so as to conform to the 
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anticipated political views of their intended audiences (Mazur, 2016; Olive, 2016; Jaspal 
& Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal, Nerlich, & Lemancyzk, 2014). Research examining local 
newspaper in extractive zones, almost exclusively in the US context, has found that states 
that are both more politically liberal overall and in which local governments have stronger 
regulatory authority tend to have more critical coverage of fracking, as well as greater 
participation in public debates about the subject (Arnold & Holahan, 2014; Blair, et al., 
2015; M.F. Smith & Ferguson, 2013). Additionally, in these states fracking is framed as a 
more holistic sociocultural, economic and environmental issue, whereas in conservative, 
centralized states it is viewed almost exclusively in economic terms (Ashmoore, et al., 
2016). Indeed, despite the varied nature of participation in the fracking coverage 
landscape, the major finding from this body of research is that elites play a major role in 
shaping discourses and attempting to influence public opinion, a major factor in our next 
body of literature, a factor which is explored in detail in Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
dissertation, and to a lesser degree in Chapter 6. 
 Public opinion research on fracking has been divided between those reliant 
national or regional polling and those that seek to gauge support/opposition at the local 
level using targeted surveys, often, though not always, supplemented by some follow-up 
interviews with respondents. Among these larger-scale studies, the most prominent 
results have come from a national telephone survey (n=1,061) conducted by a research 
group led by Christopher Clarke (Boudet, et al., 2014; Clarke, Hart, & Schuldt, et al., 2015; 
Clarke, Bugden, & Hart, et al., 2016). These studies find that support for fracking is 
strongly correlated with proximity to active extraction, exposure to media about the 
subject, gender, education and political views. Additionally, this survey found that 
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residents were more likely to support fracking when it was referred to as “unconventional 
oil and gas development” rather than “fracking”, a word to which many respondents had 
a negative reaction. Similar findings were found by Davis and Fisk (2014) in their analysis 
of a University of Texas survey (n=2,400), with the additional finding that those who 
viewed fracking primarily as an environmental issue were among the strongest 
opponents, whereas those that viewed it largely as an economic issue were strong 
supporters, thus mirroring findings from above-mentioned newspaper studies. 
 Localized opinion studies, however, have been slightly more nuanced, attempting 
to gauge support or opposition to specific aspects of fracking development, rather than 
the concept as a whole or in the abstract. These studies have been largely situated within 
the boomtown framework popular in rural sociology and environmental psychology, which 
seeks to measure social disruption due to economic boom activities, with close attention 
paid to the effects of crime and disorder and the weakening of social ties on local 
residents’ wellbeing (Freudenberg, 1981, 1986; England and Albrecht, 1984). Gene 
Theodori has conducted a series of surveys on local residents’ opinions of fracking in the 
Barnett, Eagle Ford and Marcellus Shales of Texas and Pennsylvania, examining issues 
as diverse as general awareness of fracking, understanding about fracking and water use 
and residents’ likelihood to engage in opposition to fracking (Theodori, 2012, 2013; Willits, 
Theodori, & Luloff, 2016; Theodori & Ellis, 2017). The majority of his findings have 
mirrored those from national surveys, however, these studies have also most significantly 
discovered that those living in areas with a longer history of oil and gas tend to be both 
more educated about oil and gas technologies, as well as being more strongly opposed 
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to the industry than those living in newer fracking areas, who are more likely to support 
the industry due to optimism over the potential for economic growth. 
Another prolific contributor to this literature has been Jeffrey Jacquet, whose 
research has been focused in the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania and New York 
(Brasier, et al., 2011; Jacquet, 2012; Jacquet & Stedman, 2013). In addition to many of 
the standard findings, Jacquet has also sought to broaden the discourse by focusing on 
specific stakeholder groups in the fracking debate, including landowners and public 
officials. In particular, Jacquet has been one of the few scholars who has sought to 
examine fracking within the broader context of energy transitions, specifically examining 
the conflicts between wind energy and fracking in Western Pennsylvania, and the 
markedly different reactions stakeholders have had to each phenomenon. Also, Jacquet 
has sought to supplement his survey work with a broad array of ethnographic studies in 
the same areas in which surveys were conducted, thus providing specific context to his 
discoveries. It is this attempt to connect these discursive issues to on-the-ground 
occurrences that brings us to our next body of literature: ethnographic case studies of 
fracking. 
 While existing localized surveys have provided a broad overview of individuals’ 
feelings about fracking and have moved beyond the simple support/denial framework of 
national studies, they have often done a poor job of integrating local cultural factors into 
their work and have often not sought to engage with social theories outside of the 
boomtown framework. Additionally, overreliance on large-n survey design has often 
proved an inherently limiting method of inquiry, as there is not much opportunity for 
respondents to explain their beliefs or to discuss topics outside of the survey’s 
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parameters. For example, Theodori’s (2013) study which sought to divine opposition to 
fracking solely in terms of “civic actions” such as writing letters to local officials. Attempts 
to remedy these issues have been made by ethnographic studies of fracking 
communities, with the studies also being divided along two major axes: 1.) studies 
concerned with activism; and 2.) studies concerned with the impacts of fracking on people 
and the environment. Within the activism frame, many scholars have sought to determine 
how and why citizens become members of the movement (or in notable cases, a counter-
movement). Several scholars have sought to demonstrate how individuals become 
fracking opponents through participation in citizen science, the enlistment of amateurs in 
the collection of scientific data often as a tool for education and public engagement, but 
increasingly for activist purposes (Ottinger, 2010). These citizen science studies, then, 
provide a direct link between professional scientific environmental monitoring mentioned 
above and place-based studies of extraction. Research by Abby Kinchy (Kinchy, Jalbert 
and Lyons, 2014; Jalbert, Kinchy, & Perry, 2014; Kinchy 2017)  on participatory water 
monitoring in the Marcellus Shale has found that the decades long tradition of citizens 
gathering data for other activist causes has allowed for an easy transition to doing to so 
for fracking, given the existence of a trained motivated body of volunteers. However, they 
have argued that the divergent organizational character and objectives of various water 
monitoring organizations has led to a disorganized landscape that has had trouble 
convincing skeptical policy makers of the purportedly actionable results of their findings. 
Similarly, case studies of attempts at collaborative socioeconomic monitoring of the 
effects of natural gas development in Wyoming have found that while citizen participation 
in “adaptive management” was initially welcomed by federal and local regulators, political 
 39 
 
disagreements between citizen groups, as well a shift in the preference of regulators for 
rapid permitting expansion to facilitate revenue, ultimately caused the groups’ efforts to 
be fruitless (Benson, 2009; Haggerty & McBride, 2016). On a more positive note, Zilliox 
and Smith (2018) have found that the demonization of citizen scientists by regulators and 
unfriendly politicians contributed to a raised level of consciousness that allowed for anti-
fracking political candidates to gain ground. This is perhaps the only example from this 
literature of citizen science having a distinct impact on fracking governance. 
 While citizen science studies have shown how many residents initially become 
interested in activism, all of the above authors carefully note that many organizations and 
participants often seek to frame themselves as apolitical or interested solely in mitigating 
instances of negative externalities, rather than opposing fracking and related 
development itself. Filling this gap are the many studies of the growth of anti-fracking 
movements in affected areas. Several studies focus on the existence and politicization of 
landowner coalitions, especially those in the Marcellus and Utica Shales. Dokshin (2016) 
and Walsh, Bird, & Heintzelman (2015) have found that New York-based landowner 
coalitions, which have historically pursued conservative, pro-development goals, were 
motivated to become public fracking supporters due to the perception that urban liberals 
were attempting to block fracking in order to ruin rural livelihoods. Conversely, Simonelli 
(2014) and Jacquet and Stedman (2011) have argued that many conservative 
landowners who have historically been skeptical of liberalism or environmentalism have 
joined forces with more liberal groups due to concerns that allowing fracking would ruin 
their ability to productively exercise their property rights.  
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While there are many studies outside the landowner frame, one of the most 
comprehensive is Adam Briggle’s A Field Philosopher’s Guide to Fracking (2015). Briggle 
traces his and others’ evolution from knowing nearly nothing about fracking to eventually 
spearheading the eventually overturned ban on fracking in Denton, Texas (Barnett 
Shale). Along the way, Briggle begins to realize the broader connections between his 
anti-fracking activism and broader struggles against neoliberalism. Further studies from 
Australia (Mercer, de Rijke, & Dressler, 2014) and Wisconsin (Pearson, 2013) have 
shown a similar trajectory, finding that many groups that begin as hodgepodge coalitions 
of strange political bedfellows often connect themselves to other activist groups and make 
themselves more politically relevant by purposely framing themselves as part of larger 
environmental or anti-neoliberal movements. 
 Yet while activist studies shed powerful light on how politics and identity interact to 
form supportive or oppositional subjectivities, they do not focus on the majority of 
residents who do not become politically involved. This often leads to a shallow 
investigation of cultural and economic factors by reducing fracking-related struggles to 
narrow struggles over property rights and environmentalism, the latter of which many rural 
residents often regard with suspicion (Haggerty, 2007). Addressing this “forgotten” 
population are a host of studies examining the effects of fracking and development on 
individual residents in boomtowns, of which we will review several that are most useful to 
this dissertation.  
The first major approach has been to study regulators, political figures and 
economic elites and their role in the local governance of fracking. Studies of this kind from 
largely rural areas including Texas’ Eagle Ford Shale (Ellis, et al., 2017; Murphy, et al., 
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2018), the Marcellus Shale (Schafft, et al., 2014), Louisiana’s Haynesville Shale (Ladd, 
2013) and the New Albany Shale in Illinois and Kentucky (Silva & Crowe, 2015) have 
found that while fracking is often viewed as a major pathway for development, rural elites 
are frustrated by the inability to make impactful regulatory decisions  about the process 
and by externalities that force them to expend more of their already over-stretched 
budgets and service resources. Schafft et al. (2014) argue that these common concerns 
across shale plays can be described as “decision making dilemmas” that “occur in the 
context of incomplete information and rapid, unpredictable community change involving 
the emergence of both new opportunities and new insecurities” (p. 389). Indeed, Ellis et 
al. (2017) have demonstrated mostly politically conservative elites in rural areas are in a 
tremendous bind in that they often personally want to slow or stop development, yet 
cannot publicly do so due to the political consequences. Such ambivalent feelings can be 
seen in the responses included in Chapter 6, in which many avowedly conservative 
respondents argue that they preferred the social landscape of the pre-boom days, yet feel 
conflicted about having such attitudes due to their divergence from the acceptable pro-
growth culture of the Bakken. 
A second major theme in these case studies has been how individuals cope with 
the physical and emotional trauma caused by fracking boomtown disruption. Studies from 
the Marcellus Shale, the UK and Alberta have sought to examine topics as varied as 
bullying (Perry, 2012), the potential relationship between fracking chemicals and poor 
health outcomes (Finewood & Stroup, 2012; Davidson, 2017; McHenry, 2017) and the 
ways in which fracking is viewed as yet another form of dispossession and 
disempowerment in depressed, former coal-mining (Hudgins, 2013; Malin, 2014; Short & 
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Szolucha, 2017) and agricultural (Wright, Muma, & Radebaugh, 2016) regions. Among 
the major advances in these studies over existing ethnographic studies is examination of 
fracking from the perspective of people without significant ties to the oil and gas apparatus 
either as employees, regulators or economically-involved local officials and elites. Much 
of this work has focused on marginalized groups that are often neglected in qualitative 
fieldwork more generally, such as women, the elderly and those living in poverty. 
McHenry’s (2017) study of explicitly-identified working class mothers in the Marcellus 
Shale and Wright, Muma and Radebaugh’s (2016) study of nursing home residents in a 
Kansas farming community representing particularly novel approaches to the 
ethnography of fracking landscapes. These latter two approaches are of particular 
relevance to this dissertation as the majority of respondents were elderly and a sizable 
minority were of modest economic means. 
Finally, a small body of work has begun to look at the relationship between fracking 
and agricultural landscapes. In addition to the above-mentioned Kansas study (Wright, 
Muma, & Radebaugh, 2016), studies on the risks that fracking poses to agriculture have 
been conducted in the Marcellus (Perry, 2011; Poulsen, et al., 2018) and Australia (de 
Rijke, 2013) finding that hydraulic fracturing poses both benefits (in the form of potential 
revenue from royalties and increased local investment by developers) as well as risks 
(fears of contamination, rising costs and competition for land use and transportation 
resources) for agricultural stakeholders and community members. These findings are of 
particular salience to this dissertation as agriculture is the largest sector of the Bakken 
economy and is identified by both elite and non-elite respondents as needing protection 
from economic and environmental challenges posed by fracking. 
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While adequately summarizing the entire breadth of each of these bodies that 
make up the collective literature on social science studies of fracking cannot be done in 
a single chapter, several major themes, as well as benefits and drawbacks can be 
identified. First, literature examining fracking discourses, policy and opinion does an 
excellent job of identifying the broad swath of issues and emotions that animate and 
condition discussions and political actions taken regarding fracking at various scales and 
spaces. These studies also help to connect fracking to broader debates regarding global 
geopolitics, the environment and economic development in the contemporary 
neoliberalized landscape. However, this broad span is also a major weakness of these 
studies, which often simplify issues that are often complex and varying across different 
cultural landscapes. Moreover, these studies also have a bias toward national scales and 
often make little distinction between the opinions of those living in extractive zones and 
those outside of them. Place-based studies do much to address these specific 
shortcomings of non-ethnographic studies, painting rich pictures of the diverse 
landscapes and cultural milieus in which fracking is occurring, as well as helping to 
contextualize fracking within local development pathways. However, this place specificity 
also tends toward a rather myopic focus on the local impacts of fracking and often does 
not satisfactorily connect these local outcomes to broader economic and political shifts, 
many of which are explicitly identified in the aforementioned discursive studies. Similarly, 
despite a few notable exceptions, the overreliance on the boomtown sociology framework 
leads to a lack of engagement with literatures on subjectivity (see 2.4), as well as with 
social theory more generally. Additionally, despite the existence of an emerging body of 
strong case studies of non-politicized fracking communities, there is a significant bias in 
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the overall literature toward the activist frame. Activist residents almost certainly do not 
comprise the majority of residents living in shale landscapes and in more conservative 
regions such as the Bakken activism is a negligible part of the overall social landscape. 
Although rectifying all of these issues in a single dissertation is not feasible, this 
dissertation addresses these notable gaps in several ways. First, it situates the Bakken 
within the broader political situation in which fracking occurs, paying specific attention to 
the ways in which discourses seek to appeal to national and global concerns (Chapter 4). 
Second, it critically examines how discourses are used, challenged and modified by a 
broad swath of stakeholders beyond elites (Chapter 5). Finally, it will seek to connect the 
issues from Chapters 4 and 5 in Chapter 6, which examines the opinions of non-activist 
residents in Minot, a Bakken boomtown at the crossroads of the agriculture and energy 
industries. 
2.4 Environmental subjectivities and natural resources  
Notions of how people come to view themselves, their surroundings, and their 
endeavors have long been key concerns within environmental social science. Traditional 
studies based in community sociology have historically focused on decline in community 
cohesion and social ties in “disrupted” communities due to residents’ confusion about 
whom to trust in unfamiliar social landscapes (Erikson, 1976; Jobes, 1987). However, 
more recent theories of the subject under globalization have demonstrated that 
subjectivity, rather than being a stable object changing only under specific stresses, is 
often a complex process in which identities are constantly re-worked and re-negotiated 
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due to rapid technological and social changes taking place in far more precarious work 
and life milieus (Cuppini, Frapporti and Pirone, 2015; Williamson, 2012). In response to 
this changing reality, scholars have drawn on the work of subjectivity theorists such as 
Foucault, Butler and Althusser to build new ways to examine “environmental subjects” in 
an era of increasingly contentious environmental politics centered on issues such as 
large-scale land grabbing and climate change (Aldrich, 2012; Borras, et al., 2011). 
Building specifically on the work of Foucault, Luke (1995) and Agrawal (2005) have 
argued that subject positions are produced through encounters with the environment 
mediated by “technologies of government” that constrain the acceptable choices and 
behaviors toward said environments in favor of outcomes that benefit elite agendas. 
However, as a counterpoint to this top-down “environmentality” narrative, researchers 
such as Robbins (2007) and Cepek (2011) have posited that changes in individual 
subjectivities (and the resulting environmental outcomes) are part of a complex and 
intertwined relationship between political economic processes, place-based cultural 
atmospheres and the landscape itself. Despite these competing outcomes, the main 
thrust of such subjectivity-centric approaches has been to show that specific experience 
with the environment, rather than solely exposure to ideology, plays a major role in 
determining individual and collective subjectivities in changing landscapes.  
Scholarship on environmental subjectivity related to natural resources has largely 
been split between two major areas of inquiry: 1.) livelihood struggles in the developing 
world related to economic restructuring around new forms of resource production; and 2.) 
studies of attitudes toward risk and benefits of production landscapes in the developed 
world.  Indeed, many of the struggles in the former category are especially contentious 
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due to being part-and-parcel of larger issues related to subsistence, traditional ways of 
life and marginalization. Scholars working on renewable energy production in developing 
countries have consistently shown that target populations are often forced to reconcile 
newer Western methods of environmental management with traditional frameworks, thus 
creating identity conflicts.  
Such contradictions have been particularly acute in post-neoliberal environments, 
in which nationalist governments have sought to demarcate appropriate forms of behavior 
for citizens in relation to resource and energy production projects, which are increasingly 
framed as collective enterprises for national improvement. Work on African oil landscapes 
has shown how petrocitizenship is increasingly associated with conservative social 
values, with authoritarian governments seeking to frame behaviors such as sex work, 
informal economic activity and labor, gender and minority rights advocacy as deviant, and 
therefore worthy of violent repression in order to create the stability necessary for proper 
resource exploitation (Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Holterman, 2014; Adusah-Karikari, 2015). In 
Latin American neo-extractive landscapes, traditions of mass demonstration and protest 
have made government control over behavior far more difficult. Focusing on similar 
indigenous conflicts over mining and oil and gas in Ecuador (Valdivia, 2008; Davidov, 
2013; van Teijlingen, 2016) and Peru (McDonell, 2015; Jenkins, 2015), several scholars 
have argued that environmental citizenship and/or petrocitizenship mean different things 
to “progressive” national governments and their business allies and to “environmentalist” 
protesters, the majority of whom are indigenous and thus already possess an antagonistic 
relationship with existing structures of authority. Svampa (2015) has argued that post-
neoliberalism is in fact a continuation of decades (and in some cases centuries) long 
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efforts on the part of White/Mestizo central governments to dispossess vulnerable 
residents of their right to land and subsistence resources in a quest to chart courses 
independent of “Washington consensus” capitalism. Indeed, in each of these authors’ 
cases, popular left-wing (and supposedly pro-environment) government officials have 
been willing to bypass existing agreements to protect both the environment and the rights 
of indigenous peoples in the name of achieving progress, whereas protestors have sought 
to re-articulate their citizenship as one focused on environmental protection as more 
important than temporary economic growth. 
Such attitudes on the part of marginalized peoples have also been prominent in 
the limited body of studies on subjectivity in subsistence, mining and/or renewables 
production landscapes in other parts of the developing world. Research from landscapes 
as diverse as timber harvesting in India (Singh, 2013; Fischer and Chhatre, 2013), 
biofuels/smallholder conflicts in Brazil (Newberry, 2013), mining in the South Pacific 
(Horowitz, 2010; Sing, 2015) and water management in Paraguay (Ward, 2013) have 
shown that conflict between states and corporations on the one hand and affected citizens 
on the other results from attempts to impose new technologies on unwilling populaces in 
the name of sustainability. However, affected citizens often choose not to comply fully 
with these projects because they feel that their existing practices are often better at 
meeting these goals. Additionally, researchers have argued that rather than merely 
accepting or rejecting projects out of hand, marginalized citizens have often adapted 
specific technologies strategically in order to bolster their own livelihood prospects. 
Indeed, as described by Lord (2014) in his work on hydropower, nationalism and 
modernization in contemporary Nepal, residents see such development projects as 
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“aspirational projects where millions … are differently seeking well-being … within 
alternative futures and imaginaries … that are disparately formed and variably contested” 
(p. 117). Thus, while such projects can be viewed as a challenge to traditional livelihoods 
and knowledges, residents often view them as a chance to reassert their own identities 
vis-à-vis the state and politics and to potentially use these opportunities for advancement. 
For residents in renewable and/or low-carbon energy landscapes in developed 
countries, though, such projects often represent not so much a chance at livelihood 
transformation, but are viewed more in terms of the risks and benefits they pose to quality 
of life in their communities and to economic growth or decline. Recent research examining 
wind power in West Texas (Jepson, Brannstrom and Persons, 2012), nuclear plants in 
the UK (Parkhill, et al., 2010) and farmers engaging in voluntary planting of bioenergy 
crops (Cope, McLafferty and Rhoads, 2011) has argued that residents in these 
landscapes display a form of environmental skepticism in which they disavow the 
sustainability goals of such projects and reject environmentalism, yet at the same time 
enthusiastically embrace the economic benefits these projects provide for them and their 
communities. Additionally, residents often viewed such projects as among the most viable 
pathways for economic growth, as they believe traditional, fossil-fuel-reliant industries will 
be made redundant due to an eventual transition towards renewable energy (see also 
Haggerty, 2007). Yet on the other hand, scholars examining projects as varied as 
hydroelectricity (Armstrong and Bulkeley, 2014), wind (Devine-Wright and Howes, 2010; 
Pasqualetti, 2011), biofuels (Gillon, 2010) and solar (Mulvaney, 2017) have found that 
when residents do support the environmental goals of renewable energy (and often 
champion said projects in other communities or in the abstract), they often oppose local 
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development due to fears of social disruption, marring of the aesthetic beauty or 
recreational capacity of the landscape or the decline of existing productive landscape 
uses (especially farming). However, in contrast to both environmental skeptic project 
supporters and environmentalist project opponents, it has been argued that residents in 
affected communities are easily swayed by arguments made in local media and by 
prominent supporters and detractors of low-carbon projects. Residents thus may choose 
to support or oppose development on the grounds of doing their proper civic duty, 
regardless of their personal feelings about the type of project being pursued or concerns 
about the ethics or outcomes of any one specific project (Walker, et al., 2010; Delshad 
and Raymond, 2013). Despite the potential contradictions between these three major 
research findings, a major conclusion of this body of literature is that while it may be easy 
to convince residents that energy development can support both economic or 
environmental goals in the abstract, it is more difficult to convince residents to accept 
specific projects in their communities if they feel there lifestyles or autonomy may be 
compromised. 
Subjectivities research in non-renewable extractive landscapes in the developed 
world has been more limited than either neo-extractivist countries or in renewable 
landscapes around the world. However, these studies tend to be more directly related to 
behavioral change, rather than acceptance or resistance to projects, perhaps due to the 
tangible social and environmental disruptions inherent in large-scale subsurface 
extraction (Bridge, 2004; England and Albrecht, 1984). Indeed, change is one of the pre-
eminent features of much of this work, as it is often focused on legacy extractive areas 
undergoing re-invigoration through new extractive processes and technologies. Research 
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from such disparate places as coal mines in Australia (Abrahamson and Somerville, 2007; 
LaPlonge and Albury, 2013), rural logging towns in British Columbia (Coen, et al., 2013) 
and offshore oil platforms in the United States (Austin, 2018) has found that older, male 
workers with conservative social values have often become the strongest advocates for 
industrial expansion and against health and safety regulations, as they view changes to 
the status quo (beneficial though they might be) as a slippery slope towards the 
destruction of their economic and social privilege. Similar masculine tropes as justification 
for continued extractivism in the face of contemporary political shifts is also found in 
studies on oil and gas conflicts in Mexico (Quist and Rinne, 2017), mining in the Western 
U.S. and Canada (Jensen-Ryan, 2014; Phillips, 2014; McAllister, Fitzpatrick and 
Fonseca, 2014) and hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania (Hudgins, 2013; Filteau, 2015). 
In each of these cases, notions of rugged masculinity and independence in labor pursuits, 
as well as appeals to extractive regimes as integral to traditional, nuclear social order in 
rural communities, were cited by residents and corporate project boosters alike as the 
main reasons why continued extraction is the only possible economic pathway for 
economically disadvantaged regions, even when other safer, more equitable alternatives 
might be available. However, a strong counterpoint to these masculinized appeals is 
found in Willow’s work on anti-fracking activism in Ohio (Willow, et al., 2014; Willow and 
Keefer, 2015), in which largely middle-class women frame themselves as guardians 
against the slide into boorish, working-class masculinity and community and 
environmental breakdown that they feel the growth of hydraulic fracturing represents. To 
summarize, this rather divided literature on subjectivity in traditional extractive landscapes 
in the developed world demonstrates the cultural embeddedness of productivist values. 
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Residents of all backgrounds view extraction in terms of both its potential positive and 
negative effects on the economy, environment and society, but also in terms of the 
psychological outcomes of its continued existence or withdrawal. Indeed, such themes 
will be particularly evident in Chapter 6, which discusses the deep-seated fears that many 
residents of Minot have about the economic decline that the end of the Bakken boom will 
have on their communities, despite the fact that many respondents were ardent 
opponents of boom-related disruption and romanticizing the “clean life” of the pre-Boom 
days. 
In summary, literatures on subjectivity in natural resource landscapes provides us 
with multiple avenues from which to understand the complex interplay between behavior, 
ideology and the physical environment. However, each of these literatures have strengths 
and weaknesses. Research in the neo-extractivist vein has provided a framework for 
demonstrating how extractive conflicts often exist alongside (or are seen as extensions 
of) existing struggles over land tenure, representation and traditional ways of life, among 
others. Additionally, this literature has demonstrated the powerful ways in which state 
authority seeks to demarcate appropriate behavior and in some cases, even directly 
intervene in citizens’ lives to enforce such boundaries. Yet the major downsides of this 
research are twofold: 1.) this literature is often heavily focused on group identity claims 
and often pays little attention to individual behaviors (perhaps a luxury that many in 
livelihood struggles do not have time to reflect on) and 2.) There is a heavy focus on 
protest and resistance, with the views of either non-activist or disaffected citizens 
receiving little attention. Each of these issues are remedied to some degree by the 
literatures on renewables and non-renewables in the developing world, as each of these 
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lines of inquiry pays close attention to both individual and collective grievances against 
specific production projects. It is, though, this major focus on specific grievances rooted 
in local cultures that often causes many studies under these rubrics to succumb to the 
opposite problem of neo-extractive literatures: a lack of connection with broader political 
and economic processes that often create the conditions necessary for localized forms of 
extraction. Although this dissertation does not seek to argue that local instances of 
extraction are simply manifestations of global neoliberalism or capitalism (the folly of 
which is discussed in Chapter 2.2), it is important to balance the roles that both local 
culture and larger-scale discourses play in determining on-the-ground experiences and 
behaviors, an attempt at which is made in Chapter 4’s explication of the Homo Dakoticus 
concept. 
Two other important shortcomings of the overall body of environmental subjectivity 
case study literature are: 1.) much of this literature falls into the classic political ecology 
trap of viewing the environment as merely an arena where political disputes play out, 
rather than as an important element in its own right (see Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003); 
and 2.) with notable exceptions, the vast majority of case studies make only passing 
mentions to theoretical innovators such as Agrawal and Luke (and to a lesser extent, 
Foucault) and do not attempt to engage with many of the foundational social theorists that 
have expounded on subjectivity outside of the environmental realm. While addressing 
each of these issues is beyond the scope of this dissertation, doing so will be important 
for moving environmental subjectivity forward as an important theoretical and analytical 
tool. Therefore, potential pathways for doing so will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
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2.5 Bakken case studies 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, social science research in the Bakken is extremely 
limited. These literatures can be broadly separated into two major categories: 1.) 
confessional and artistic non-fiction writing that frames the emotional toll that fracking has 
taken on residents who long for the “clean” North Dakota of pre-boom days; and 2.) 
ethnographic case studies of fracking impacts in local Bakken communities. While each 
of these bodies of literature are strongly in-tune with the specific cultural milieu of North 
Dakota, as we will see in our brief overview, they largely replicate many of the same 
problems that can be seen in place-based studies of fracking that have been conducted 
in other regions. 
 In the artistic/confessional genre three major books standout: Lisa Westberg 
Peters’ Fractured Land: The Price of Inheriting Oil (2014), Richard Edwards’ Natives of a 
Dry Place: Stories of Dakota before the Oil Boom (2015) and Taylor Brorby and Stephanie 
Brook Trout’s edited volume Fracture: Essays, Poems, and Stories on Fracking in 
America. Peters, a self-described liberal bookstore owner from Minneapolis, writes of the 
moral conundrum she faced after inheriting thousands of acres of Bakken mineral rights 
upon her father’s death: how can a committed environmentalist reconcile her personal 
politics with the newfound prosperity that oil royalties have brought her? Although the 
book is somewhat limited by its confusing, non-linear organization and rambling stream-
of-consciousness narration, Peters’ diaries of her travels across North Dakota in search 
of answers to her major question provide stronger empirical evidence about the social 
impacts of the fracking boom than can be found in the majority of existing academic 
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studies. Similarly strong work is done by the career academic economist Edwards, whose 
humorous collection of folksy aphorisms and rural anecdotes provides one of the more 
concise depictions of the rural culture that underpins the North Dakota Way discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. However, the book is clearly pitched at a nostalgic, 
regional audience, as the majority of the book is filled with arcane cultural references 
unintelligible to Dakota outsiders, with Edwards additionally making little effort to 
contextualize these stories in the present context beyond wistful pronouncements about 
Dakota life being changed forever. A more explicitly politicized and contextualized take 
on fracking is provided by Brorby and Trout, whose book ranges from abstract feminist 
poetry to polemics from leading environmentalists such as Bill McKibben. While the book 
is often a strangely juxtaposed mélange of disconnected narratives (the majority of which 
do not discuss North Dakota). Bakken specific selections by Brorby and other Dakota 
natives, however, provide a strong psychological meditation on the complicated emotions 
of watching one’s homeland be rendered unrecognizable through development and 
cultural change. Although such pieces are not written for academic audiences and do not 
engage with social theory, they deeply engage with subjectivity in a fashion untypical of 
most social science pieces on natural resources. 
 Explicitly academic social science studies of the Bakken are particularly rare, 
totaling slightly more than two dozen articles and book chapters. The most cited existing 
studies have come from either social work on criminology and have sought to examine 
how the Bakken has placed strains on limited rural social services (Weber, Geigle, & 
Barkdull, 2014; Archbold, Dahle, & Jordan, 2014; O’Connor, 2017). However, these 
studies are all narrowly focused on economic concerns and policy recommendations, 
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largely ignoring broader cultural issues and making limited attempts to connect these 
struggles to broader political themes. More substantive interventions are provided by Felix 
Fernando and in an edited volume by William Caraher and Kyle Conway. In a series of 
papers based on more than 100 in-depth interviews conducted among Bakken residents 
(Junod, et al., 2018; Fernando & Cooley, 2016a, b), Fernando has addressed all of the 
stereotypical hallmarks of fracking boom landscapes: residents opinions of the boom, elite 
stakeholders governance concerns, quality of life issues created by disruption, etc. These 
studies are among the only extant examples of long-term ethnographic research being 
conducted in the Bakken, and help to provide a strong picture of both the on-the-ground 
impacts of the boom, as well as a strong connection to the local culture not present in 
social work and criminological studies. Yet despite breaking new ground geographically, 
these studies, all of which employ the boomtown sociology framework, read almost 
identically to similar studies in the same vein from other shale plays. Crucially, these 
studies neither seek to frame the Bakken within larger political and environmental 
systems, nor do they engage with social theory in novel ways.  
Caraher and Conway’s The Bakken goes Boom: Oil and the Changing 
Geographies of Western North Dakota (2016), however, remedies both of these major 
issues. The editors explicitly argue in their introduction that economic processes in the 
Bakken, including the globalization of agriculture and the growth of the oil and gas 
industry, are the direct result of North Dakota’s entanglement in global capitalism. 
Although the rest of the volume is uneven due to being split between theory-informed 
case studies and confessional/artistic pieces, the case studies chapters not only show 
evidence of deep engagement with the social particularities of the Bakken, but also apply 
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theory from a host of social science and humanities disciplines while also examining 
several uncommon topics in the existing literature such as the resource curse, domestic 
violence, sex trafficking and women’s health. These studies serve as a foundation for this 
dissertation by seeking to move beyond many of the pitfalls that have plagued existing 
research on the community impacts of fracking development. 
 Although the existing literature on the Bakken is both sparse and often suffers from 
some of the same flaws found in fracking studies conducted in other areas, this literature 
provides several key findings that inform this dissertation’s approach. First, North Dakota 
has not attracted the scholarly attention of other shale plays, thus there is much work to 
be done as far as elucidating its specific cultural milieu as well as how fracking-based 
development has been operationalized versus in other plays. Second, North Dakota’s 
extra-territorial political relationships are quite different from those of shale states in 
Appalachia and the US South, leading to a different set of important local and geopolitical 
issues than are found in plays such as the Marcellus or Eagle Ford. Finally, although the 
oil and gas has been produced in North Dakota for more than six decades, unlike in shale 
boom regions in more traditional oil and gas states such as Texas and Colorado, the 
industry has not been a major economic player in the region until the present boom. Thus, 
residents’ reactions to the fracking boom are likely to be different from residents in other 
plays who may have a longer history of interactions with oil and gas development. 
2.6 Summary of key findings from the literature 
 While there are many findings from this literature, there are several strengths and 
weaknesses that are particularly relevant to the content of this dissertation. In 
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geographies of natural resources (Chapter 3.2), the main strengths are: 1.) Geopolitical 
studies provide a strong framework for exploring how extraction is conditioned by 
broader-scale political and economic forces; 2.) Case studies of renewable energy do an 
excellent job of describing how energy is operationalized in specific places; and 3.) Neo-
extractivism is a model that provides a pathway for integrating geopolitical concerns 
alongside place-based phenomena. The weaknesses of natural resource geographies 
are: 1.) Case study approaches often fail to link local outcomes to broader processes 
identified in the geopolitics literature; 2.) With notable exceptions, case studies 
approaches are absent for fossil fuel production landscapes; and 3.) With notable 
exceptions, energy production case studies do not engage with theories of subjectivity. 
 For social studies of fracking, the main strengths are: 1.) Policy and opinion studies 
provide a broad overview of political issues related to fracking; 2.) Case studies provide 
rich empirical detail and analysis of local cultural contexts in which extraction occurs; and 
3.) Scholars have made a strong case for viewing fracking in combination with other 
issues related to rurality such as agriculture, social isolation and revenue struggles. The 
main weaknesses of this literature are: 1.) With notable exception, scholars are overly 
reliant on the boomtown sociology framework for analysis, with studies often reading 
similarly despite taking place in markedly different cultural contexts; 2.) Case studies often 
fail to adequately connect local phenomena within the broader scale concerns identified 
in the policy literature; and 3.) There is a general bias toward the activist framing in most 
case studies, thus neglecting the majority, non-involved populations who reside in 
extractive zones. 
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 The main strengths of the literature on environmental subjectivities in natural 
resource contexts are: 1.) Case studies provide strong examples of how ideology and 
technologies of government play a role in determining subjectivities and behaviors; 2.) 
Case studies in the neo-extractivist framing have provided a model for linking struggles 
over extraction to existing conflicts related to identity and land use; and 3.) Case studies 
in the first-world have provided a model for elucidating the difference between collective 
and individual grievances over the externalities of natural resource projects. Major 
weaknesses are: 1.) With notable exceptions, case studies do not link localized 
subjectivities to larger-scale discourses that may influence them; 2.) Outside of the neo-
extractive studies in Africa and Latin America, there are few case studies of fossil fuels 
that explicitly examine subjectivities; and 3.) These studies often show superficial 
engagement with foundational theories of environmental subjectivity or theories of 
subjectivity more broadly. 
 Additionally, many of the same issues that have plagued case studies from each 
of these three major bodies of literature have also been present in the limited number of 
case studies specifically examining fracking in the Bakken. Thus, to rectify these issues, 
this dissertation will take several affirmative steps. Chapter 4 analyzes how discourses 
are shaped by elites and how these lead to a particular pro-extractive subjectivity rooted 
in long-standing North Dakota values. Chapter 5 examines the conflict between elite and 
non-elite actors regarding these values as they appear in North Dakota newspapers. This 
chapter is also empirically novel, as it focuses specifically on editorial coverage, a 
neglected area of inquiry in much of the fracking newspaper analysis literature. Chapter 
6 retains the positive deep empirical and cultural analytical models used in existing case 
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studies of production landscapes, while also seeking to more directly connect economic 
development in the Bakken to broader-scale political processes. Additionally, this chapter 
connects localized subjectivities with the discourses identified in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Introduction 
 This research project uses a suite of qualitative methods to examine discourse 
generation and use among three distinct populations: 1.) oil industry, political and 
regulatory personnel involved in shaping policy about and promoting the state’s oil and 
gas industry (referred to as elite or policy actors); 2.) Elite and non-elite writers of editorials 
in North Dakota-based newspapers regarding the oil boom; and 3.) Non-elite, non-
industry connected residents of the boomtown of Minot, North Dakota. This chapter 
describes in detail each facet of the research process, including: a.) results of my 
preliminary research (3.2); b.) Positionality concerns I faced in conducting research 
among a group with which I have longstanding social ties (3.3); c.) A description of the 
research objectives and the underlying hypotheses (3.4); d.) The rationale behind each 
objective and sampling procedures (3.5); e.) Data collection procedures (3.6); and f.) Data 
analysis (3.7).  
3.2 Preliminary research 
 My initial project idea, developed in May 2014, was to examine reactions among 
North Dakota residents to oil and gas-related accidents, specifically those related to 
pipeline and rail transportation. Two non-fatal 2013 accidents in particular had captured 
significant local and national media attention: a pipeline leak near Tioga in September 
and a train derailment in Casselton. Following Perry’s (2012) article on fracking and 
community trauma, it was my initial contention that reactions to these events would be a 
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window to examine residents’ post-disaster subjectivity, which I believed would involve 
expressions of fear, insecurity and disputes over who was to blame for the disasters, 
following Erikson’s (1976) findings of “loss of community” following the Buffalo Creek 
floods in West Virginia. However, upon venturing to North Dakota for preliminary field 
work in the summer of 2014, I discovered that if I had applied my initial hypothesis, then 
I would have missed important emerging phenomena that appeared more relevant to 
human geographers than fracking accidents. 
 Upon arriving in Minot in Ward County and conducting my first set of interviews 
with residents (many of whom I was introduced to through my family), it became clear 
that industrial safety, as well as all general logistical and technical issues related to oil 
extraction, production and transport, were of minimal concern to residents when 
compared to quotidian quality-of-life concerns such as traffic, crime and the rising costs 
of gasoline, food and housing. Indeed, many residents spoke of a general fatigue and 
confusion about accidents, often displaying difficulty in distinguishing one accident from 
another.  This resulted from near constant local media reporting on the subject, much of 
which was viewed as repetitive, contradictory and lacking in the context needed to 
“ground” such events in the personal milieus of readers (see Chapter 5.4.2.1).3 The only 
major group that attempted to sway public opinion about the oil and gas industry using 
the accident framing was state-level Democratic politicians, who challenged the pro-
industry status quo I analyzed elsewhere (T. Loder, 2016a).  
                                                 
3 As I would discover throughout the project, a respondent’s level of concern about industrial safety roughly 
mirrored their concern about the environmental impacts of oil and gas, thus accounting for this dissertation’s 
lack of focus on traditional ecological issues outside those discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Due to my initial thesis being not applicable, I decided in September 2014 in to 
shift the focus of my research away from industrial safety and towards the aforementioned 
quality-of-life issues. My preliminary research yielded an important finding that would 
structure my research objective and, therefore, the entire dissertation: elite-level 
petroleum industry and trade-group conferences influenced oil and gas policy and 
shaping public opinion on the subject. However, before an in-depth explanation of the 
research objectives and process, I will briefly address issues of positionality that were 
important to determining how the research itself unfolded. 
3.3 Positionality 
Although I specifically began the Ph.D. program seeking to do research in North 
Dakota, my goal was to avoid doing research on hydraulic fracturing. This reticence was 
due to my family having longstanding social and political ties to North Dakota. For 
example, my paternal grandfather served as district attorney for Ward County (where 
much of my field research took place) and my maternal grandmother represented this 
same area in the North Dakota House of Representatives for more than three decades, 
including a term as Speaker of the House. Additionally, due to the savvy land investments 
of my maternal great grandfather, members of my family have earned substantial royalties 
from increased oil and gas production since 2007. While I have not personally benefited 
from these royalties and I had not ever lived permanently in North Dakota until I conducted 
the research for this project, I felt that potential conflicts of interest due to my family 
entanglement in the Bakken (as well as my own personal objections to the oil and gas 
industry, and hydraulic fracturing in particular) would have prevented me from maintaining 
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the objectivity necessary to properly conduct the research. However, after I consulted my 
maternal grandfather (the primary holder of the mineral rights) and told him that I was 
concerned about “not wanting to step on anyone’s toes” in my field research, he said that 
was not something to be concerned with and that he had his own ambivalent feelings 
about profiting off the oil industry and the negative effects he felt it was having on his 
home state (nearly all of my family have moved to Minnesota). After receiving his blessing, 
I decided to commit fully to a project examining hydraulic fracturing. 
However, my research was not without significant positionality issues. One of the 
major issues I wrestled with was the insider/outsider dynamic. Although both sides of my 
family have deep roots in North Dakota and my parents grew up in Minot, I have lived 
outside of the state for my entire life and have limited direct ties to any communities there. 
Thus, I found myself frequently attempting to balance using my limited local cultural 
knowledge in order to connect with respondents, while at the same time being unable to 
fully relate to their experiences or fully understand their points of reference. Indeed, in the 
Bakken, being a native of the area is highly prized, as outsiders are seen historically as 
unknown quantities with questionable moral values (Norris, 1993) and more recently 
during the fracking boom as either greedy profiteers or “grungy” lowlifes associated with 
criminality (Reed, 2016). Despite never being directly marked as part of either of these 
groups, respondents often expressed sentiments much in line with those interviewed by 
Norris and Reed.  Therefore I was always concerned with how I would be perceived and 
whether I could properly represent my subjects’ feelings without allowing my own outside 
biases to affect my interpretations, a problem I described in J. Jenkins, et al. (2015). This 
“dialogic” nature of the outside researcher has been previously remarked upon by 
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England (1994), who argues that it is nearly impossible to separate one’s personal 
“biography” from the research process. England advocates for a strong awareness of the 
power dynamics at play in the qualitative process. While my own research did not 
necessarily present as many ethical issues as England’s (a straight, white researcher 
working among a minority-heavy LGBT population), power relations became particularly 
important when dealing with specific groups of interviewees. 
When I arrived in Minot for my dissertation research in 2015, I initially had trouble 
making contacts and finding respondents for the project. However, my fortunes greatly 
improved when my grandfather (who has retired to Arizona) put me in touch with his 
former long-time social circle “The Know it Alls”, a tongue-in-cheek reference to the group 
both consisting entirely of retired business executives and their legendary reputation for 
bloviating on nearly any subject. This group, which consists of men over age 85, has met 
weekly for breakfast for more than 20 years. With the exception of those who have moved 
away or died (an increasingly frequent occurrence given the group members’ advancing 
ages), membership in the group has remained largely unchanged, with many members 
having been social/business acquaintances for several decades and some members 
even being childhood friends. In addition to their social dimension, Know it Alls breakfasts 
also function as an important political venue for conservative politics in Minot; the group 
counts among its membership two former Republican state senators, the city’s former city 
manager and the city’s former Republican Party chairman (now deceased). In this 
capacity, the group hosts a once-monthly forum where prominent Republican politicians 
introduce policy proposals for the city, with the group’s support being seen as necessary 
for such proposals to move forward (I was specifically not allowed to attend these 
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meetings). Indeed, the group relishes this purported kingmaker role, with one member 
boasting that the group had chosen Minot’s three most recent mayors, as well as giving 
the initial approval to the ultimately successful initiative to decrease the size of the city 
council (see Chapter 6). 
I was warmly welcomed (except into policy gatherings) into the group by my 
grandfather’s old friends, all of whom were eager to hear stories of my grandfather and 
father, both of whom had long since left Minot. Many of the Know it Alls were happy to be 
interviewed as they were both excited to have a younger audience hear their views as 
well as to reminisce about pre-boom Minot. Although this provided me with incredible 
access to a treasure trove of information about the city’s cultural foundations and inner 
political workings, I was at times thrust into roles in which I was either uncomfortable or 
for which I was ill-suited. Given my acknowledged outsider status as a Texan and as an 
academic studying oil and gas, many of these respondents believed that I was privy to 
confidential information from inside the industry as to the present and future state of 
exploration and production in the Bakken. Though I did in fact have some contacts with 
industry figures, I did not receive any special information from these respondents beyond 
a few uncharacteristically frank answers. Yet despite not having much privileged 
information for my Know it All respondents, I also felt a sense of obligation not to betray 
what knowledge these industry insiders had provided me, no matter how trivial. Thus, I 
was forced to speak in guarded terms and to use such phrases as, “I’ve heard from 
several people that we can expect a lot of bankruptcies and reduced activity this year.”4 
                                                 
4 These interviews all took place at the lowest point of the downturn in late 2015 and early 2016. 
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While such answers generally tended to satisfy respondents’ curiosity, I felt that I was in 
an ethical grey area in which I was simultaneously perilously close to divulging 
“confidential” information from one set of respondents while also not being fully honest 
with another set. 
Additionally, my family ties to the Know it Alls and other respondents also posed 
significant challenges to conduct interviews without the interference of outside bias. As 
both sides of my family have been heavily connected with Republican politics in Minot, 
many respondents assumed that I, too, must be a conservative (I am not). While I rarely 
prompted subjects to talk about specific political issues during interviews and did my best 
to refrain from injecting my own biases into my comments, many respondents, particularly 
the Know it Alls, put their political views high   on the list of topics they most wanted to 
discuss. This became particularly challenging when many respondents would voice their 
opinion on an issue with the expectation that I agreed with them. One specific example is 
of a Know it All respondent who argued that if Minot were to adopt the views of then-
candidate Donald Trump and other conservative Republicans, they would be far more 
successful economically and culturally. He then asked me point blank who I was voting 
for in the Republican primary, reasoning that if it were not Trump, it would have to have 
been Cruz due to my being from Texas. Despite prefacing my non-committal answer with 
the fact that I was sorry to disappoint him, I still felt that too much of this conversation was 
pushed in the wrong direction due to mistaken assumptions about politics. Following this 
experience, I attempted to avoid such situations in the future by arguing that I wanted to 
hear respondents’ opinions on topics and that I would only be there to guide the interview. 
Indeed, this approach proved particularly effective in focus groups, as participants’ felt 
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they had the freedom to discuss amongst each other, rather than under the impression 
that they were only giving answers to satisfy what they believed I wanted from them. 
To summarize, the major challenges I faced with positionality during this research 
project were based upon my family history in the Bakken and reputational issues that this 
history created among respondents who either personally knew members of my family or 
who knew of them and their roles in Minot’s political and business scene. Yet at the same 
time, I often felt like an outsider, at times struggling to understand the extremely place-
specific cultural references that only a life-long North Dakotan could understand, while at 
other times being mistakenly viewed by respondents as an oil-and-gas policy expert and 
having to awkwardly sidestep or talk around such topics I had only superficially 
understood. This bind of being both an insider-confidant and outsider-expert in a shared 
racial and cultural community mirrored much of what was experienced by educational 
theorist Juanita Johnson-Bailey (1999) in her research on African American women who 
returned to university education after taking time off for a variety of issues such as family 
obligations, financial hardship or incarceration (defined as “re-entry Black women”). While 
Johnson-Bailey is herself a re-entry Black woman, and thus shared many race, gender 
and life experiences with her respondents, she, much as in my case, also struggled with 
the outsider status created by the implicit baggage of being an academic researcher 
assumed to be the consummate expert on all things related to her topic. Indeed, Johnson-
Bailey spoke of the simultaneous level of unconsciously understanding her subjects while 
struggling to fully relate to many of the in-group particularities of a community she was 
largely divorced from due to the economic privilege and cultural separateness that came 
with her academic position:  
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Throughout much of the feminist literature, discussions present all women 
as the same, a norm, and all people of color as similar. When a specific 
racial group is discussed, it is presented monolithically. The dilemmas that 
transpired in the field during this research proved such conclusions 
imprudent. My educational level and attached class status were mentioned 
by several of the respondents as factors that set me apart as different. It 
was conjectured by several respondents that “educated Blacks” think of 
themselves as  “better” or superior to other members of the race … 
However, commensurate with the intensity of the scenario when Black 
women talk within racial and gender boundaries are benefits. There were 
silent understandings, culture- bound phrases that did not need 
interpretation, and nonverbalized answers conveyed with culture-specific 
hand gestures and facial expressions laced throughout the dialogue. At 
times these shared issues of race and gender were connections between 
the women (Johnson-Bailey, 1999, p. 663, 669). 
 
Johnson – Bailey, however, concluded that despite the uncomfortable, and at times 
openly hostile, situations that such tensions provoked, the closeness and intimacy that 
developed over shared in-group experiences ultimately improved the research process 
for both researcher and respondent and made for better data gathering. In my own 
research, I, much like Johnson-Bailey, found that despite some of the awkwardness of 
being a researcher in a group with which I share ties, the ultimate closeness that such 
ties provide allowed a deeper connection to respondents which led to fuller and more 
useful responses than could have been obtained if I had solely been an outsider. 
3.4 Research objectives 
The overarching objective of this research is to examine how North Dakota 
residents understand and experience the fracking boom in North Dakota (2007-present). 
For this study, the research populations are divided between three groups: policy makers 
related to the oil and gas industry (including politicians, bureaucrats, business executives 
and interest group leaders), editorial writers in North Dakota newspapers and “longer-
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term” residents of Bakken oil patch communities. For the purposes of this study, longer-
term residents are those who have lived permanently in the oil patch for more than five 
years, based on the reasoning that these residents will have developed deeper 
community ties and have a stronger base from which to compare the pre- and post-boom 
Bakken than temporary residents or newer permanent residents. Following insights 
gained from preliminary research, this study began with the hypothesis that the lives of 
these residents were mediated both through their daily, direct experiences with the effects 
of the boom as well as through formal discourses about the boom created by the policy 
maker group, which are then filtered down to the “ordinary” population through print 
media.  
Given this hypothesis, the research aimed to answer 3 related questions: 1.) How 
are formal and informal discourses about fracking produced and in what arenas do 
debates about these discourses occur?; 2.) How do the ways in which policy makers and 
ordinary residents (both within and outside the oil patch) understand and employ these 
discourses vary?; and 3.) How do these discourses support or conflict with the daily 
experiences of longer-term residents? Additionally, this research aims to test 3 quasi-
hypotheses (Bebbington and Bury, 2009). First, individuals approach fracking differently 
based upon their employment status, ownership of mineral rights, concerns about the 
environment, and interpretation of media coverage (Boudet et al., 2014). Second, longer-
term residents understand fracking based on cultural values rooted in specific 
understandings of place mediated through both experience and discourse (Devine-
Wright, 2009; Hudgins and Poole, 2014). Third, level of awareness of key energy policies 
and politics affects the abilities of residents to participate in policy debates and contributes 
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to feelings of inclusion or alienation regarding fracking-led development (Malin, 2014; 
Arnold and Holahan, 2014).  
Finally, following these research questions and hypotheses, 3 specific objectives 
were determined for collecting and analyzing data: 1.) Examine how elite-level policy 
makers created discourses surrounding fracking and how these discourses were used to 
advance specific political goals; 2.) interrogate how these discourses were employed in 
state-level print media by both elite and ordinary actors alike in order to debate the merits 
of specific boom-related policies; and 3.) study how longer-term oil patch residents 
understand fracking and to ascertain how and to what degree these media discourses 
effect such understandings. The following subsections will discuss the rationale behind 
these objectives and how respondents were identified, how data was collected and how 
data was analyzed. While there are separate subsections for each objective on rationale 
and data gathering, as the analysis techniques for both the elite and longer-term 
populations, these techniques are covered in a single section, while the newspaper 
analysis has its own section. 
3.5 Objective rationale and identification of respondents 
3.5.1. Policy rationale and respondent identification 
 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) refer to the linked network (and its governing rules) 
where elite-level in-group negotiations and policy making take place as the organizational 
field. Engaging elite stakeholders (those with significant ties and decision-making power 
within the field) as respondents has been demonstrated as a viable method in 
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ethnographic studies of fracking in contexts as varied as Colorado (Cook, 2014), the 
Texas Eagle Ford Shale (Murphy, et al., 2016) and the Bakken itself (Fernando and 
Cooley, 2016a). Additionally, such constellations of power in the energy sector have been 
identified as key sites for the contestation of energy governance norms (Osofsky and 
Wiseman, 2014). Therefore, this dissertation builds on these existing studies by engaging 
elite stakeholders in the oil and gas organizational field in North Dakota. The major 
purpose of this objective was to determine how this field operates and what discourses it 
generated. These identified discourses and themes were then used both in the analysis 
of state-level media (objective 2) and as springboards for discussion during ethnographic 
fieldwork with respondents at the local level (objective 3). This study had a goal of 
interviewing ~15-20 key policy actors; ultimately, I conducted 14 interviews and made 
contact with and gained information from approximately 3 dozen individuals through my 
participation in two workshops (only one of these individuals participated in an interview, 
but was not local to North Dakota and thus his information is not included in the 
dissertation), described in greater detail below. 
My sampling strategy was purposive, based on the role or position of the person 
with regard to the oil industry or municipal or state government and policy making. As I 
had already had some experience in observing these arenas during my preliminary 
research (T. Loder, 2016a), this objective targeted many of these previously encountered 
players such as the various oil and economic development agencies of the North Dakota 
state government, the North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC, a private industry-
supported lobbying group) and various pro-oil media and advocacy groups such as Shale 
Plays Media and the Bakken Backers (a “grassroots” group of industry supporters 
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composed largely of oil-related businesses and oil industry employees). Additionally, I 
sought to interview local officials from Bakken oil patch cities, in order to determine how 
boom-related policies were being generated at the local level. 
While I believed in summer 2015 that I would have little difficulty securing meetings 
with these above-mentioned figures, I quickly discovered that many of these figures either 
did not want to participate in the project or were simply unreachable despite repeated 
attempts at contact. However, my fortunes with this set of potential respondents changed 
drastically once I attended an energy education workshop in August, 2015 run jointly by 
the aforementioned NDPC and the Lignite Energy Council (an equivalent group for the 
state’s coal industry). At this workshop, I was able to develop strong connections not only 
with representatives from NDPC, but also with representatives from state government as 
well other non-elite conference attendees, one of whom became an important Minot 
based respondent for objective 3 (see T. Loder, 2016b for more information about this 
workshop). After the conference, I was easily able to schedule interviews with figures from 
the various agencies and groups, whose shift in tone indicated that I was neither a hostile 
figure nor someone interested in telling false stories about the Bakken and the oil 
industry.5 Although some agencies and groups were still unwilling to talk to me or 
repeatedly claimed they were “too busy”, I was able to gather information from a strong 
cross-section of state-level policy makers, totaling 7 interviews. 
                                                 
5 According to one disgruntled former reporter for the Minot Daily News, this “scooping” by national news 
sources was the major reason all Dakota-based newspapers had placed a blanket ban on their employees 
speaking to outside sources about their work. 
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A second group that I targeted as respondents were members of the oil-related 
state media. As mentioned above [note 3], I had either ignored or was told outright to stay 
away by several of the state’s major print newspapers, thus I began targeting web-based 
media sources that explicitly focused on the oil boom. While I was able to interview 
several prominent members on the pro-oil side, I had far greater success with those in 
the anti-oil camp. Indeed, many of those writing against the industry were often doing so 
independently and often without any financial support, and were thus very eager to have 
someone listen attentively to their stories.6 This contrasted heavily with those from the 
pro-oil media, many of whom claimed they were working on tight schedules and thus 
could only speak briefly or would stick mainly to pro-industry talking points (not entirely 
unexpected as many of these figures had longstanding ties to groups such as NDPC and 
to North Dakota’s conservative movement at-large). Overall, I interviewed 6 members of 
the oil-related media. 
The final significant group from which I sampled purposively was local officials and 
business leaders in Minot, North Dakota, the dissertation’s primary field case study site.  
Much of the access I had to this group was through family-based connections, with many 
respondents having knowledge of my older relatives, especially those that had served in 
the political arena. While this group was quite small (only 4 respondents), the respondents 
provided incredibly useful data, particularly in that they were able to demonstrate how 
state-level discourses and policies affected policy making at the local level. Indeed, in 
                                                 
6 One respondent, Ron Schalow of the Coalition for Bakken Crude Oil Stabilization, spoke for more than 2 
hours, a time period during which I asked only 7 questions. 
 74 
 
many cases, while ideologically these respondents were largely on the same page as 
their state-level counterparts, they were far more open about the benefits and drawbacks 
of the boom and did not merely repeat talking points or serve as boosters for the 
petroleum industry. 
3.5.2 Newspaper analysis rationale 
 Newspaper analysis in social studies of hydraulic fracturing has emerged as a 
distinct subset of this small, yet growing, body of research. Much of this research has 
attempted to examine how discourses about hydraulic fracturing have been propagated 
and what impact, if any, this might have on public opinion. While this research has varied 
in the types of newspapers it examines (local v. national, tabloid v. specialist, etc.) and 
has examined geographical locales as varied as small towns in Pennsylvania to the UK.  
This work has focused on 3 major areas: 1.) scientific and policy debates regarding 
fracking (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2014; Jaspal, Nerlich and Lemancyzk, 2014; Kroepsch, 
2016); 2.) The creation of pro- and anti-fracking discourse coalitions (Cotton, Rattle and 
van Alstine, 2014; Metze, 2014; Vesalon and Cretan, 2015; Bomberg, 2014); and 3.) 
Impacts of fracking on local communities (Evensen, Clarke and Stedman, 2014; Arnold 
and Holahan, 2014; Ashmoore, et al., 2016). However, these studies have largely focused 
solely on fracking, rather than oil and gas as a whole, and with the exception of 
Kroepsch’s (2016) study, have given scant attention to opinion pieces. Additionally, 
Hough (2015) attempted to perform discourse analysis on media coverage of fracking in 
the Bakken but only considered national-level newspaper coverage of the New York 
Times and was chiefly focused on online media. Thus, this dissertation builds on this 
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existing research while also addressing several of its gaps, namely: a.) lack of focus on 
editorial coverage, specifically in relation to local events that interact with national-level 
policy issues; b.) lack of focus on oil and gas beyond debates about the merits of fracking; 
and c.) lack of analysis of local print media in the Bakken. 
 While there are other forms of local media extant in the Bakken, newspapers (and 
their editorial sections, specifically) were chosen for this project for two major reasons. 
First, local newspapers, especially, in rural communities, are viewed as one of the key 
venues that provide social structure to a community by providing a shared cultural 
institution for its widely dispersed (geographically and socially) residents that helps to 
demarcate that community’s values in ways that larger, urban newspapers do not. Janes 
(1959) argued that such a process occurred through specific coverage of community 
events and local culture that were often neglected by large-circulation newspapers that 
aim to serve a more nebulous and more diverse general public: “In a small town, a visit 
to a another town for shopping or visiting, falling sick, or just a local visit with friends will 
regularly appear in news items, but such events will not be regularly reported of persons 
in a larger community” (p. 108). Harry (2001), working in the tradition of the structural 
pluralist school of communications (Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, 1970), has further 
argued that this phenomenon is magnified in reporting of environmental controversies, 
with larger newspapers focusing mainly on overarching points of contention and smaller 
newspapers seeking to contextualize these struggles within the social and political 
environment of the communities in which they occur. Indeed, these patterns are well 
represented in many of the editorials analyzed in this study, which frequently place 
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fracking debates within a North Dakota-centric paradigm, using language and cultural 
references that outsiders lacking local knowledge would have difficulty understanding. 
 Second, newspapers have been identified as one of the pre-eminent venues where 
contentious social issues are publicly debated in a quest to create dominant narratives. 
Critical discourse theorists such as Wodak and Meyer (2009) and Fairclough (2013) have 
argued that powerful societal actors use media to portray their views as normal and 
desirable, thus making analysis a tool for ascertaining how dominant narratives are 
promulgated. Harry (2001) argues that this hegemonic style is historically more 
pronounced in small, rural newspapers due to the consensus-based politics that prevails 
in these types of communities. However, as a counterpoint, he suggests the approach 
taken by C.E. Taylor, Lee and Davie (2000), who viewed newspapers from smaller, 
suburbanized communities under 100,000 residents as “fragmented” or caught between 
the more pluralistic big city newspaper approach and the smaller consensus-seeking 
approach of rural newspapers published in urban conurbations with fewer than 2,000 
residents.  Fragmented cities are more diverse than purely rural communities, yet not 
large enough in population to be considered urban. To avoid any of the pitfalls of the big 
city or rural newspaper approaches, the authors supplemented “news items” (hard news 
stories) with “non-news items” (editorials/letters-to-the-editor and advertisements), which 
they felt gave the community more of an opportunity to voice their opinions on debates 
regarding an incinerator in Morgan City, Louisiana. Given the consensus-based politics 
of North Dakota (see Chapter 4) and that all but one of the newspapers included in this 
dissertation’s sample are published in fragmented cities, editorial analysis can be 
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expected to provide a window into the creation of discourses around key debates related 
to hydraulic fracturing in North Dakota. 
3.5.3 Sampling strategy for longer-term residents 
 Community-based, ethnographic studies on fracking have analyzed the role that 
oil boom-related growth plays in the economic and social life of communities. These 
studies have examined various issues such as how economic stakeholders and 
regulators deal with boom externalities and uncertainties (Cook, 2014; Murphy, et al., 
2016; Fernando and Cooley, 2016), quality of life impacts in fracking boomtowns 
(Hudgins, 2013; Pearson, 2013), and the ways in which activist coalitions emerge to 
oppose hydraulic fracturing (Willow and Keefer, 2015; Simonelli, 2014), among many 
others. However, one of the major under-examined phenomena in fracking landscapes 
has been the way in which non-elite, non-activist and non-petroleum industry affiliated 
permanent residents—people without a significant personal stake in the success or failure 
of resource extraction-- experience the fracking boom and how this experience is 
interpreted through a long-standing cultural filter unique to each boomtown. These 
residents are referred to throughout this dissertation as “everyday” or “ordinary” residents. 
This dissertation aims to analyze to how social and political attitudes affect the ways in 
which “ordinary” residents understand the oil-related changes that are happening in their 
community. The particular goal of this research objective is to examine how formal and 
informal discourses about fracking and related developments (many of which are created 
at scales beyond and divorced from the everyday realities of boomtown life) circulate “on-
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the-ground” in fracking boomtowns and what role they play in shaping respondents views 
of the oil boom. 
 While many of the above cited studies engage with permanent residents of fracking 
boom regions, the criteria for determining what constitutes permanence is not always 
made clear. Therefore, for this dissertation, purposive sampling targeted people who have 
lived in Minot for five or more consecutive years.  This study refers to these respondents 
as “longer-term residents.” While this restriction excludes some newcomers who are now 
developing social ties in the community, the rationale behind focusing on this specific sub-
population is to gauge the views of residents who have been in the community before and 
during the oil boom. It is hypothesized that these residents will have, a.) Better 
understanding of the social and economic differences between pre-boom and boom 
Minot; b.) Greater understanding of and exposure to the specific cultural milieu of both 
Minot and North Dakota as a whole; and c.) Greater familiarity with and exposure to 
outlets for the dissemination of discourses (local media, face-to-face interaction with 
community members, etc.). Other studies have used probabilistic sampling methods to 
identify respondents to mail-out surveys regarding attitudes to disruption (Theodori, 2012, 
2013), but this study specifically attempts to purposively sample respondents for in-
person interviews and focus groups.  We reasoned that the longer-term cohort would 
perhaps be less likely to respond to mail-out surveys because they are not being strongly 
polarized on the fracking issue: they did not move to Minot to participate in the boom, nor 
did they benefit financially from the boom. Purposive sampling of this group has the 
advantage of reducing this sampling bias, but it has the disadvantage of not producing 
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generalizable results. This study had a goal of engaging ~35-40 respondents in interviews 
and focus groups.  
 I initially believed that I would have little difficulty finding respondents for this study 
due to my strong family ties to the community.  But during field work it quickly became 
clear that many of the respondents I had hoped to interview had either left Minot or had 
passed away. Additionally, although I quickly made the acquaintance of multiple 
individuals who I felt would have made useful respondents, most of these residents had 
themselves only moved to Minot within the past 1-3 years and thus did not qualify as 
longer-term. However, my fortunes changed when I began more assertively engaging 
myself in the community socially. As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, I gained a significant 
number of respondents through my connection to the Know It Alls social group of retired 
male professionals. These respondents additionally put me in touch with other member 
of their social circles, thus allowing my sample to grow through snowballing. Additionally, 
I gained several respondents through attending social groups I discovered on 
Meetup.com, a website that allows users to discover events and clubs in their area. By 
becoming acquainted socially with these club members and informing them of the goals 
of my research project, I was able to gain their trust, which allowed for better 
conversational flow and a greater willingness to share details of their personal lives in 
subsequent interviews. Additionally, the shared social circle that these groups fostered 
provided a useful environment from which to recruit participants for subsequent focus 
groups, as these respondents felt comfortable engaging in group discussions with their 
peers. 
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 In addition to the respondents gained through these two social circles, I also gained 
several respondents through a combination of snowballing out from these two groups, as 
well as contacting notable community members who had been identified to me by family 
members and respondents. Of particular note among this subset were 3 key figures I 
interviewed who were connected with Minot Public Schools. Although these figures did 
not have directed connections to oil and gas related policy making, they served as a 
bridge figures who had both experience in local government and administration, as well 
as having been “ordinary” community members with local cultural knowledge. These 
respondents provided me with invaluable insider information on notable conflicts about 
education and employment opportunities for local youth, which formed significant topics 
of analysis in Chapter 6 (section 4.3). 
3.6 Data Collection 
3.6.1 Policy interview and participant observation procedures 
The majority of the research for this objective (objective 1) consisted of semi-
structured interviews in order to allow for maximum respondent and interviewer freedom.  
Therefore, I prepared an interview protocol covering key themes. As these interviews 
were highly focused on elite-level oil and gas policy figures and their roles during the 
period in which North Dakota’s economy was reconfigured around their industry, this 
method draws heavily from Schoenberger’s conception of the open-ended corporate 
interview. Schoenberger notes this approach focuses on “the real-world predicaments 
and strategies” of “institutional agents embedded in a complex network of internal and 
 81 
 
external relationships”, a situation which is made particularly acute during “periods of 
great economic and social change … characterized by the rise of new industries and the 
retrenchment of older ones, the diffusion of new technologies and new principles of 
industrial organization” (Schoenberger, 1991, p. 181).  Certainly, North Dakota in the 
Bakken boom period matches these criteria. 
 Building on another tenet from Schoenberg, these interviews would seek to 
examine each respondent as responding to an equivalent phenomenon (in this case the 
fracking boom), while also having slightly different responses based on their own histories 
and political economic capacities in North Dakota’s oil and gas policy milieu. Therefore, I 
varied questions based upon the respondents’ job duties (i.e. a chamber of commerce 
representative would receive slightly different questions than would a state-government 
official in charge of pipeline safety), but the major points that were in every protocol were 
as follows:  
1.) How has your role and that of your organization changed as a result of 
the different stages of the fracking boom (pre- (before 2007), during (2007), 
and post- (2015-2016)  
2.) What do you feel have been some of the biggest benefits and drawbacks 
for North Dakota as a result of the boom?  
3. What do you think the biggest challenge will be for North Dakota going 
forward? 
4.) Do you believe the media has done a good and fair job of covering North 
Dakota and the boom? What do you think need to be done 
better/differently? 
 
Indeed, this last question was of particular importance to the project due to the need to 
discern key themes and create prompts regarding the role of ideology transmission 
through media that would be used in objectives 2 and 3. 
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In addition to interview-based respondents, I also attended 3 conferences where 
those attempting to influence oil and gas policy were present: 1.) The annual Williston 
Basin Petroleum Conference (WBPC) sponsored by the NDPC; 2.) A Bakken Basics 
education session, sponsored jointly be the NDPC and the Lignite Energy Council; and 
3.) The annual meeting of the Extreme Energy Extraction Collaborative (E3C), a collection 
of activists seeking to oppose practices such as fracking, sand mining and tar sands 
production.7 I specifically use the words “attempting to influence” because participants at 
the latter conference were excluded from formal policy conversations, whereas the first 
two conferences were attended by the very people who either write, vote on or implement 
the majority of oil and gas policies for the state of North Dakota. Despite only conducting 
one interview at these events, I was able to absorb information, recorded in field notes, 
just by being a proverbial “fly on the wall”; I felt as if I was given exclusive access to the 
inner workings of these incredibly different communities with minimal effort on my part. 
While I was somewhat familiar with the culture at the two fossil fuels conferences given 
my academic background and having already forged links in those specific communities 
(indeed, at Bakken Basics I was also among fellow academics), this feeling was 
particularly acute at E3C, as I was unfamiliar with the specialized language and lifestyle 
that accompanied the activist community. Indeed, during several tense debates between 
white and non-white attendees at E3C, I felt very confused and alienated from the overall 
                                                 
7 As most of the attendees at this latter conference were not North Dakotans and/or were at work on issues 
or than fracking in the Bakken, the data I gathered there is largely not included in the dissertation. This 
conference did, however, provide me with a window into a neglected side of the conversation in North 
Dakota and also challenged me as a researcher, thus I felt it was important to include a reflection in this 
section. 
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debate, as it seemed to have completely diverged from the extractive industries, a far cry 
from the industry events where the agenda was always laser focused.8 Although I did at 
times feel like a tourist, or worse a voyeur, at some of these events, I felt that in many 
ways the data I gathered was less biased or less directed than that I gathered in 
interviews. Indeed, despite not being able to create the trust relationships inherent in one-
on-one interviews (see section 3.3), many of these residents seemed freer to express 
themselves in these gatherings of like-minded individuals, as they felt (often correctly) 
that these were safe spaces where they could share “controversial” or “confidential” ideas 
without fear of judgment (or in the case of some activists working in politically sensitive 
arenas or employing less-than-legal tactics, actual punishment). Yet despite my own 
discomfort at these venues due to either being unable to “speak the language” of 
participants (E3C) or feeling excluded from key conversations and moments due to the 
chummy, “old boys’ club” atmosphere (WBPC), some of the most illuminating qualitative 
data  came from the presentations I observed.  These conferences mirrored Laurier’s 
maxim on participant observation in unfamiliar places: “Yet while it is a struggle to observe 
what is happening in these places, let alone participate in them, your findings will be of 
value by the very fact that how many unfamiliar places are organized is not part of the 
everyday knowledge of members of society” (Laurier, 2010, p.119). 
                                                 
8 In T. Loder (2016b), I wrote about how many of these conflicts came about as a result of younger, non-
white and LGBT activists feeling that the struggle for the recognition of their identities and overcoming 
economic marginalization in their home communities preceded any environmental activism. This feeling 
was not shared by the older, largely white activists, who seemed to have done little reflection about their 
own identities and felt that the environment trumped any other concern. 
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3.6.2 Newspaper data collection 
 The newspapers analyzed in this dissertation were identified using the directory of 
the North Dakota Newspaper Association, a trade group for the publishers of newspapers 
throughout the state. Initially, 10 newspapers were chosen in order to create a balance 
between large circulation newspapers from populous and/or politically important cities 
(Fargo, Grand Forks and the state capital, Bismarck) and cities and smaller towns in the 
core Bakken region. Additionally, these newspapers were specifically chosen because all 
possessed online archives and could be accessed without visiting the local archives 
where back issues of specific newspapers would be held. However, upon further 
investigation, only 5 of these newspapers were deemed as viable for the study.  Excluded 
papers had either incomplete archival coverage or significant duplicated the editorial 
content of other newspapers on the list owned by the same media conglomerate (see 
Table 3 (p.86) for a listing of the included newspapers). 
 The time period for data collection was the 5-year interval between August 1, 2011-
July 31, 2016 (the latter date being when archival searches began), with this period 
chosen due to encompassing the beginning and height of the boom (2011-2014), as well 
as the more recent bust period (2015-2016). Searches of online archives were initially 
conducted using a set of keywords such as “oil”, “gas”, “Bakken” and “fracking.” This 
approach, however, proved unsuccessful, as many of the archives either did not properly 
tag their articles and/or only allowed article titles (not body text) to be searched, thus 
yielding an incomplete set of results when compared to a cursory manual search. Despite 
being time consuming, it became clear that the only way to properly query the online 
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archives was to manually examine each of the editorials in reverse chronological order. 
This task was made somewhat easier as all but the TT allowed for editorials/LTEs to be 
searched separately from other content.9 Articles with titles that were clearly not related 
to oil and gas were immediately excluded, whereas any article with either a clear oil and 
gas theme or an ambiguous title was read individually to determine whether it should be 
kept or discarded.  
After completing this querying process for each newspaper, a total of 1,535 
editorials were identified (FF=640, MDN=85, WH=68, DP=591, TT=151). As this was 
seen as too large a sample for analysis, a strategy for selecting specific articles was 
devised. Although a random-stratification sampling approach (Stempel, 1952) was 
considered (i.e. choosing a day of the month and then sampling only results from that day 
each month, etc.), the small overall sample sizes from the WH, MDN and TT meant that 
such an approach would have resulted in a very small filtered sample. Thus, instead, I 
chose to filter my overall sample by choosing editorials focused on specific events, an 
approach successfully used by Jaspal and Nerlich (2014) in their analysis of fracking in 
UK newspapers. The two specific events chosen were: 1.) Measure 5 (M5), a 
conservation measure on the state-wide ballot in 2014 and 2.) The Keystone XL (KXL) 
pipeline. 
  This led to a sample size of 271 editorials, with 117 from the DP, 115 from the 
FF, 26 from the MDN, 11 from the TT and 2 from the WH. Both the DP and the FF are 
  
                                                 
9 The TT was only available as a non-text searchable PDF of each issue. To sample this newspaper, I 
had to find each editorial, read it to determine if it was related to oil and gas issues and then manually 
take a screenshot. 
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Newspaper Location Pop. (2016) Pop. served Core city 
(Y/N) 
Fargo Forum Fargo, ND 120,762 Urban N 
Minot Daily News Minot, ND 48,743 Urban Y 
Williston Herald Williston, ND 26,426 Mixed 
urban/rural 
Y 
Dickinson Press Dickinson, ND 23,400 Mixed 
urban/rural 
Y 
Tioga Tribune Tioga, ND 1,547 Rural Y 
Table 3: Names and Locations of Selected Newspapers 
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owned by the same large conglomerate (Forum Communications), thus Forum 
Communications’ opinions are over-represented in the sample (232 items, ~86% of the 
total). Forum Communications content is often recycled among these papers as well as 
other papers in the company’s portfolio (such as the Grand Forks Herald and the 
Jamestown Sun) that are not included in the sample. Duplicate items were removed 
based upon either: 1.) which paper published first; and b.) which paper was originally 
responsible for the content.  
 This sample was then broken down into several categories (see Tables 4 and 5 
(p.88-89)). First, I determined that editorials/LTEs were written by 6 distinct types of 
authors. Concerned Citizen Writers (CCW) are any writers who are either not professional 
journalists or are not politicians or affiliated with the oil industry. Local Editorial Writers 
(LEW) are North Dakota-based professional journalists who either write for a specific 
newspaper or are syndicated in various newspapers across the state. Interest Group 
Writers are writers affiliated with non-oil and gas interest groups advocating for specific 
policy positions (i.e. North Dakotans for Clean Water, Wildlife and Parks, an umbrella 
group lobbying on behalf of M5). Politicians are current and former candidates, holders 
of elected office and appointed officials representing North Dakota at the local, state and 
federal levels. Industry-Affiliated Writers (IAW) are writers who either work directly for oil 
and gas companies or for oil and gas advocacy groups. 
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Newspaper Total eds. Pro-industry 
position (% of total 
by newspaper) 
Anti-industry 
positions (% of 
total by newspaper 
Neutral positions 
(% of total by 
newspaper) 
DP 117 66 (56%) 45 (38%) 6 (5%) 
FF 115 45 (39%) 67 (58%) 5 (3%) 
MDN 26 21 (81%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 
TT 11 6 (55%) 2 (11%) 3 (27%) 
WH 2 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 
 n=271    
Table 4: Editorials by Position 
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Type of writer No. of eds. % of sample Pro-industry 
positions (% 
of total by 
group) 
Anti-industry 
positions (% 
of total by 
group) 
Neutral 
positions (% 
of total by 
group) 
CCW 153 56% 64 (42%) 88 (56%) 1 (<1%) 
LEW 67 25% 49 (73%) 8 (12%) 10 (15%) 
IGW 25 9% 16 (64%) 9 (36%) 0 (0%) 
Politician 31 8% 18 (86%) 3 (14%) 0 (0%) 
IAW 3 <1% 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
NSC 2 <1% 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 n=271     
Table 5: Editorials by Writer-type 
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Nationally Syndicated Columnists (NSC) are non-North Dakota-based columnists whose 
columns are published in North Dakota newspapers. The small samples from the MDN, 
TT and WH are due to 3 major differences between these papers and the two Forum 
Communications papers (DP and FF) : the lower number of editorials written in these 3 
papers overall (thus leading to fewer editorials on all topics), a greater focus on intensely 
local events rather than state or national events and an extremely low level of participation 
by non-professionals (writers other than LEWs and NSCs), especially CCWs, who make 
up a disproportionate share of the overall sample. 
The sample articles were strongly polarized along pro- and anti-industry lines, with 
nearly all articles taking an affirmative position either for or against the petroleum 
industry’s preferred position on either issue (opposition to M5 and support for KXL, 
respectively). Overall, the pro-industry/anti-industry/neutral split was 51/43/6%, 
respectively. However, this varied strongly by newspaper. The DP, MDN, WH and TT 
were all strongly pro-industry, with each newspaper being more than 50% pro-industry 
and less than 40% anti-industry. The FF, though, was an outlier, with its pro-industry/anti-
industry/neutral split being 39%/58%/3%, respectively, largely due to the relative over-
representation of CCWS, who trend strongly anti-industry as a group. As editorials from 
the FF make up 42% of the sample, the sample skews significantly more towards an anti-
industry position than if the FF were to be excluded.  
 Among the different groups of writers, a similar trend was observed. Indeed, while 
CCWs broke 42/58/<1% pro-industry, anti-industry, neutral, respectively, all other writer 
groups were >60% pro-industry. Yet despite a clear majority of non-CCWs taking pro-
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industry positions, the sample is only moderately pro-industry due to the outsized 
influence of anti-industry CCWs, who make up a slight majority of the sample. 
Regarding the two issues, M5 was the most debated topic among the articles in 
our sample, comprising 65 % of the total articles examined (175 out of 271). Overall, this 
subset consisted of slightly more   anti-M5, opinions (53%) than pro-M5, ones (43%), with 
only a small percentage remaining neutral (4%). As with the overall sample, the FF was 
significantly more anti-industry than the DP, MDN, WH and TT and thus obfuscated the 
overall pro-industry body of opinion expressed in those papers due to its significant 
contribution to the total articles in the subset (40% of the 175). Similarly, this pro-
industry/anti-industry divide persisted across different writer groups, with CCWs (66% of 
the subset) breaking 47% anti-M5 to 53% pro-M5, while all other groups were over 50% 
anti-M5, with only LEWs being less than 60% pro-M5 (see Tables 6 and 7 (p. 92-93) for 
exact figures). 
KXL editorials made up a smaller, yet no less passionate, sample. Of the 96 total 
articles examined, 47 articles (49%) expressed pro-KXL sentiments, 41 articles (43%) 
expressed anti-KXL sentiments, while only 8 articles (8%) remained neutral. As was the 
case with the overall sample, FF letters on KXL (47% of the subsample) tended to skew 
more anti-industry than pro-industry (71% versus 24%, respectively), while the DP (31% 
of the subsample) and MDN (18% of the subsample) were far more pro-industry (70% 
pro-industry versus 27% anti-industry and 82% pro-industry versus 6% anti-industry, 
respectively). The TT and the WH contributed only 4 articles total (4% of the subsample), 
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Newspaper Number 
of M5 
articles 
Pro M5 (anti-
industry) 
editorials (% 
of total) 
Anti M5 
(pro-
industry) 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Neutral 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Dickinson 
Press 
87 37 (43%) 45 (52%) 5 (6%) 
Fargo Forum 70 35 (50%) 34 (49%) 1 (1%) 
Minot Daily 
News 
9 2 (22%) 7 (78%) 0 (0%) 
Tioga Tribune 9 2 (22%) 6 (67%) 1 (11%) 
Total 175 76 (43%) 92 (53%) 7 (4%) 
Table 6: Measure 5 Editorials by Newspaper 
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Type of writer Number 
of M5 
articles 
Pro M5 (anti-
industry) 
editorials (% 
of total) 
Anti M5 
(pro-
industry) 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Neutral 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Concerned Citizen 
Writer 
116 61 (53%) 54 (47%) 1 (>1%) 
Local Editorial 
Writer 
25 6 (24%) 13 (52%) 6 (24%) 
Interest Group 
Writer 
19 6 (32%) 13 (68%) 0 (0%) 
Politician 14 3 (22%) 11 (78%) 0 (0%) 
Industry Affiliated 
Writer 
1 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Total 175 76 (43%) 92 (53%) 7 (4%) 
Table 7: Measure 5 Editorials by Writer Group 
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with 3 (75%) being neutral and 1 being pro-industry (25%) (See Table 8 (p. 95) for exact 
figures). In terms of authorship, CCWs (37 editorials) trended strongly anti-industry (73% 
anti-industry versus 23% pro-industry), whereas nearly all other groups, except IGWs 
(who were evenly split), trended almost wholly pro-industry. As with the overall sample, 
CCWs formed a strong plurality of all editorials on KXL, thus this subsample appears far 
more anti-industry than the unified pro-KXL stance of most professional writers would 
suggest (see Table 9 (p. 96) for exact figures). 
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Newspaper Number 
of KXL 
articles 
Pro-KXL 
(pro-
industry) 
editorials (% 
of total) 
Anti-KXL 
(anti-
industry) 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Neutral 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Dickinson 
Press 
30 21 (70%) 8 (27%) 1 (3%) 
Fargo Forum 45 11 (24%) 32 (71%) 2 (4%) 
Minot Daily 
News 
17 14 (82%) 1 (6%) 2 (12%) 
Tioga Tribune 2 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 
Williston Herald 2 1 (50%) 0 1 (50%) 
Total 96 47 (49%) 41 (43%) 8 (8%) 
Table 8: KXL Editorials by Newspaper 
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Type of writer Number 
of KXL 
articles 
Pro-KXL 
(pro-
industry) 
editorials (% 
of total) 
Anti-KXL 
(anti-
industry) 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Neutral 
editorials 
(% of total) 
Concerned Citizen 
Writer 
37 10 (27%) 27 (73%) 0 (0%) 
Local Editorial 
Writer 
42 36 (86%) 0 (0%) 6 (14%) 
Interest Group 
Writer 
6 3 (50%) 3 (50%) 0 (0%) 
Politician 7 7 (100% 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Industry Affiliated 
Writer 
2 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Nationally 
Syndicated 
Columnist 
2 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 96 47 (49%) 41 (43%) 8 (8%) 
Table 9: KXL Editorials by Writer Group 
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3.6.3 Longer-term interview and focus group procedures 
 As was the case with the policy interviews in 3.6.1, the interviews for the longer-
term subset (n=18) were conducted in a semi-structured fashion. While I had a standard 
slate of questions prepared for respondents, my goal was to allow respondents the 
maximum amount of freedom in discussing the topics that were of greatest importance to 
them. However, whereas my conception of the policy interviews was largely based on 
Schoenberger's conception of the open-ended corporate interview, the Minot interviews 
were a much more intimate research endeavor. These interviews were conducted in far 
less formal settings with respondents whom I in many cases already shared a social 
relationship and in which there was far less trepidation on the part of both researcher and 
respondent about speaking to “experts” who would potentially judge one another for lack 
of knowledge or formality. In her chapter on interviewing in the SAGE Handbook of 
Qualitative Geography, Linda McDowell argues that in such cases of interpersonal 
familiarity, interviews often take on the qualities of a social exchange of information, rather 
than a one-sided transaction in which a researcher extracts knowledge from their 
respondents. This entanglement, she argues, is an unavoidable, and in fact, desirable, 
part of engaged research that takes seriously power dynamics in the researcher/subject 
relationship, resulting in ultimately stronger interview questions that seek to interrogate 
the specificities of time, place and politics that underlie in-person interviewing regarding 
time and place-related phenomena:  
‘Reality’ is no longer assumed to be ‘out there’, waiting to be discovered, 
named and described by social researchers but is itself constituted in and 
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by discourse, and embodied interactions, as are the representations that 
we chose to construct from fieldwork and interviewing. Thus we construct 
questions to ask and make knowledge claims on the basis of what we 
discover though the already existing conventions of language and discourse 
within which we are working (McDowell, 2010, p. 160). 
 
Indeed, as mentioned in 3.5.3, the trust relationships I created with my subjects prior to 
approaching them for interviews was critical in both increasing the likelihood of these 
subjects agreeing to interviews as well as feeling more comfortable sharing intimate 
details during the interviews themselves. Additionally, following McDowell’s contentions 
about “the already existing conventions of language and discourse,” I found that my 
growing familiarity with the local culture of longer-term respondents allowed me to 
establish a stronger rapport during interviews and allowed me to ask culturally- and 
geographically-specific questions that I would not have been able to ask without such 
entanglement with Minot’s specific cultural milieu. 
However, despite allowing these close, culturally-mediated relationships to dictate 
the flow and focus of the majority of my interviews, I always made sure to ask each 
respondent about key topics. These topics were drawn from discourses generated from 
results from the policy interview data, as well as newspaper data collected in objective 2. 
Of particular importance were the following questions: 
1. How did you first come to know about the importance of oil in the Bakken 
and hydraulic fracturing? 
2. When were you first aware of the fracking boom occurring and what were 
some of the key changes you have noticed as a result? 
3. What is your opinion of the way local media has covered the boom? Do 
you notice major differences between local media and national media 
narratives about the Bakken? 
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4. What do you think the biggest challenge will be for Minot in the future? 
Will this future look different if the oil industry is no longer a major factor in 
the economy? 
 
Although each of these questions covers somewhat different subjects, they all are 
intertwined as they help to establish how existing discourses (of both the media and face-
to-face varieties) are filtered down to the public. Indeed, while question 4 specifically 
examines media consumption, questions 1 and 2 elicited a host of answers that often 
directly pointed to the conduit through which such understandings were transmitted, with 
responses including such varied sources as school history classes, hearing gossip from 
neighbors, postings on social media and more traditional print and television media. Such 
answers made it clear that while traditional media still held a strong place in Minot’s 
information landscape (especially among older male respondents), there were a host of 
competing discourses that were often seen as more trustworthy. 
 Another major benefit to conducting interviews in a semi-structured manner was 
that I was able to be attuned to the particular topics that residents found to be of greatest 
importance in their understanding of how the oil boom had changed Minot. While my a 
priori reasoning had conditioned me to expect responses about issues such as crime, 
traffic and infrastructure, I was unprepared for how concerned residents were about 
lingering recovery issues related the 2011 Souris River flood or the long-term career 
prospects of Minot’s youth. In my early interviews, respondents continually raised these 
issues without prompting and were often far more animated on these subjects than on 
those related to more direct boomtown effects. In my later interviews, I began to use these 
two discourses as prompts in order to engage respondents, as they served to help both 
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make them comfortable and to allow them to speak at length about a topic that nearly 
everyone had an opinion on. This was particularly true in the case of more reserved 
respondents who often had little to say about the conventional externalities or were 
unwilling to directly criticize the oil industry (see Chapter 6). Indeed, if I had not been 
cognizant of interviewees’ feelings about their community and solely sought to have them 
answer questions about what I thought was important, I would not have received as strong 
responses as I did. 
 In addition to interviews, I also conducted 2 focus groups (n=7, with 1 respondent 
being among the 18 interview respondents) with these longer-term residents. In each of 
these focus groups, the respondents already knew one another due to being part of the 
same extended social circle, with each focus group being purposely scheduled around a 
group social activity such as gathering for food. My approach drew strong inspiration from 
Bosco and Turner (2010), who argue that focus groups in critical geography should 
function as a “collaborative performance” in which researchers and participants 
collectively converse in order to draw out responses that would not emerge in individual 
interviews. The goal of this collaborative performance, then is about, “exploring the 
dynamics of social discourse and social practice in relation to the construction of collective 
meaning” (p. 195). This notion of collective meaning proved particularly important as 
focus group respondents largely framed their understandings of boom effects in relation 
to the violation of strongly-held community-based cultural values (see Chapter 6). As 
Bosco and Turner note, this process of emergence of unexpected themes specifically in 
these internal group conversations allows for researcher theories to be reworked in light 
of new knowledge that only emerges from these shared conversations that individuals 
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have among their peers. Indeed, as mentioned in greater detail in section 3.5.3, the fact 
that many respondents already knew and trusted both me and each other as friends and 
social equals meant that they had no qualms about broaching contentious topics such as 
the broader role of the oil industry in North Dakota, and the genuine, race- and class-
based suspicions they had of in-migrants. 
 As far a specific questions asked during focus groups, these were roughly similar 
to those asked of interview participants covering topics such as how respondents became 
aware of fracking in the Bakken, what impacts of the oil boom have they noticed and what 
the major future challenges for Minot will be. Additionally, these focus groups often served 
as opportunities for participants to discuss their own personal lives in relation to the boom, 
which often spurred respondents to delve into subjects that I often had not considered in 
my initial questioning, particularly around issues such as youth entitlement and criminality. 
Finally, the second of two focus groups offered one of the only examples of respondents 
offering open denunciations of the oil and gas industry, with one respondent being 
especially critical of what she believed to be the negative environmental impacts of drilling 
and fracking. 
 Thus, to summarize, it was precisely my cultivation of these trust relationships that 
allowed me to successfully gather data that I feel I would not have been able to if I had 
taken a more formal and rigid ethnographic approach or if I had attempted to gauge 
residents’ feeling through a probabilistic sample design aiming to recruit hundreds or 
thousands of respondents. Although my positionality conflicts and social ties to many of 
my respondents may have caused me to at times blurred the lines between personal and 
professional and objective and subjective in my interviews and focus groups, I believe 
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that a more traditional, objective approach would have led to a greater number of 
interviews with uninterested and non-talkative subjects, which would have produced 
much more “standard” and expected data such as what was produced from many of my 
interviews with policy actors. 
3.7 Data analysis 
 3.7.1 Interview, focus group and participant observation analysis 
While just under half of the interviews (n=11) and both focus groups (n=2) were 
recorded, most interview (n=13) were done in either an impromptu fashion or over the 
phone, thus recording was either impractical or not feasible. In this latter case, I took 
detailed notes including word-for-word quotations of important things that were said. 
While the non-recorded interviews were transcribed by copying handwritten notes word-
for-word, recorded interviews were coded by attempting to strike a balance between a 
naturalized and de-naturalized approach. The former approach seeks to transcribe not 
only every word, but also grammatical and verbal mistakes, dead space in recordings, 
filler words (such as “um” or hmm”) and all sorts of non-speech cues as to the 
respondents’ behavior (i.e. displays of emotion such as laughter or crying, hesitation 
implying discomfort or doubt, changes in tone and volume, etc.). On the other hand, the 
de-naturalized approach seeks to create a “clean” transcript free of any mistakes or fillers. 
Although both of these approaches have their own merits depending upon the 
researchers analytical goals, as the analysis was focused largely on meaning and 
ideology rather than on analyzing speech patterns or respondents’ emotions, I chose to 
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follow a specific de-naturalized approach advocated by Oliver, Serovich and Mason 
(2005), which is in turn based on the work of Fairclough (1993). This approach focuses 
on accurately capturing “the substance of the interview, that is, the meanings and 
perceptions created and shared during a conversation”, rather than the intricacies of 
speech and emotion, as “the maneuverings of power are often captured in the content of 
the interview rather than in the mechanics of the conversation” (Oliver, Serovich and 
Mason, 2005, p. 1277-1278). However, in order to preserve some of the respondents’ 
emotional reactions, I did use notations to indicate displays such as humor anger and 
fear. 
 Following the completion the transcription process, I then coded the transcripts 
using ATLAS.ti qualitative data software. The transcripts for policy interviews (12 total) 
and Minot-based longer-term residents (18 total) were coded separately as the interview 
protocols for each group were significantly different and due to my desire to focus on 
policy themes with the former group and quality of life with the latter. Although I did not 
stick to one specific family of discourse analysis methods, my coding approach drew from 
several schools of thought, most of which privilege a priori (prior assumption) over en vivo 
(arising during textual analysis) coding. However, the over-riding similarity between these 
approaches was that they sought to examine how power is exercised and identities are 
formed through the strategic use of language and discourses. 
Major inspiration came from Manuel Delanda’s conception of the assemblage. While 
assemblages and networks mean many things to many different scholars and have been 
used in various ways in human geography (Sheppard, 2008), Delanda’s approach 
focuses on examining the discourses that bind actants (the collective category of humans, 
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non-humans and objects) and institutions together into internally and externally coherent 
networks.10 Although such codes may be interpreted differently by those in control of the 
network versus those outside of it, the general purpose of these codes is to craft a specific 
language that legitimates the existence of the network and helps spread its ideology 
(Delanda, 2006). An example can be found in Table 10 (p. 105), in which a priori codes 
and assumptions about actants I developed based on literature review and preliminary 
research have a specific meaning within the North Dakota’s oil and gas policy community, 
but may not be shared by non-community members. These discourse/actant assumptions 
then formed the basis of interview prompts that could be used to test whether my 
assumptions about their meaning was correct. These tests were then used to structure 
specific ATLAS.ti codes that reflected the outcomes of these interviews. For example, 
using the growth discourse in the following table, can be found in the differing uses of this 
discourse between policy figures and “everyday” North Dakota residents: whereas policy 
figures largely confirmed my a priori definition of the concept (measuring development in 
terms of number of industry jobs, pipelines built and wells drilled), non-policy individuals 
viewed development quite differently (overall job growth, construction of civil 
infrastructure and increased provision of social services). 
  
                                                 
10 Delanda refers to specific words or phrases imbued with particular meanings as codes. However, so as 
not to create confusion with the codes used in ATLAS.ti markup, Delandan “codes” will be referred to as 
“discourses.” 
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Discourse/Actant Role/Meaning Prompt 
Discourse   
Development/Growth - Legitimizes political/ 
economic intervention 
- Positions the fossil 
fuel economy as the 
only legitimate option 
- What does development mean for your city 
or organization? 
Actant   
Industry - Supportive of 
development 
-Connotes opposition 
to environmentalism 
- Connotes strong 
political influence 
- Do you have overall positive or 
negative feelings about the oil and gas 
industry? 
Table 10: Discourses and Codes 
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 Another major influence on my coding approach was the general school known as 
critical discourse analysis (CDA). Although there are many disputes about what does and 
does not constitute CDA, it is generally viewed as an analytical approach inspired by the 
work of theorists such as Karl Marx and Michel Foucault that seeks to show how 
discourses function in society in regard to the exercise of power and control over culture 
(see Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000) for an extensive review). In addition to theories 
adapted from Fairclough (1993, 2013) on the hegemonic role of discourse in society (to 
be discussed in greater detail in 3.7.2), I also drew substantial inspiration from Tujn van 
Dijk (2004), who argues that knowledge, both personal and at the group level, is formed 
through the interplay between experience and discourse. The repetition of these 
discourses through face-to-face interaction leads to their acceptance and further 
dissemination among community members. Indeed, this notion is particularly important 
for helping to link Objectives 1, 2 and 3, as there are many discourses that cut across the 
texts analyzed, but are often employed in different ways by individuals depending on their 
various identities and locations. Building on these same themes, Gee (2014, 2017) has 
developed a toolkit for doing discourse analysis centered on the concept of discourse as 
an attempt to affirm or challenge assumed notions of practice, politics and identity. 
Although I do not directly follow Gee’s coding method, his conception was particularly 
important for the coding of all 3 objectives, as each major group of respondents and/or 
editorial writers specifically sought to support or oppose the dominant pro-industry 
ideology (see Chapter 4). 
 In terms of the coding itself, I attempted to balance these a priori power-centric 
methods with what a “patterned meaning” approach, which allows for the development of 
 107 
 
en vivo codes under the explicit acknowledgement that a researcher’s own prior 
assumptions, research objectives and individual subjectivity help to determine which 
codes and themes are meaningful (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Indeed, while I attempted to 
remain as objective as possible when making these en vivo codes, I often found myself 
basing them on how they related to the main question I was trying to answer: How do 
individuals conceptualize and understand the fracking boom? An example of this in the 
coding comes from a specific anecdote about identity I heard from respondents of all 
stripes: North Dakota and North Dakotans are special. Several respondents also told me 
that the opposite held true: Those from outside the state, as well as their cultures, were 
therefore suspect. Once I began coding these interviews, I was cognizant of that fact, 
creating several en vivo codes that reflected the meaning of these types of statements in 
the text: “North Dakota exceptionalism”, “the North Dakota Way/good government”, 
“improvement of community values/quality of life” and “decline of community 
values/quality of life” and “Us v. them” for the policy interview set; “North Dakota native”, 
“decline in moral/community values”, “outsiders hurt culture” and “North Dakotans have 
better values” for the longer-term set. Indeed, these codes were used frequently for both 
sets, being used 74/487 (15.2%) times in the policy set and 32/364 (8.8%) in the longer-
term set. Indeed, while there were other prominent codes in each set, these value 
judgment utterances defined the tone of both sets around the question of morality, which 
became the overarching organizational theme for both chapters 4 and 6. 
 However, not all en vivo codes were so intimately tied to a priori assumptions. One 
of the most surprising themes that began to emerge in the coding process was how policy 
individuals framed the success of the oil and gas industry as a reflection of the overall 
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“state of the state” of North Dakota. While some of these responses may have been more 
the result of playing to an intended audience or a reflection of the corporate messaging 
of respondents’ institutions (indeed, most of these respondents worked for the oil industry 
or on its behalf or as its regulators), this theme ran counter to many national media 
framings of North Dakota, by both national media and several respondents, as an isolated 
landscape that would not be worthy of outside attention if not for the existence of oil, “a 
bust with tumbleweeds” (personal interview). While I certainly expected some of these 
talking points from the policy respondents, I did not expect them to be as prominent as 
they were. To this effect, I created two specific codes to deal with the relationship between 
“boosterism” and “industry/government cooperation.” After I had finished assigning these 
codes to all of the policy documents, I began to notice a pattern: nearly all of the instances 
in which I assigned these two codes matched strongly with previously mentioned codes 
about fostering a positive North Dakotan identity, as well as being strongly tied to 
eliminating purportedly burdensome regulations on the oil industry in order to encourage 
growth. Indeed, in each of the 16 times the boosterism code was assigned to a passage, 
that passage was also assigned codes from the preceding paragraph about North Dakota 
values (exceptionalism, improving quality of life, etc.), a coincidence which also occurred 
in 6/16 passages the industry/government cooperation code was used (increasing to 6/11 
passages if a technical interview with the state’s chief pipeline regulator is excluded). 
Thus, although these emerging patterns challenged my initial assumptions that the 
industry/government relationship was solely a transactional economic one designed to 
increase the profits and prestige of both parties, they helped to confirm the degree to 
which this cooperation was as much, if not more, a cultural project to repurpose North 
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Dakota’s existing pro-industry identity, Homo Dakoticus, in order to support (or at least, 
not oppose) the oil and gas industry. 
 An example of yet another unexpected en vivo occurrence comes from the longer-
term interview and focus group set. In 2011, Minot (where all of these interviews took 
place) experienced the worst flooding in city history (see Chapter 6). Although I was aware 
of this event and knew that it had been majorly disruptive to many city residents, I 
expected that the flood would have become a smaller topic of concern in the more than 
4 years that had passed between it and the time that I began my interviews in fall 2015. 
However, this was by far the topic that respondents identified as Minot’s number one 
issue, even above-and-beyond oil and gas concerns. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 6, 
respondents viewed the flood and its resulting devastation of the city’s housing market as 
the precursor to many of the more recent oil-related housing struggles. Thus, the flood 
became a lynchpin event that held together many of the varied grievances that 
respondents held regarding development in the city. Indeed, in addition to housing, the 
flood (and its incomplete and uneven recovery) was seen as compounding other issues 
such as boom-related traffic increases, infrastructural woes and the city government’s 
failure to develop Minot’s downtown, which was the lowest-lying area of the city and site 
of greatest devastation. This flood/disorder synergy can also be demonstrated directly by 
analyzing the codes. Flooding was mentioned in 17/18 documents (94%) in the Minot set 
and was brought up without prompting in 9 of those interviews (53%). Indeed, I began 
asking people about the flood in later interviews as it became clear to me that this was 
the topic that respondents felt most passionate about. Additionally, flood-related codes 
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were coincident with housing-related codes in 13/28 cases (46%) whereas oil was only 
mentioned in 7/28 (25%) cases. 
 To summarize, while there are various approaches to coding that attempt to 
balance a priori and en vivo code creation, research for this dissertation largely privileged 
approaches that favored a priori reasoning. I wanted to focus thematically on power, 
ideology and identity, all of which are fundamental to a priori-centric methods rooted in 
CDA. However, as the above examples demonstrate, there were many instances where 
en vivo discoveries either directly contradicted a priori assumptions or revealed 
unexpected themes that ultimately became important organizational cornerstones of both 
ethnographic chapters in the dissertation. 
3.7.2 Newspaper coding and analysis 
 As mentioned in section 3.6.2, the newspaper sample was focused on two major 
issues: Measure 5 (M5) and the Keystone XL (KXL) pipeline. The editorials in each of 
these subsamples were then divided further into one of three categories: 1.) a pro-industry 
viewpoint; 2.) an anti-industry viewpoint; and 3.) neutral or not taking a specific viewpoint. 
In practical terms a pro-industry viewpoint meant opposing M5 while supporting, whereas 
an anti-industry viewpoint meant the reverse. Given these pieces of information, it would 
have been easy to begin coding using a priori reasoning based on stereotypes about what 
a pro-industry or an anti-industry individual was expected to believe. However, given my 
previous experience coding policy interviews, I was aware that important, unexpected 
thematic details would be lost without allowing for the emergence of at least some en vivo 
codes. Thus, I chose to again use a loose patterned meaning approach (Braun and 
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Clarke, 2006), which would allow for a balance between a priori and en vivo codes. 
Indeed, this approach has already been used successfully in fracking-related newspaper 
analysis by Jaspal and Nerlich (2014). In their study of the national fracking debate in the 
UK, the authors created what they refer to as “superordinate themes”, or those that help 
to frame often diverging arguments under major thematic groupings that provide a 
coherent narrative superstructure. Based upon initial cursory readings that had already 
identified the general ideological viewpoint of each editorial, I assigned headings for each 
subsample that I used to group articles based on shared themes and the discursive work 
that these themes did for writers that employed them (See Table 11 and 12 (p. 112-113)).  
Using this overarching a priori structure, I was then able to code each of the 
editorials en vivo while remaining cognizant of the over-arching ideological camps to 
which authors aligned (see Tables 13-16 (p.114-117) for the 5 most prominent codes 
assigned to each group). Indeed, using these superordinate themes as starting points for 
deeper exploration within the corresponding framework led to the emergence of 
unexpected subthemes that provided for a richer analysis that a sole en vivo or a priori 
one would have allowed. Building on Gee’s (2014) social languages tool, which argues 
that writers and speakers of content have self-fashioned identities which they consciously 
and unconsciously change when speaking to different groups of speakers in order to 
deliver messages with specific meanings beyond the literal meanings of their words. 
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Measure 5 Editorials   
Superordinate theme Discursive purpose No. of editorials 
Farming Created trusted expert 
subject position that lent 
extra legitimacy to those 
that employed it 
61 
Hunting/outdoor heritage Created conservationist 
subject position that 
allowed one to 
support/oppose M5 on 
benefits/drawbacks to 
recreation 
48 
Property rights Allowed for a M5 to be 
opposed by relating M5 to 
an unrelated wedge issue 
40 
Environmentalism Allowed for M5 to be 
supported/opposed by 
connecting it to 
contentious national-level 
issue 
32 
Table 11: Measure 5 Superordinate Themes 
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Keystone XL Editorials   
Superordinate Theme Discursive Purpose No. of editorials 
“Washington”/corruption Connected KXL to reviled 
federal government and 
emblematic public 
supporters/opponents 
37 
Energy security Allowed KXL to be 
supported/opposed on 
geopolitical grounds 
33 
 Environmental risk Allowed KXL to be 
supported/opposed on 
health and safety grounds 
33 
Table 12: Keystone XL Superordinate Themes 
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Most prominent codes for M5 supporting articles 
Code No. of occurrences 
Hunting (pro) 28 
M5 is pro-farming 24 
Environmentalism (pro) 12 
Honors Theodore 
Roosevelt’s conservation 
legacy 
10 
Measure is pro-private 
property 
3 
Table 13: M5 Supporting Article Codes 
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Most prominent codes for M5 opposing articles 
Code No. of occurrences 
Out-of-state takeover 50 
M5 diverts money from 
other needs 
44 
M5 is anti-private property 40 
M5 is anti-farming 37 
Legislature, not 
referendum, should 
address conservation 
28 
Table 14: M5 Opposing Article Codes 
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Most prominent codes for KXL supporting articles 
Code No. of occurrences 
Pipelines safer than 
railroad/truck 
19 
Good for energy security 18 
Obama (anti) 17 
Bi-partisan project 14 
No environmental risk 13 
Table 15: KXL Supporting Article Codes 
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Most prominent codes for KXL opposing articles 
Code No. of occurrences 
Republicans/leaders 
corrupt 
20 
Environmental risk 20 
KXL prelude to oil export 17 
Bad for energy security 15 
Will raise gas prices 11 
Table 16: KXL Opposing Article Codes 
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Examples from the M5 subsample are provided by the hunting/outdoor heritage 
and farmer subjectivities that editorial writers assigned themselves. By rhetorically 
labeling themselves as either farmers, hunters and outdoorsmen, letter writers were able 
to take on subject positions that carry strong currency in a state that prides itself on its 
identity of homesteading and agrarian productivism. Thus, this heritage framework 
allowed for particularly effective emotional, rather than factual, appeals to be made, all of 
which made specific appeals to a nebulous “heritage” that was “at risk.”  
This notion of a mysterious, yet undeniable, existential threat to North Dakotans’ 
collective identity led me to examine this heritage framing in relationship to an en vivo 
code that became the most used code in the entire M5 subset: “out-of-state takeover.” 
Many M5 opponents specifically sought to cast the measure as a conspiracy created by 
non-Dakotans to destroy North Dakota’s rural economy and environment out of jealousy 
of not having viable oil and gas resources. This framing, which was used by 50/93 (54%) 
of all anti-M5 writers became a common means to voice trope grievances against those 
from outside of the state, who were seen as implicitly not sharing the values that have 
promoted “stewardship” of North Dakota’s rural environment (a specific word used 
frequently by “farmers” using the takeover framing). Thus, I decided to examine how 
frequently these heritage and takeover framings co-occurred, feeling that there must be 
a pattern. Indeed, the out-of-state takeover discourse frequently overlapped with the pro-
hunting and anti-farming heritage discourses, co-occurring 11/50 times (22%) with the 
former, 25/50 times (50%) with the latter and having a tri-occurrence 8/50 times (16%). 
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The overlapping themes identified by this pattern analysis became the bedrock of the 
arguments I advanced in Chapter 5.2. 
Another example of the benefits of this framework approach can be found in the 
KXL subsample. As mentioned in Table B, the environmental risk framing became a way 
for both supporters and opponents of KXL to argue their position by framing themselves 
as caring about the environment. While the connection between this discourse and 
pipeline opponents is self-evident (an oil leak would cause contamination), the connection 
between it and the KXL opponents was less obvious as environmentalism is generally a 
concept that supporters of the oil industry have been hostile to and most KXL supportive 
writers were eager to argue how unlikely a pipeline accident would be. However, much 
as with our previous case, a closer examination of code co-occurrence can help to shed 
light on the purpose this discourse serves.  
One of the major en vivo codes that was assigned to KXL opponents was “Obama 
(anti)”, as many directly blamed the former president for preventing KXL’s construction. 
Indeed, 17/47 opponents (36%) directly expressed opposition to Obama and his policies 
regarding the pipeline. This code frequently co-occurred with the code for “no 
environmental risk”, being mentioned in 5/13 (38%) editorials using the environmental risk 
framing. Additionally, many of the passages where these overlapping editorials 
specifically sought to show that the Obama Administration was deliberately stymying KXL 
despite being aware of how few safety and environmental issues were involved. This led 
me to believe that the debate over KXL was not so much about the pipeline itself, but yet 
another issue that had become a test of partisan loyalty. Evidence for this theory was 
born out through a co-occurrence check on articles from the anti-KXL set for the codes 
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“environmental risk” and the three related codes “Obama (pro)”, “Republicans/leaders 
corrupt” and “Heitkamp is a sellout” (in reference to North Dakota’s Democratic U.S. 
Senator being a strong public supporter of KXL), which showed that these partisan codes 
were used in 11/20 cases (55%) in which KXL opponents employed the environmental 
risk framing. Thus, it became clear to me that KXL had become yet another oil-related 
proxy issue through which deeper debates about North Dakota’s political, cultural and 
environmental values could be had. This proxy issue framing is of fundamental 
importance to the argument advanced in chapter 5 that the fight over KXL was more over 
the future of North Dakota than about pipelines, property or the environment. Indeed, the 
patterns discovered in the coding of these KXL articles helped me to understand how the 
debate over a pipeline that neither traverses North Dakota, nor carries a significant 
amount of Bakken crude, became one of the most hotly debate topics in local newspapers 
for a period of over 5 years. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the research process for the dissertation. The overarching 
objective of the dissertation was to examine how North Dakota residents have understood 
and experienced the Bakken oil boom and how discourses about the boom have 
mediated these experiences. Purposive sampling focused on two groups: elite policy 
actors directly connected to the oil and gas sector and non-elite, longer-term residents of 
Minot, a Bakken boomtown. Methods included semi-structured interviews, focus groups, 
and participant observation at industry and activist conferences. Newspaper editorials in 
North Dakota-based newspapers, sampled through a regime that identified coverage of 
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key oil and gas related events, were examined using content analysis methods strongly 
inspired by CDA. All of the resulting text (including transcription of ethnographic data and 
editorials from 4 newspapers) were coded and analyzed in ATLAS.ti software using an 
approach that was influenced by CDA and “patterned meaning” coding.  
This chapter also introduced several key concepts that provide the foundation of 
the dissertation’s substantive analytical chapters (Chapter 4-6), including the role of 
values in structuring respondents experiences of the oil boom as well as how certain 
apparently innocuous debates (such as the struggles over M5 and KXL) were proxies for 
debates over cultural meaning and group identity. Additionally, this chapter sought to 
reflect critically on issues such as positionality and researcher and respondent 
relationships.  Trust played an integral role in conducting interviews and focus groups 
with purposively sampled respondents. 
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4. HOMO DAKOTICUS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concept of the Homo Energeticus, a subject who builds 
their identity around the consumption of fossil fuels. As such high-consumption lifestyles 
are so prevalent within Western capitalism, many individuals unconsciously adopt this 
identity without realizing they are doing so. It is posited that elites are then able to appeal 
to these individuals to find support for policies that further entrench existing energy 
policies. Building on these findings, this chapter introduce a new Bakken-specific variant 
of the Homo Energeticus, the Homo Dakoticus. This chapter then examines discourses 
used by oil and gas and political elites to help promote such an identity among North 
Dakota residents. It is argued that elites attempt to graft support for the oil industry onto 
existing prevalent ideologies that support free-market capitalism, consensus-based 
politics and patriotism. 
4.2 Homo Dakoticus 
One of the principal reasons that fracking has become an integral part of the 
political and economic landscape in North Dakota is through concerted efforts by the oil 
and gas industry, state and local governments and various boosters to foster positive 
images of fracking-related development among the state’s population. Indeed, such a 
strategy is common in energy landscapes beyond the Bakken, with attempts to replicate 
pro-industry and pro-energy subjectivities among populations referred to separately by 
Arthur Mason and Randolph Haluza-Delay as the creation of the Homo Energeticus. 
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Mason’s (2013) conception of the Homo Energeticus is of an individual who consciously 
fashions their identity around the conspicuous consumption of fossil fuels, with higher 
levels of consumption providing the illusion of high social standing and moral superiority, 
regardless of one’s actual class position or behavior: “Through elaborate energy 
expenditures, today's high-energy consumer achieves an equivalency with the morality 
of the aristocrat whose elaborate cultivation of outward appearance served as an 
instrument of social differentiation and the display of rank through outward form” (3).  
Indeed, such is the need among post-WWII Americans to maintain this façade of 
carboniferous opulence, that all reductions in fossil fuel use and emissions must be, 
“about production and not consumption” (3).  
Haluza-Delay’s Energeticus, while also tied to consumption, places individual 
behavior toward energy within more explicit discourses of nationalism and capitalist 
development. Kowalsky and Haluza-Delay (2013) argue that the rhetoric of the Alberta 
government seeks to make tar sands development the default position by presenting it 
as, “necessary, socially naturalized and thus immune to any criticism other than 
technological fine tuning”, echoing many classic post-political arguments about the nature 
of environmental governance. This not only shuts down debate, but also forces Albertan 
society to support the government’s position as part of normal good citizenship: “the 
Alberta tar sands are developed such that Albertan society has to conform to the demands 
put on it by mining operations, and that human beings are fitted to the demands of the tar 
sands rather than the inverse” (162). The ways in which the collective apparatus of the 
Albertan government, energy industry and pro-oil civil society groups “interpellates 
Albertans” within a “common sense” identity that is centrally-defined around unwavering 
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support to the tar sands has led Haluza-Delay (2012) to argue that Homo Energeticus 
has morphed into the more nationalist-centered Homo Alberticus. Indeed, this conception 
of an industry-state nexus seeking to control and define debate is highly reminiscent of 
the situation in the Bakken, hence this chapter will seek to define these efforts as the 
creation of Homo Dakoticus. 
4.3 Key themes for the creation of Homo Dakoticus 
Creating pro-energy subjectivity, as mentioned in the literature review, is as much 
about demarcating appropriate behaviors as it is about direct coercion. In a stable, 
homogenous sociopolitical climate such as North Dakota where civility reigns, logical and 
emotional appeals are particularly important, especially when it comes to nurturing a 
supposed personal connection between residents and the energy industry. As such, 
boosters frequently rely on several key themes to foster this sense of belonging among 
citizens, often seeking to flatter residents about their particular role in making sure the 
Bakken is a successful project. The three major themes, which overlap significantly, are: 
The North Dakota Way, North Dakota Exceptionalism and Resiliency. Each of these 
themes, which will be developed in detail in the following sections, seek to inculcate a 
sense of personal mission among Dakotans as an integral part not only of their state and 
local communities, but as players in national and international affairs. 
4.3.1 The North Dakota Way 
North Dakota is rarely the first, and often the last, state that comes to mind in 
popular and scholarly discussions about the United States. Among the state’s populace, 
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this often manifests as a perceived slighting of the state relative to others and the notion 
that North Dakotans must support one another as they believe that any relief from outside 
influences, be they corporations or the federal government, is both unlikely and 
undesired. Indeed, there is often strong, reflexive distrust of those from outside of North 
Dakota who claim to have solutions for the state’s problems, either real or imagined. This 
distrust is a core component of the so-called “North Dakota Way”, an oft-invoked, yet 
rarely-defined code of behavior for “native” White North Dakotans to follow. The core 
tenets of the Way, although not universally agreed upon, are typically said to include the 
following: 
1. Placing the interests of one’s community and one’s state above one’s 
own. 
2. Being an unquestionably loyal American patriot as a matter of principle, 
rather than for selfish purposes. 
3. Working hard and not complaining about one’s circumstances, because 
they could always be worse. 
4. Being excessively polite and hospitable, as one must behave in the way 
one wishes to be treated, especially if they expect assistance from their 
community in the future. 
4. Favoring “common sense”, tried-and-true approaches over ideological 
ones.  
5. Taking pleasure in simple, uncomplicated ways of living that emphasize 
faith, family and home over decadent, urban, outsider culture (Ms. C, 2016). 
  
Despite these tenets potentially opening up the possibility of government 
intervention, community, state and nation are seen entities often divorced from politics, 
thus liberalism and socialism are often seen as counter to the Way. As such, Dakota 
culture can be viewed as being stubborn, insular and averse to any changes, even if they 
could benefit individuals or the community without radically altering their character. 
However, more often the Way is invoked positively as separating North Dakota from the 
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perceived failures of the rest of the United States and certainly other countries. The 
leaders in the state Republican Party, which has completely dominated government at all 
levels in North Dakota since the 1930s, have specifically championed the Way of late as 
an antidote to Democratic attempts to foster growth in the wake of the Great Recession. 
During his successful 2010 campaign for the state’s lone seat in the U.S. House, longtime 
Republican state senate majority leader Rick Berg specifically invoked the Way to 
demonize nine-term Democratic incumbent Earl Pomeroy as out of touch: “There’s a 
Washington way and a North Dakota way and that’s what our campaign is about. I believe 
that Washington can learn a lot about the way we do things here in North Dakota” (Herald 
News Service, 2010).  
However, some have been more critical of this invocation of the Way, arguing that 
it is often used to bully critics of conservative, pro-business policy into silence, particularly 
when it comes to the regulatory capture of elected officials and bureaucrats by the energy 
industry. Democratic Party chair and state Rep. Kylie Oversen has argued that her 
Republican colleagues have given precedence to the financial needs of the oil and gas 
industry over those of average citizens, arguing that, “that is not the North Dakota way 
and not the way we do business in our state” (Oversen, 2013). Similarly, the editorial 
board of the conservative Fargo Forum, the state’s largest newspaper, has argued that 
oil and gas donations have clouded the judgment of North Dakota politicians: “embrace 
of big bucks from oil and gas executives doesn't seem to comport with the much-
ballyhooed ethical foundation of "the North Dakota way." Or does it? And if it does, North 
Dakota is no different than anyplace else” (Forum News Service, 2012). More recent 
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scandals in the oil patch have led the Forum to declare that invocation of the Way to 
trumpet the status quo is, “a cynical joke” (Forum News Service, 2014). 
Yet despite these public denunciations of the Way, its influence remains strong 
among the general population and is frequently invoked by those seeking to defend 
and/or promote the oil and gas industry and the way it has partnered with state and local 
governments. At the 2016 Williston Basin Petroleum Conference, the primary meet-and-
greet for regulators, elected officials and industry personnel, then-Lt. Gov. Drew Wrigley 
held a roundtable discussion with two prominent Bakken industry players, Jim Arthaud of 
oilfield-service company Behm Energy and Ernie Graham of Graham Development, one 
of the oil patch’s key real estate developers. Both men praised the role of state and local 
government in creating a pro-business, anti-regulatory climate for oil and gas corporations 
and partner industries. While such responses would be expected at business conferences 
of all stripes, the two specifically argued that such industry-government cooperation was 
emblematic of the common sense values inherent among North Dakotans. In arguing for 
the continued importance of investing in the oil patch during the downturn, Graham was 
particularly effusive in his praise:  
I’d like to thank the local and state government of North Dakota. I’ve been 
coming here for about 6-7 years. I lived here for 3 years. My son lives in 
Minot. Williston, the epicenter of the OG business in North Dakota, bears 
no resemblance to the city I saw 6 years ago. The infrastructure is much 
better. Better roads. Schools. Hospitals. Housing. Hotels. There’s a 
fantastic community center there. A new airport’s coming. It’s going to be a 
great place to live, if it isn’t already a great place to live. What should the 
state government do to keep the ball rolling? If I had 1 suggestion, I would 
say, continue on with what you are doing (personal recording). 
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Similarly, Arthaud, who touts his lifelong association with the small, oil patch town of 
Belfield, believes that the conservative, slow growth culture of rural North Dakota will be 
its major advantage in recovering from the slowdown:  
I think we can say we’re in great shape to take advantage of the recovery. 
We have great infrastructure. We have great schools. We have great 
pipelines. We’ve got water. We’ve got ambulances. Fire trucks. Hospitals. I 
tell you, I think North Dakota and its leaders have just done a fabulous job 
over the last 10 years. There were times on the county commission where 
we thought we couldn’t get it fast enough. But when you look back at it, they 
did a fabulous job. So, I think the state’s done good. I think they need to 
steer the course and keep up with those investments (personal recording). 
 
Indeed, under this invocation of “the Way” the people of North Dakota and their ability to 
prioritize the needs of the oil industry over those of their community is seen as essential 
to making sure that the state remains prosperous under the current economic model. 
The Way has always taken on somewhat of a mystical quality and is used to 
hagiographically explain how North Dakota broke free of outside influences during its 
early period. As John MacMartin, director of the Minot Area Chamber of Commerce 
argues, it was this desire for economic independence among the nascent Non-Partisan 
League (the forebears of the state’s contemporary Democratic party, although in its early 
years ideological adherents crossed party lines) that led to the end of the state’s 
dependence on the Minneapolis grain cartel:  
If you go back to our populist history, the reason we’ve got the Mill and 
Elevator in Grand Forks or the Bank of North Dakota is that folks really 
believed that they were being strangled by Minneapolis. General Mills was 
in Minneapolis. You sent your raw grain to Minneapolis. They ground it and 
they added something to it that added more value and they could keep the 
price really low. So, they farmers never really made a lot of money. By 
creating a mill and elevator that the State owned, the farmers had the 
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opportunity to send their grain someplace else, and perhaps get a little bit 
more money than somewhere else since that mill was run differently than it 
would have been in other places” (personal recording). 
 
MacMartin uses this example to promote the state’s current efforts to rapidly expand their 
road, rail, pipeline and processing industries in support of both the oil and agriculture 
industries: “Most of those cycles have since been broken … and we’re now looking for 
things we can do better with our own products … to stabilize and survive some of the ups 
and downs better … it’s going to make our economy more solid.” This supposed radical 
independence of North Dakotans is, according to conservative Christian talk show host 
Scott Hennen, what allows them to persevere in the face of national media “myths” about 
how they are being forced by the oil industry to accept growth that can only be brought 
about through, “the raping and pillaging of the landscape”: “Given all the negative 
coverage, you’d be surprised at how positive people are. They just keep plowing along 
and doing what they want to do.” Hennen argues that these perpetual falsehoods have 
driven the near total blackout of national reporters by local governments in Western North 
Dakota and given him, a lifelong Dakotan, unique inside access to local goings on through 
his popular human interest radio program What’s on Your Mind? and its companion 
website Voices of Watford11:  
I’m just trying to be the voice of the industry and the voice of the people and 
to take out the middle man and tell it like it is. I’m trying to tell it the way it is 
for people who are actually there and give people from outside of the West 
                                                 
11 A former reporter for the Minot Daily News, who wishes to remain anonymous, told this researcher that 
the reason newspapers would refuse to talk to me was because they thought I would either steal their 
local stories or use information gained to slander Western North Dakota. 
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who don’t understand it a frame of reference, not just use a quote here and 
there for window dressing” (personal recording). 
 
 This mistrust of outsiders and anger over perceived misrepresentation is also used 
to justify the state’s, and by extension its rural residents’, rejection of both 
environmentalism and other “liberal, big government” political economic interventions in 
order to fix some of the boom’s ills. Tessa Sandstrom, the public relations manager for 
the North Dakota Petroleum Council (NDPC), the industry’s lobbying arm within the state, 
argues that North Dakotans are proud of their communities and the prosperity that the 
boom has brought them, even if there may be some social downsides:  
Yes, we need to do a better job educating the public about what the industry 
is doing to clean up spills and improve communities, but the national media 
isn’t helping us. They always portray North Dakota as a bust with 
tumbleweeds whereas local papers are always showing the vitality of the 
Bakken. That’s kind of an illusion that Western North Dakota is a disaster, 
but I’m from Western North Dakota and I go back every weekend, and that’s 
just not the case (personal recording). 
 
This pride and community cohesiveness is, according to Sandstrom, also why the majority 
of residents support the “cozy relationship” between industry and state and local 
governments and generally tend to oppose environmentalist, “keep-it-in-the ground type 
of groups” such as the Dakota Resource Council (DRC) and the Sierra Club, whom 
Sandstrom argues reject the maintenance of a “positive business environment for 
development” in favor of “stopping all oil development in general.” The environmentalists’ 
behavior contrasts strongly with that of “property rights” groups such as the North Dakota 
Association of Oil and Gas Producing Counties (NDAOGPC) and the Northwest 
Landowners’ Association (NWLOA) who appreciate the intimate connections between 
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citizens and business that North Dakota’s small size allows: “We can actually come 
together for bipartisan solutions” that “encourage continued development of all our 
resources.” This theme of constructive engagement between industry and certain citizens 
is echoed by NDPC president Ron Ness, who has similar disdain for DRC and Sierra 
Club:  
You know, they frankly don’t carry any weight in North Dakota whatsoever. 
They are not viewed as credible. Essentially the North Dakota attitude is 
that you need to be willing to be at the table and be part of the discussion 
and find reasonable, common-sense approaches. If you don’t bring that to 
the table, then you don’t get a seat at the table. Now, other groups like 
Northwest Landowners, they came to take the path that we should work 
together to find things that we want changed. And we’ve had tremendous 
success making changes on things that are important to them. Those are 
the real people who farm and ranch up in those communities and who 
understand and value energy production. They’re not just obstructionists or 
people who have made environmentalism an occupation, rather than a 
passion. For others it’s become an occupation and an economic driver for 
them to be obstructionists (personal interview). 
 
Indeed, such rhetoric reinforces the notion that “real” North Dakotans are somehow 
different from those who would seek to undermine the oil industry, even in the face of 
potential disaster, a theme Ness seeks to prove with his relaying of the story of Steve 
Jensen. In September 2013, nearly 860,000 gallons of oil spilled from a Tesoro pipeline 
on Jensen’s ranch near Tioga, midway between the hub cities of Williston and Minot. 
While spills such as this are “tragic in their own way”, Ness argues that the Jensens are 
good North Dakotans who are willing to make personal sacrifices for the greater good: 
“They’re typical North Dakotans who want their land cleaned up. They’re reasonable. 
They probably bake pie for the workers who are out there. In the scheme of the whole 
thing it’s a very small part of what you might think of Downtown Houston or something. 
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It’s only the equivalent of 1 block. It’ll get cleaned up and the Jensen family will champion 
the effort.” Although the pie baking anecdote is rooted in truth, in interviews with the press, 
the Jensens have been a bit less bullish on the cleanup effort, with Don Morrison of the 
DRC arguing that the Jensens don’t speak out for fear of being ostracized or damaging 
their communities. Jensen himself has somewhat concurred with this, noting that he 
remains as hospitable as possible in order to keep the peace: “When people ask you 
about it, you don’t dwell on it. You just keep it short and simple” (Bryan, 2014). 
As is the case with many of the above examples, invocation of “the Way” can be 
viewed not as promoting community values, but as wielding their abstract notion in order 
to prop up a divisive status quo that is often of greater benefit to the industry and its 
boosters than many average North Dakotans. While this is at times accomplished directly 
among politicians by invoking “the Way” in order to counter anti-boosterist rhetoric, “the 
Way” also draws on the strong culture of silence and consensus that is pervasive in 
Western North Dakota’s small towns, where anti-oil-by-rail activist Ron Schalow argues 
that the pro-industry status quo reigns because, “people just go along to get along” 
(personal interview). Thus, while official appeals to tenets of “the Way” in support of 
boosterism can only reach so many, fear among the populace of being the one to break 
standards of decorum often leads to a vicious cycle of residents policing other community 
members and censoring their own speech. The effect of marshalling “the Way” to support 
pro-industry rationality is that dissenting views are not only suppressed, but also painted 
as entirely without merit for consideration by “real” North Dakotans. Although some 
prominent voices in state government or media may occasionally speak out, the effect of 
such interventions often has little effect on the overall debate. In fact, such interventions 
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are often criticized by boosters as an example of doing exactly what dissenters claim to 
oppose: violating “the Way.” 
4.3.2 North Dakota exceptionalism 
One of the major talking points among pro-industry boosters has been the supposed 
exceptionalism of North Dakota, both within a national and international context. This line 
of thinking has been particularly strong during the most recent oil boom due to the 
industry’s perceived protective influence over North Dakota during a time when many 
states, as well as other countries, are struggling economically in the wake of the Great 
Recession. While touting the economic benefits makes good sense from a purely 
commercial standpoint, this exceptionalism is often said to stem not solely from sound 
economic and political decision making, but also from the strong moral character, 
intelligence and work ethic of North Dakotans. Rep. Andrew Maragos (R-Minot) is an 
especially strong proponent of the virtuous citizen model, arguing that the state’s 
residents have defined its exceptional reputation since the state’s inception:  
We keep a strong higher education system. I’ve always marveled at how 
our forefathers understood how important access was … Our two 
universities, especially at Fargo [North Dakota State] … were turning out 
such quality students. When they were done being educated, they could go 
anywhere they wanted. And I believe other states always targeted North 
Dakota for several reasons. They knew if they hired us, we had good work 
ethic, we had good common sense, we were morally centered. I remember 
even when I was in Vietnam, I said, “If you get anybody from North Dakota, 
I get first crack at them. I want those people.” Because I knew what they 
were capable of. And I think the other states knew it, too … I don’t know of 
anybody that graduates from our colleges that couldn’t get a job right away” 
(personal interview). 
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Indeed, under this model, North Dakota is positioned as doubly blessed with both a strong 
citizenry and abundant energy and agricultural resources, each of which are the envy of 
groups as varied as foreign government officials, energy executives and American 
workers.  Ron Ness of the NDPC has argued that fracking and related technologies have 
helped make North Dakota a global leader in integrating responsible oil and gas 
development within an existing agro-resource landscape:  
I think that the untold story is that the Bakken is almost a revolutionary way 
of energy development in terms of the ability to extract oil and gas from very 
large areas with a very small footprint. If you think of other fields across the 
world that produce 1 million barrels/day, you have an oilfield. But here you 
have agriculture with oil on it. So, it’s a very miniscule footprint on the 
landscape, but yet we’re able to extract huge amounts of oil underneath 
with the technology … the real news is the fact that we’ve changed the 
energy mix of the world. We’ve changed the geopolitics of the world. We’ve 
uncracked a method for extracting oil from a shale resource that’s present 
in many areas of the world and that’s going to change our energy future. 
However, as Paul Lucy, Director of the Economic Development and Finance 
Division of the North Dakota Department of Commerce, has argued, while the industry 
has been one of the main things keeping North Dakota afloat, the economic growth it has 
produced has fueled, in combination with good decision making, the diversification of the 
economy and the state’s relative stability in the face of crisis:  
As people look at North Dakota, they think that the oil and gas development 
over the last 8-9 years was a lifesaver for the state, but people really don’t 
realize that while the rest of the country was going through a recession, 
North Dakota was experiencing growth. We were the only state in the nation 
with a growing economy as everyone else was seeing losses. And that was 
the result of some very concerted efforts to diversify the economy (personal 
interview). 
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This diversification, the natural outcome of “common sense” policymaking promoted 
under the North Dakota Way, is what has truly allowed North Dakota’s economic and 
human potential to serve as an example of how to recover from recession. Lucy has 
argued that despite oil and gas employment declining due to the recent drop in prices, 
the overall economy remains strong due to the growth of North Dakota as a place to find 
employment of all types, particularly the service industry. Maragos has argued that this 
was an intentional outcome of shrewd policymaking which enticed families, rather than 
solely single men and women, to move to the state: “We became very business friendly. 
And business loves friendly! … I was very supportive of the amendments to put seed 
money … to strategically invest in helping areas succeed in creating those jobs and giving 
people that idea, ‘Boy! I can get a good job in North Dakota. And I can have a good quality 
of life.’”  However, Maragos also noted that incentives to create high paying jobs and 
affordable housing were necessary due to a lack of amenities that would otherwise draw 
people to North Dakota.  
Yet despite this supposed lack of either big city cultural or traditional Western 
amenities such as hiking or skiing, several interviewees for this project argued that it was 
the friendly and genuine attitude of North Dakota government and residents that has been 
the largest factor in improving the state’s outside reputation and attracting new visitors, 
businesses and workers. Lucy’s Commerce Department colleague, Sara Coleman, 
Director of the Tourism Division, notes that the state government has invested heavily in 
its North Dakota Legendary ® campaign, which seeks to rebrand North Dakota as a 
lifestyle destination with friendly people interested in diverse community-based outdoor 
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and consumptive experiences. Coleman argues that despite lacking many typical 
amenities, the goal is to create memorable experiences that can only be had in North 
Dakota:  
Outdoor is what drives most of our travel, most of our visitors come 
for an outdoor experience. That doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s 
just hiking and mountain biking and doing horsebacking trails and 
hunting and fishing and birding … we really talk about those, but also 
round them off with the cultural experiences … the wineries and the 
microbrews and the culinary scene that’s starting to boom like it is 
everywhere else as well as all of the other traveler amenities and 
niche interests that people have … We just talk about our unique 
advantages. We’ve got the same challenges that some other states 
have. We don’t have the Grand Canyon, but we do have a lot of 
authentic experiences and I think that’s what really drives people to 
the state. We don’t give them a manufactured experience like you’re 
going to have in Vegas or Orlando. We’re the anti of that (personal 
interview). 
It is this authenticity and supposed substance, rather than the superficiality of more 
cosmopolitan and/or developed parts of the country, that marks North Dakota as an 
exceptional place not only for resource development, but as a place to seek out the 
supposed “real America” that is being steadily eroded by a culture that de-emphasizes 
many of the community-centered values, such as those emphasized in The North Dakota 
Way, that are held dear by Dakotans. It is this sense of closeness and community values 
that other interviewees argue is the catalyst for making North Dakota a competitive state 
in the long term, with oil and gas playing an outsized role in creating the foundation for 
prosperous cities and towns with high paying jobs. John MacMartin of the Minot Area 
Chamber of Commerce argues that in particular, the focus needs to be on creating high 
paying, permanent jobs within the oil industry such as well and pipeline maintenance, as 
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well as focusing on “job attraction” by raising the typically low salaries for other skilled 
positions, which have in the past caused both talented North Dakotans and outsiders to 
overlook North Dakota as a place to settle and work. Indeed, several interviewees argue 
that providing high paying jobs for those with North Dakota roots will lead to a long-term 
revitalization of the state, as these individuals will be motivated to return home from big 
cities in other states in order to experience the positive values that set North Dakota apart. 
Scott Hennen of What’s on Your Mind? argues that North Dakota communities are special 
precisely because of the pride residents take in living there, noting that despite challenges 
posed by oil and gas development, “the worst day in Watford [City] is the worst day in 
Dallas or Minneapolis,”  a sentiment echoed by Coleman:  
It’s like home, you always want to go back. So, it’s about expanding those 
lifestyle opportunities that people expect. … We just need to tell them about 
what we have, the jobs, but then also that we aren’t isolated. That you can 
still fly to anywhere you want to out of here and that you’re not going to be 
starved to death. We’ve got great restaurants and all these other amenities 
and kind of packaging that lifestyle to appeal to the young families that we 
really need is what we’ve got to do (personal interview). 
Ness of the NDPC takes this line of reasoning a step further, arguing that North Dakota 
not only has exceptional people with exceptional values, but its embrace of oil and gas-
related growth as a way to lure former and first time educated individuals has provided 
the successful blueprint for stemming the decline of “real America”: 
The Bakken is an incredible story of almost a melting pot of the country and 
the world into a very rural, very White, Norwegian community that has 
adopted people from all over. It’s become a tremendous place to start fresh, 
whether they were run down in the financial crisis and they came here. It’s 
a tremendous wage opportunity and a tremendous opportunity to restart 
your life. The biggest story from a North Dakota standpoint, is that this is 
the repopulation of rural America, which we’ve tried to figure out for 
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decades. We’ve been losing our kids. We’re losing our best and our 
brightest to Denver and Minneapolis. We never could find a mechanism to 
get them back. Life on the farm had changed and it was not the life they 
wanted. You now are seeing a revitalization of rural America and we’re 
showing that if you have good jobs and you pay good wages and you 
created good opportunities for people, they will come. And they have 
(personal interview). 
 Thus, with statements such as Ness’, the goal of appeals to exceptionalism are 
quite clear: there is a right way and a wrong way to be a North Dakotan, and the right way 
means fully accepting the oil and gas industry and the conservative community values 
that underpin its expansion. Indeed, much of this boosterist rhetoric reflects the 
nationalistic and conformist tenets of the Way. While critics of the oil and gas industry, as 
well as Dakota outsiders, may argue that over-reliance on specific tropes leads to 
insularity, isolation and potential backwardness in a state that has long struggled to 
overcome such stereotypes, boosters argue that it is precisely because of North Dakota’s 
persistence in continuously defending supposedly contrarian, “traditional” values that the 
state and its people are exceptional. Thus, while narratives that North Dakota has 
“changed the geopolitics of the world” and is leading “the revitalization of rural America” 
may smack of hubris, they fit entirely within a worldview that prizes relentless devotion to 
small-town boosterism that is uniformly pro-business and anti-Washington and thus find 
a ready audience in policymakers and many ordinary North Dakotans. As we will see in 
our next section on resilience, this stick-to-itiveness in the face of internal and external 
challenges is seen as inherent in crafting a good energy citizen. 
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4.3.3 Resiliency 
One of the supposed truths underlying the Way is the notion that North Dakotans 
are somehow more robust, harder working and engage in less questioning and 
complaining in the face of obstacles than urbanized outsiders. Much of this mythology is 
derived from notions that contemporary Dakotans prairie-homesteading ancestors were 
toughened physically, mentally and spiritually by the difficulties in eking out an existence 
in an unforgiving landscape cut off from extended family and mainstream American 
society and comforts.12 These notions of innate toughness among North Dakotans have 
only been further reinforced during the most recent downturn in oil and gas prices, with 
many boosters, particularly the NDPC, strongly promoting the idea of “Bakken Strong,” a 
riff on the popular post-marathon bombing slogan of “Boston Strong.” Although the 
Bakken has not, like Boston, suffered at the hands of terrorists, the strength of those in 
the Bakken comes from a different kind of suffering: the Great Recession. Much of the 
ideological underpinning of Bakken Strong relies on examples of downtrodden workers 
using oil-related growth to reinvent themselves in the wake of devastation in traditional 
masculine, blue-collar sectors (Spiess, 2014). Indeed, Bakken Strong plays heavily on 
both the prairie toughening myth as well as notions that North Dakota values, especially 
those that favor strong traditionalist conservative ways of life and economy, help foster 
                                                 
12 This is an often-used theme in much prairie literature by the likes of authors such as Laura Ingalls 
Wilder, Willa Cather and Ole Rolvaag among others. Rolvaag’s Giants in the Earth, a story of Norwegian 
immigrants to the Dakota Territory, is frequently referenced, particularly by older North Dakotans, as a 
seminal influence during their early years as it was almost universally read in primary schools. Olson 
(1981) argues that this style of the building up of the plains as a monumental event is a foundational myth 
on the order of older Germanic and Scandinavian legends of conquest. 
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Dakota prosperity while other parts of the country underperform. Thus, the message 
behind Bakken Strong is clear: North Dakota, and by extension the Bakken, will survive 
and be reinvigorated, because Dakotans always find a way to survive and reinvigorate, 
no matter whether they face poor harvests or flagging global energy markets. 
 Resiliency and good old-fashioned Dakota toughness were on full display during 
the roundtable featuring Lt. Gov. Wrigley, Arthaud and Graham. Given their long-term 
experience in multiple oil plays and business environments, Arthaud and Graham were 
asked to specifically address investment strategies during the downturn, the major theme 
emerging being “don’t quit.” In typical fashion (see above section on “the Way), Graham, 
who has been involved in many real estate ventures beyond oil, provided a particularly 
colorful anecdote about overcoming depression during a previous period of economic 
stagnation, the mid 1970s: 
During the terrible recession of 1974-1975, I was dejectedly walking on 
California St. in the Financial District of San Francisco, just kind of 
wandering around actually wondering how I was going to survive. I’d just 
started having kids and times were tough. I looked in a shop window and 
there was a poster of a cat. The cat was hanging on by the tips of its 
fingernails on its front two paws. It was 15 stories above the ground, looking 
kind of wild-eyed at the camera. The caption was, ‘Hang in there, baby!’ I 
think that’s what we’re looking at and what we have been looking at for a 
year and a half. So, we might have a little bit more to go. But, if I would give 
anybody any advice as to how to get through a recession, it’s hang in there. 
The key to surviving a recession, assuming you have good, well-positioned 
assets in Western North Dakota, like I said, it’s just hang in there. Don’t 
leave! A lot of people bail when times get tough (personal recording). 
Such a story not only reinforces typical Dakota notions about not folding under strain, but 
also seeks to show that such perseverance is both natural and expected. Implicit in such 
exhortations about the need for “good, well-positioned assets” is the idea that smart 
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Dakotans will prepare themselves for downturns so that they can survive when they get 
there. While not bailing may seem to be a simple answer to how to dealing with any 
difficult situation, Graham seeks to show that one should not bail on a place like Dakota 
because it, and its residents, are inherently special and sticking it out allows one to 
prosper in ways that one could not anywhere else:  
Remember why you came to North Dakota in the first place. The world 
needs oil and gas. We have a lot of it … Make sure your asset business or 
service is one of the best in your area. It’s very, very important to always be 
one of the very best. We’re all in the recession boat. People will remember 
businesses that run smoothly during the downturn … hang in there and you 
will reap the benefits of the inevitable comeback (personal recording). 
This idea of renewal in a special place was echoed by Arthaud, who argued that 
such lean times offer the chance to cheaply reinvest, rebuild and acquire new assets, 
including local employees, which others with weaker temperaments have abandoned: 
Every down cycle provides an opportunity to invest. You just have to be 
patient … You have to be able to react and make the investments that you 
feel good about making. You can’t make those decisions and those 
investments without the people you have around you. So, our team is my 
biggest asset that I have. Anybody can buy equipment. Anybody can buy a 
truck. Anybody can buy a workover rig. But, it’s the people that you have 
around you that actually allow you to survive this (personal recording). 
Indeed, implicit in this argument is that “the people that you have around you” are 
determined, optimistic, hard-working, pro-industry North Dakotans (or transplants), who 
have the will to remain in the Bakken when others seek to leave due to potential 
uncertainty. When Graham interjected that such individuals do not possess the requisite 
“mental toughness”, Wrigley was quick to point out that Dakotans were able to whether 
difficulties and were absolutely not members of the aforementioned category: “North 
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Dakotans are pretty tough. We’ve been through these cycles before and been through 
the ups and downs … oil booms have come and gone. And we’ve lived through them.” A 
similar opinion was expressed separately from this forum by the NDPC’s Ron Ness: 
“We’ve been through the cycles of industry … related to oil and gas in North Dakota, the 
region and the country and here we are! We’ve been through the Bakken and we’re still 
here” (personal interview). Along with this mere survival, Ness, much like Graham and 
Arthaud, argued that through each successive downturn, the NDPC and its industry 
partners and their workforce have emerged stronger, more efficient and ready to take the 
best advantage of the good times. Thus, just as tough prairie winters can be prepared for, 
so too can oil and gas downturns through improvement of one’s key assets, thus allowing 
one to remain “mentally tough” and hold on until “spring.” 
 Fetishizing toughness, then, not only serves to flatter North Dakotans and reinforce 
the stereotypes that they are naturally superior to outsiders, but also serves to bolster the 
argument that people’s strong support for the oil and gas industry and concerted efforts 
to support will consistently pay dividends. Although these dividends may not immediately 
be visible, especially given the economic devastation that the downturn has caused for 
cash-strapped oil patch residents and governments, such appeals seek to reassure 
residents that the hardships they bear are necessary in order to eventually receive 
reward. Indeed, Graham lays this bare on multiple occasions buy repeating his slogan, 
“Don’t bail on the Bakken!”, arguing that this region will recover not only due to its 
excellent place in the market, but also its exceptional residents. Graham even goes so 
far as to argue that, “I don’t think it’s even rational to think that Western North Dakota 
won’t come back.” Thus, being a naysayer towards the industry makes one not only weak, 
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but also wrongheaded, labels individuals would want to steer clear of in a culture which 
prides itself on traditional, masculine fortitude and “common sense”, pro-growth decision 
making. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
 The creation of the Homo Energeticus requires fostering among the target 
population a sense of duty to the industry and its governors, as well as making the 
outcomes of those relationships seem both natural and desirable. Implicit in such 
arguments is that energy development becomes a project that is bigger than the thoughts 
and needs of any single person, but a collective effort that requires a certain amount of 
personal sacrifice in order to make the project a success. All of these tropes are present 
in normalization and boosting efforts by the state, the industry and their partners in North 
Dakota, where existing moral codes such as “The North Dakota Way” can be marshalled 
in order to demonstrate the necessity of the industry to a public already sympathetic to 
pro-business ways of thinking and doing. Thus, in many ways, there is already a dormant 
Dakoticus within each and every Dakotan waiting to be awakened. 
 However, despite the potential ease of building the foundations for such a pro-
industry subjectivity, the reality is that constant appeals and assurances must be made in 
order to maintain the “common sense” mindset and behavior necessary to weaponize the 
Dakoticus against its perceived enemies. Indeed, during the present downturn in oil prices 
when social and economic ills rear their heads in oil patch communities, the need for such 
cajoling is greater than ever. Thus, falling back on founding and more recent myths about 
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the goodness, toughness and uniqueness of North Dakota’s mineral landscape and its 
people plays a major role in demonstrating the righteousness of continuing to support the 
oil industry despite the potential suffering that one may have to bear at both the personal 
and community level. 
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5. BAKKEN NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyzes editorials and letters to the editor (LTEs) (n = 271) published 
in 5 North Dakota newspapers between August 1, 2011 and July 31, 2016. Focusing on 
Measure 5 (a North Dakota ballot initiative targeting spending of oil-related tax revenue) 
and the Keystone XL Pipeline, the analysis identifies several themes article authors used 
in support and opposition to these significant hydrocarbon policies (see Tables 11-16 (p. 
114-119) for a summary of the codes and themes). The analysis contributes to the 
dissertation’s argument by showing how various actors (political and business elite, 
interest group representatives and “ordinary” citizens) use formal and informal discourses 
to both support and contest the status quo (i.e. the preferred views and policy positions 
of the petroleum industry and its allies). This chapter builds upon themes of subjectivity 
and citizenship advanced in chapter 4 in order to argue that editorials constitute a safe 
space for arguments about the oil industry’s role in North Dakota. Such a space provides 
a critical window into ideological formation and contestation, as North Dakota culture 
otherwise discourages public debates on politics and policy, preferring deference to 
established institutions and experts (especially the Republican-dominate state 
government) and tried-and-true ways of thinking and doing (i.e. the North Dakota Way 
introduced in chapter 4). This analysis also demonstrates that seemingly innocuous or 
abstract policy debates such as tax spending (under M5) or the benefits and drawbacks 
of KXL (a pipeline that does not cross North Dakota) are in fact the vehicles through which 
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editorial writers engage in broader debates about identity, the role of the oil and gas 
industry in North Dakota and the fate of North Dakota at large.  
Theoretical positions underpinning this analysis include insights from geographies 
of energy (as discussed in Chapter 2, Review of Relevant Literature) which argue that 
policies regarding energy production, transportation and use are increasingly determined 
by extra-local economic and political processes, thus providing residents of extractive 
zones little opportunity for contestation. However, this chapter will specifically seek to 
argue that North Dakota newspapers, which, despite the general decline of print media, 
still enjoy broad readership and whose content feature heavily in the conversation, offer 
a unique, place-specific form of contestation of fracking-led development. This argument 
follows similar assertions by critical discourse theorists such as James Paul Gee and 
Norman Fairclough, who argue that mass media serves as a key arena for struggles over 
social and political norms, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 (Research Design).  
Five North Dakota newspapers were chosen for selection of articles, which were 
then separated into different categories and coded in ATLAS.ti using the aforementioned 
methods (see Research Design chapter). The sample analyzed in this chapter consists 
of 271 editorials and letters-to-the-editor (LTEs) published during a five-year period 
between August, 1, 2011 and July 31, 201613, with the Dickinson Press (DD) contributing 
117 articles, the Fargo Forum (FF) 115, the Minot Daily News (MDN) 26, the Tioga 
Tribune (TT) 11 and the Williston Herald (WH) 2. These articles cover 2 major current 
                                                 
13 Although these categories are often separate in many newspapers, the newspapers in this sample rarely 
differentiated between the two and in many cases there was little indication as to whether an article was an 
editorial or a LTE. 
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event topics: Measure 5 (M5) (175 articles) and the Keystone XL pipeline (KXL) (96 
articles). This chapter specifically analyzes narratives that support or oppose both M5 and 
KXL. 
5.2 Analysis of Measure 5 editorials 
5.2.1 Measure 5 summary 
Measure 5 (M5), officially titled the North Dakota Clean Water, Wildlife and Parks 
Amendment (often referred to popularly by a combination of those terms, i.e. parks 
amendment, water amendment, wildlife amendment, etc.), was a state-wide ballot 
measure defeated by a nearly four-to-one margin the 2014 general election (Ballotpedia, 
2016).  However, if passed, the amendment would have designated 5 % of the state’s oil 
extraction tax for a fund to be used to promote conservation and outdoor recreation 
activities.14 This fund would have been overseen by the North Dakota Industrial 
Commission (chaired jointly by the governor, attorney general and secretary of 
agriculture) and a citizen review board consisting of representatives from conservation 
associations, fish and game organization, and the energy industry, all of whom would 
have been chosen by the governor.  
                                                 
14 There were various debates as to how much oil would be produced and at what price, thus leading to 
wildly varying figures as to the amount of extraction tax collected and therefore how much the share for 
the M5 fund would be. The lower estimates were ~$60 million per year, with higher estimates closer to 
~$300 million. M5 supporters tended to cite the lower numbers to argue that the amount proposed would 
not be a large imposition on the overall budget, whereas opponents tended to cite the higher numbers in 
order to argue the opposite. 
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One of the major purported reasons for the initiation of the ballot measure was 
frustration with the repeated failure of conservation-related measures in the state 
legislature, as well as a perceived lack of consideration for the environment in a political 
climate tilted heavily towards promoting and expanding mineral extraction through 
fracking. One of the events that motivated supporters was the watering down of Attorney 
General Wayne Stenehjem’s Special Places initiative, which would have placed 
significant restrictions on drilling in environmentally sensitive areas.  Objections from 
Republicans and the energy industry neutered the initiative. In addition, supporters 
expressed disappointment with the rather small scope of then-Governor Jack Dalrymple’s 
Outdoor Heritage Fund (OHF), which provided only a token amount for conservation 
projects and which was widely viewed by the conservation community as a public 
relations stunt meant to paint the governor as environmentally friendly (Fuglie, 2014a). 
The measure was heavily supported by the conservation community. Ducks 
Unlimited (DU) initiated the amendment and the Nature Conservancy was the largest 
individual financial backer, contributing more than $600,000. The measure was also 
heavily supported by the state-level Democratic Party (Democratic-Non-Partisan League) 
and received several “celebrity” endorsements from relatives of Theodore Roosevelt (a 
legendary figure in North Dakota homesteading history and the namesake of the state’s 
national park) and Washington Capitals NHL player and University of North Dakota 
alumnus T.J. Oshie, one of the state’s most prominent professional athletes.  
Measure 5 was enthusiastically opposed by the state’s business, energy, 
agricultural and property-rights lobbies, as well as the state-level Republican Party and 
several local, state and federal GOP politicians. The Greater North Dakota Chamber of 
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Commerce spearheaded the opposition campaign, creating an umbrella coalition and 
affiliated political action committee (PAC) under the name North Dakotans for Common 
Sense Conservation (NDCSC). While the PAC ultimately raised nearly $600,000 dollars, 
the American Petroleum Institute (API) independently spent more than $1 million to hire 
two public relations firms to lobby against M5 (Ballotpedia, 2016). 
5.2.2 Arguments against M5 
The major arguments against M5 largely revolved around the notion of a perceived 
“invasion” of a largely-conservative state by liberal and out-of-state interests who desired 
to “steal” hard-earned oil wealth in order to make it more difficult for average North 
Dakotans to determine how to manage their own lands and lifestyles. In particular, many 
of the arguments made revolved around the idea that the state’s energy, agriculture and 
hunting industries would be disadvantaged by radical environmentalists who would 
destroy private property rights. In order of frequency, the five most common arguments 
advanced against M5 were:  
1. The measure is an out-of-state takeover by corrupt environmental 
interests (51 articles), with DU’s supposed corruption mentioned in 25 
articles.  
2. The money directed to this fund takes away from infrastructure and 
social-service needs in Bakken cities and towns (44 articles). 
3. The measure is an attack on private property rights (40 articles). 
4. The measure will disadvantage agricultural land users in favor of 
“conservation” (37 articles). 
5. The measure is an end-run around the legislature, whose record supports 
the industries and individuals who believe they would be wronged if M5 
were to go into effect (28 articles). 
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These arguments strongly mirror, oftentimes word for word, those advanced by the 
NDCSC under the “Amendment Concerns” section of their now-defunct website (no 
longer accessible as of April 7, 2018). Given that many articles using these talking points 
were written either directly by the Greater North Dakota Chamber or by partner 
organizations and their members, this suggests that there was at least some level of a 
coordinated strategy to push these arguments in the popular media. While anti-M5 letter 
writers often brought up personal or local anecdotes, these arguments held remarkably 
constant across all of the five newspapers. This suggests that in many cases, M5 
opponent letter writers, especially professionals (i.e. LEWs, politicians, IGWs, etc.), were 
more concerned with repeating NDCSC talking points than with expressing their own 
general opinion. However, many CCWs writing on this topic had far more heterodox 
opinions about the negative effects of M5, despite often falling back into NDCSC logic. 
While the reasons for this deep penetration of elite discourses is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, it is possible that many M5 opponents who were already pre-disposed to support 
pro-industry positions were more heavily exposed to individuals and media sources that 
emphasize such talking points. The next few paragraphs will explore in depth what the 
“no” campaigners actually said in their editorials regarding each of the major talking 
points. 
5.2.2.1. The out-of-state takeover 
 The theme of M5 resulting in an out-of-state takeover by corrupt environmentalist 
organizations, DU chief among them, occurred in more than half (52 of 93) of the editorials 
and LTEs written against the measure. Many writers were particularly animated on this 
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topic, as they felt that this would violate North Dakota’s traditions of self-governance and 
self-sufficiency, both of which they felt were under threat due to an increasingly over-
zealous federal government which sought to punish North Dakota for its reliance on fossil 
fuels and agriculture. This was extended specifically to DU and partner organizations, 
who were seen as being part of a conspiracy to take oil revenues from North Dakotans in 
order to satisfy the needs of “Washington”, often a stand in for then-President Barack 
Obama, Democratic senators and representatives and others supposedly allied with the 
environmentalist cause.  Excerpts below illustrate this theme: 
I did not sign onto DU for this BS, and I urge all North Dakota members to 
opt out like me on continued membership. I signed on for ducks, not politics. 
All DU is doing is going after the oil money. They accuse the Measure 5 
opponents of being out-of-state interests and telling lies. As if DU is not out 
of state? With only 7,000 members (6,999 now with me gone), you think 
you are going to run my state? (Carlson, 2014b). 
 
Maybe all these groups who are pushing for this measure should just go 
back to their home states. And make no mistake, this is being driven by 
outsiders who see North Dakota as a cash cow. All these national 
environmental groups are flocking into our state just to take advantage of 
our natural resources. If my great-grandpa thought the original oil tycoons 
like Carnegie and Rockefeller were robber-barons; he'd really love these 
environmentalist carpet baggers (Kaldor, 2014). 
 
Real North Dakotans oppose Measure 5 … We know how to take care of 
our land without out-of-state groups coming in here and telling us how to do 
it. Let’s send these groups back to Washington empty-handed (Jacobson, 
2014). 
 
North Dakotans will be writing a blank check to non-profit organizations that 
are more concerned about ducks than people if they pass Measure 5 (Dihle, 
2014). 
 
This notion of betrayal by the federal government and formerly friendly 
organizations such as DU is stressed by measure opponents who feel that their values 
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are being disregarded to push goals out-of-sync with North Dakotans major priorities. One 
letter writer sought to paint M5 campaign manager Michael Dax as a disrespectful, carpet-
bagging, East Coast elitist trying to impose unwanted environmentalism on the populace: 
He's a native New Yorker who recently moved to Fargo after working for the 
Montana Wilderness Association. Who does he think he is moving here and 
telling us as North Dakotans how we should take care of our land, outdoors 
and wildlife? We don't need out-of-staters telling us how to preserve our 
state's outdoors, hunting and wilderness. We're more than able to do that 
for ourselves without the help of outsiders like Dax who just don't get it. 
Don't sign the petition. But if you do, know that you're signing against 
agriculture, the true heritage of North Dakota, and for folks who don't have 
a vested interest in our future (Colwell, 2014). 
 
The above quote, and many others in the same vein, make it clear that M5 
opponents feel that this is not merely a political debate for policy specialists, but a 
personal one that represents a deep, existential challenge to what they feel makes North 
Dakota special and successful. Many letter writers were specifically upset that M5 would 
purportedly target the oil and gas and agricultural industries, the drivers of the state’s 
economic renaissance in the 2010s, with opponents arguing that, “this fund would directly 
compete with our state’s two largest industries, energy and agriculture” (Amundson, 
2014), “the measure would have wide ranging and devastating results to North Dakota's 
largest and most impactful industries” (Fox, 2014), and that measure supporters are 
seeking to, “earmark dollars that could disrupt energy and agricultural development and 
production” (Quist, 2014). State Sen. Wesley Belter (R-Fargo), one of M5’s fiercest public 
opponents, summed this feeling: “These out-of-state groups are not friends of our coal, 
oil, or agriculture industries. This is a bad idea for North Dakota’s economy. This is white 
collar robbery of our money” (Belter, 2014). 
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Thus, the crux of this argument is that North Dakota’s independence is being 
violated and that M5 is merely another in a long line of such intrusions. However, critics 
have argued that this anti-outsider stance on the part of state residents and Republican 
state officials is selective, given their repeated kowtowing to out-of-state energy 
companies and other conservative interest groups. In a recent dispute between the cities 
of Fargo, North Dakota and Minneapolis, Minnesota over Wells Fargo’s role in funding 
the Dakota Access pipeline, a Minneapolis paper declared that, “North Dakota has moved 
to the right of Mussolini, making it a receptive home to a bank that defrauds customers, 
screws Natives, and exacerbates climate change” (Glass-Moore, 2016).  Jim Fuglie, a 
prominent local blogger and former Democratic state official, argues that he has seen a 
marked departure from the cautious, ruggedly independent politics of old: “I’ve never seen 
a group of people that are so completely sold out as the Republicans in our state 
legislature” (personal interview, 25 July 2014). These arguments provide credence to the 
notion that those who argued against M5 may have been more concerned about who was 
doing the purported takeover and why, rather than the takeover itself. 
5.2.2.2. Underfunding Bakken Communities 
 The second most frequent talking point advanced in the anti-M5 editorials was the 
notion that diverting tax money to create the necessary fund would deprive Bakken 
communities of the money they need to maintain infrastructure and social services. 
Despite the financially dubious nature of such a claim (the fund would only take 5% from 
one of the state’s many sources of tax revenue), anti-M5ers held this line vociferously, 
leading readers to believe that this “theft” would have been the nail in the coffin of a 
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Bakken already burdened by regulatory overreach and the beginnings of a downward 
slide in oil prices. In particular, many of those using this argument liked to cite very large 
figures and extrapolate them out to 20 years in the future, thus resulting in deceptively 
large numbers lacking context, as is the case with these two examples:  
I am a lifelong Benson County farmer and rancher and an avid sportsman, 
and I am deeply concerned about the consequences of Measure 5. This 
ballot initiative would carve away 5 percent of oil extraction taxes — to the 
tune of almost $5 billion — and hand that over for projects that don’t 
necessarily mesh with our priorities here in North Dakota. Don’t get me 
wrong. Conservation is important to me. But there are better ways to 
achieve the goals of ensuring clean water, wildlife and parks for North 
Dakota. In 2013, North Dakota legislators established the Outdoor Heritage 
Fund, which is already investing $30 million per biennium in projects that 
enhance our outdoors (Kenner, 2014). 
 
Beware of Measure 5. The proponents make it sound good, but in reality it’s 
a wolf in sheep’s clothing. How much money do we need to spend on this 
issue? In my book, $4.3 billion in 25 years is a bit much. Four hundred 
schools could be built (that’s more than one per school district), 282 
hospitals, 390 miles of four-lane highway. That would be enough to stretch 
from the Montana border to Minnesota with about 50 miles left over. We 
could hire 88,000 state employees, or we could reduce or eliminate property 
and/or income tax (Moen, 2014). 
 
Spending $30 million to $50 million on recreation at this point in time, when 
so much is needed by the cities, counties and EMS, is crazy. Build the 
house, then worry about the swing set (Marek, 2014). 
 
These arguments make strong logical and emotional appeals by creating the 
image of massive waste and deprivation. How could a common-sense, fiscally 
conservative North Dakotan vote to steal billions of dollars from innocent schoolchildren, 
truck drivers, the sick and, not least of all, hardworking American taxpayers? In particular, 
these purposely inflated numbers seek to bolster the case for sticking with the Outdoor 
Heritage Fund (OHF), which at $30 million per year looks like a comparative bargain 
 155 
 
against “the $4.8 billion fund they [M5 opponents] have their sights on with the faulty 
measure on the Nov. 4 ballot” (Schafer, 2014). To emphasize this point, M5 opponents 
used the supposed guardian of Teddy Roosevelt’s legacy, Dickinson State University 
undergraduate and Miss Roughrider Days 2015 Hannah Frazier, to demonstrate how 
even the young and uncorrupted share the proper North Dakota values that cause all 
right-thinking citizens to support such a piecemeal approach:  
When did we start valuing the agenda of nonresident groups over the needs 
of our own people? Why is it acceptable to give an estimated $300 million 
per biennium of state money to these private groups? It is not OK, and it is 
not the North Dakota way [emphasis added].Rest assured, the North 
Dakota Legislative Assembly passed the Outdoor Heritage Fund, which 
provides $15 million per year to conservation efforts in our state … I believe 
that we as North Dakotans are perfectly capable of tending and properly 
maintaining our land, keeping the heritage of our state alive … Clearly, they 
[out-of-state groups] do not understand that North Dakota is successful 
because of the hard work ethic, and proper management of natural 
resources already practiced by North Dakotans (Frazier, 2014). 
 
These specific appeals are perhaps the most effective critique of the wastefulness 
of M5, casting M5 supporters as violators as all of the key positive traits of North Dakota. 
Specifically, Frazier successfully magnifies the out-of-state takeover argument to its 
logical extreme: not only are these liberal, Washington interlopers disregarding the will of 
humble North Dakotans and pushing this reckless proposal on her state, but in doing so 
they reveal their true character in besmirching the impeccable character of its residents. 
Despite lacking data to stand up to even the most basic fact-checking, such arguments 
retain their effectiveness due to their carefully crafted rhetoric, which appeals directly to 
some of the most hackneyed, yet most deeply-held, platitudes about what it means to be 
a “good” North Dakotan: cautious, conservative and deeply respectful of status quo, pro-
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community thinking. Under this line of reasoning, M5 not only fails because its specific 
proposals are too expensive and potentially damaging to the Bakken, but also because it 
is deeply disrespectful by its very nature to the most basic ideas of what North Dakota is 
and should be. 
5.2.2.3. An attack on property rights and farming 
 Along with the notion of fierce independence and self-reliance that forms the core 
of much conservative ideology in North Dakota is a belief in strong, inalienable private 
property rights. More than 95% of all land in the state is privately owned, the fourth-highest 
total of all US states in the Western region, where federal and state ownership of land is 
greatest (Vincent, Hanson and Argueta, 2017). Despite this belief, property rights in North 
Dakota are in many cases restricted for private non-profit groups. While in many states 
non-profit, conservation-oriented buyers such as DU or Nature Conservancy are allowed 
to purchase land from private individuals as if they were any other type of private buyer, 
this right is severely restricted in North Dakota due to the state’s anti-corporate farming 
laws. These laws, which limit the ability of incorporated, non-agricultural groups to 
purchase agriculturally-assessed land, largely prevent private land from being owned by 
conservation groups (ND Legislative Branch, 2018). Due largely to misinterpretation or 
deliberate misinformation, many M5 opponents argued that M5 would reverse this statute 
and lead to widespread land purchasing by “environmentalist” interests and a restriction 
of hunting opportunities on private land. Additionally, as much of the land that would likely 
have been considered for conservation is rural, there was a strong overlap between the 
anti-private property and anti-farming arguments. Despite the potential hypocrisy of 
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supporting suppression of another’s rights to bolster one’s own, such arguments were 
extremely prominent among anti-M5 editorials. 
 Opponents of M5 were particularly incensed not only about the potential land 
grabbing, but also about the potential land grabbers. As noted above, opponents felt that 
DU and their allies in the pro-M5 camp were both dishonest and not supportive of norms 
governing land ownership and use in North Dakota, a theme that arose repeatedly in 
property rights-based arguments. In the editorial mentioned in section ii, Miss Roughrider 
Days also launched a strong attack against DU and their supposed stance on private 
property: “These groups have no clear agenda or spending plan except vague 
conservation ideas. Their idea of ‘conservation’ is buying up land, removing it from the 
hands of North Dakota citizens, all while increasing the price of already high land values” 
(Frazier, 2014). Several writers seized on language in the amendment that mandated that 
75%of all money in the proposed fund would need to be spent annually, positing that the 
only way such sums could be spent was on private land:  
The fact is — this measure really would, contrary to what he [anti-M5 
blogger Jim Fuglie] claims, create a stand-alone fund in our constitution that 
would give public and private groups hundreds of millions of dollars each 
biennium to spend on conservation projects. With that kind of big money 
and only so many conservation projects to even fund, they will be forced to 
look at other options such as buying land because of the requirement that 
at least 75 percent of the fund must be spent each year (Zetocha, 2014). 
 
One of the amendment’s most alarming aspects is that there’s no language 
explaining how the money will be spent other than that it will be spent on 
“conservation” and can be used to purchase land. Conservation groups 
would be able to buy land and take it out of production agriculture, restrict 
public access or close it to hunters and fishermen — whatever they wished 
(Godfread and Watne, 2014). 
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I think this is just an example of good old fashioned greed. The trough is full 
and all the hogs are fighting for an additional share. Where would they 
possibly spend all this extra money? They are not supposed to be able to 
buy land, according to their proposal, but isn't that exactly where they are 
going with this? There can't be too many other places to spend this money 
(Kaldor, 2014). 
 
Such lines of attack feed into classic tropes about the resistance of North Dakotans to 
new ideas without a proven track record: if it’s different, involves lots of money and is run 
by the government and elitist outsiders, it simply must be risky, and at the very least, 
unwise. For those committed to “the North Dakota Way,” such arguments are incredibly 
persuasive as they cause individuals to have an emotional response to the possibility of 
their lifestyles being compromised. 
 These factually suspect appeals were often highlighted in editorials bemoaning the 
fate of North Dakota’s agricultural and hunting economies if M5 were to have passed. 
Many writers felt that these activities were not only important to their own livelihoods, but 
also that they were integral to their identity as rural North Dakotans connected to and 
invested in the landscape. These writers gave anecdotes of how farming, ranching and 
outdoor recreation have been the most important parts of their and their families’ lives, 
arguing that if M5 were enacted these bonds would be broken: 
One of the reasons North Dakota hunters enjoy the great outdoors is 
because most private landowners allow hunters onto their property. I’ve 
developed a lot of good relationships with hunters over the years and I have 
no problem letting them on … But if hunters and anglers decide to support 
the out-of-state groups because they make empty promises about more 
opportunities, instead of supporting the landowners and neighbors they 
spent years building relationships with, well then my land is off limits (Voll, 
2014). 
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Farmers and ranchers make their living off of the land, drink the water and 
feed their families from the fruits of that land. We know the pain of saving a 
calf from a snow bank at 40-below zero, just to see it die a few days later. 
Who better to appoint than people who work to conserve a way of life that 
is sown into the framework of what it is to be a North Dakotan? The 
agricultural industry has been North Dakota’s lifeblood for generations. The 
proposed Clean Water, Wildlife and Parks Amendment is not the answer to 
any of the above, nor is it the solution to protecting our air, water and soil 
(Odermann, 2014). 
 
After waiting for about 12 years, I cannot believe that the time has actually 
come. My oldest child hunted his first deer last weekend. As a child, some 
of my earliest family memories involved hunting, fishing and the great 
outdoors. And I cannot wait to make those same memories with my children 
… I am a big fan of clean water, I appreciate the beauty (and tastiness) of 
wildlife, and my family and I enjoy spending time at the parks frequently, but 
I believe we can address these issues without risking the future of 
agriculture (Wagner, 2014). 
 
Thus, these arguments paint a rather clear picture of the supposedly stark divide 
between the traditional, agrarian lifestyle of “real” North Dakotans and the ruinous path 
down which environmentalists would take the state. This argument set up an either/or, 
us/them duality that forces residents to choose sides: either one remains true to their 
heritage and opposes M5 or one votes for it and shows their contempt for the people, 
industries and lifestyles that make North Dakota great. This strategy can have a powerful 
impact on many newspaper readers who may support the goals of M5 in the abstract, but 
share the same concerns as M5 opponents about the threats to their established 
pastimes and livelihoods that the measure might represent. Indeed, many newspaper 
readers will pay special respect to the opinions of farmers who identify their profession 
and deep Dakota roots by name, viewing this as proof that such writers have the authority 
and expertise to speak on such weighty topics. 
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5.2.2.4. The end run around the legislature 
 M5 arrived at a time when ballot measures were criticized by Republicans within 
the North Dakota legislature. On the same 2014 ballot as M5, was Measure 4 (M4), the 
North Dakota Referral and Initiative Reform Amendment. M4 was effectively a ballot 
measure to end ballot measures, as it made the process for creating such measures far 
more difficult and banned measures that amended the constitution in order fund specific 
purposes. Although M5 was such a measure and was viewed as being the tipping point 
that pushed M4 onto the ballot, the initial catalyst for M4was a longstanding dispute 
between the legislature and state residents over whether money earmarked for specific 
purposes could be diverted without public approval. Of particular salience to this dispute 
have been conflicts over how $300 million from a landmark 1998 settlement between 
leading tobacco companies and 46 state attorneys general (including then-ND Attorney 
General and current US Sen. Heidi Heitkamp) would be spent. While this money was 
designated solely for state-run anti-tobacco initiatives, the Republican-dominated 
legislature appropriated the money elsewhere. As a result, Sen. Heitkamp (then a private 
citizen) spearheaded a successful 2008 ballot measure that transferred control of the 
settlement money from the legislature to a new anti-tobacco commission and mandated 
the creation a stand-alone, comprehensive tobacco control agency, BreatheND 
(Heitkamp, 2018).15 Since the passage of this amendment, Republicans have repeatedly 
                                                 
15 Despite being widely credited with reducing smoking rates in ND, BreatheND has consistently been the 
bête noire of many Republicans and conservatives, who have held the agency up as an example of both 
wasted taxpayer money and an infringement on individual rights and the free market. Under the pretext of 
massive budget cuts due to a drop in overall tax revenues, the state legislature voted in June 2017 to 
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argued that the ballot measure system has been abused in order to curtail the authority 
of the legislature and that M4 is necessary to prevent future abuses such as those they 
attribute to BreatheND and to allow elected representatives to make revenue-related 
decisions that they believe best reflect the will of the majority of North Dakota voters. 
North Dakota Senate Majority Leader Al Carlson (R-Fargo), derided by opponents as 
“Angry Al” due to his belligerent and uncompromising leadership style, declared that M4 
would be “good management of the taxpayer dollars. It’s not a power grab” (Nowatzki, 
2014). 
 However, as mentioned above, one of the reasons that M4 finally manifested itself 
some 6 years after the initial slight was the notion that M5 was merely a rehashing of the 
same problems posed by the tobacco amendment, in that M5 would force the legislature 
to spend state funds for only one specified purpose--conservation. Even worse, 
opponents mused, M5 would be a constitutional amendment, thus making it far more 
difficult to weaken or repeal through legislative means. State Sen. David Hogue 
 (R-Minot), one of M4’s original sponsors in the legislature, publicly stated that M4 was 
necessary to prevent abuses such as those that would be perpetrated by M5: 
Look no further than the language of Measure 5, the outdoor wildlife 
measure, and the mission of the not-for-profit Ducks Unlimited organization, 
to understand why Measure 4 is necessary to protect our state economy 
against special interest poaching of state resources … Why is this approach 
to state spending - permanently embedding spending in the state 
constitution - proposed in Measure 5, but prohibited by Measure 4, radical? 
Because it's undemocratic and inflexible (Hogue, 2014). 
 
                                                 
eliminate BreatheND and place tobacco control moneys under the purview of the North Dakota Department 
of Health. 
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Although pro-M4 sentiment was not nearly as strong as anti-M5 sentiment at the 
polls (M4 lost by 13 points), many of Hogue and Carlson’s arguments about the need to 
curtail constitutionally-mandated spending found a ready audience among M5 opponents. 
Many of the attacks against M5 made in this vein relied on a similar tactic to those 
described in section ii: sowing doubt about the prudence of locking in billions of dollars of 
spending when it was unclear what budget needs would be in the future. Jon Godfread, 
the public face of the Greater North Dakota Chamber’s campaign to defeat M5, 
summarized this argument succinctly:  
It [M5] would be part of the state constitution. That’s disconcerting for many 
reasons. Not only would it mandate massive amounts of conservation 
spending for the next 25 years — to the tune of some $5 billion — but the 
only way to change or repeal it would be through another statewide vote of 
the people. How is that a good thing? (Godfread, 2014). 
 
Additionally, writers felt that this constitutional lock-in was bad for democracy because it 
was, “a good-sounding attempt by greedy and selfish people and outside interests to tap  
into the North Dakota oil money and usurp the authority of our duly elected Legislature” 
(Carlson, 2014a) and interfere with “sound government decision-making” (Schafer, 2014). 
Writers found particularly unsound the notion that “special interests” were able to skip the 
normal political process in order to codify their agenda without any input from those 
charged with implementing it, often equating this with cutting in line and gaining and unfair 
advantage: 
Many other special interest groups work very hard with elected officials 
during the legislative session to secure fair levels of funding. It should be 
the same for the groups supporting this amendment. They should not be 
allowed to skip the legislative process and take this amount of money off 
the table (Brooks, 2014). 
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In this case, special interests are looking to surpass our electoral process, 
and our budgeting and spending processes, to fund their own special 
interests. No matter how great a special interest is, that is why government 
and our legislative process exist. I want elected officials to debate 
conservation in the same process as they debate all other spending. 
Measure 5 usurps this process and gives it over to those that have the most 
money. Is that really what we want? (Burgum, 2014). 
 
While such arguments clearly demonstrate that certain “special interests” are acceptable, 
the purported behavior of DU and their pro-M5 allies was not. Indeed, while 
environmentalist groups are seen by M5 opponents as invaders, the behavior of special 
interests that worked to support the measure’s defeat (API, Greater North Dakota 
Chamber, etc.) was alternately praised or ignored by M5 opponents.  Such reasoning, at 
times bordering on willful ignorance, is in keeping with other attempts to demarcate 
appropriate behaviors which support the conservative, status quo culture of North Dakota. 
Thus, support for pro-business “special interests” is seen as appropriate, as the actions 
of these groups do not, under the logic of M5 opponents, undermine the will of North 
Dakota voters (or, at least, that of Republicans in the state legislature). However, as we 
will see in our next section outlining the arguments of M5 supporters, it is these same 
entrenched, “common sense” special interests that many M5 supporters believe are 
responsible for many of the specific problems that M5 potentially addresses. 
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5.2.3. Arguments for M5 
 The major arguments for M5 largely focused on the idea that the environment in 
North Dakota was, as a whole and the Bakken specifically, not properly protected from 
poor land use processes, many of which could be directly linked to oil and gas industry 
activity. Thus, in the minds of most commenters, not only were the goals of M5 fully 
justifiable, but so was funding it through taxes levied on oil, considered to be the root 
cause of the “Bakken Hell,” as one writer described environmental problems in the oil-
producing region of North Dakota. In particular, M5 advocates argued that their approach 
was not the least bit radical, as it neither jeopardized the state’s overall economy nor 
mandated any specific land ownership or use conditions. M5 supporters were less 
uniform in their overall arguments than M5 opponents, suggesting less direct coordination 
among supporter groups. The most common themes stressed were that M5 would be 
generally good for North Dakota’s outdoor heritage (all 74 articles mentioned this to 
varying degrees), with a notable subset (26 articles) arguing specifically that policies 
enacted under M5 would be positive for farming in North Dakota. In addition, writers 
frequently invoked the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt (11 articles), as well as expressing 
strong support for environmentalism/conservation in general (12 articles). In order to 
make these points, writers often invoked specific damage that could be remedied under 
an enacted M5, as well as more directly appealing to scientific, rather than solely cultural 
or economic logic, than did M5 opponents. The following subsections will look in-detail at 
how these arguments were deployed by pro-M5ers. 
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5.2.3.1. Preserving the environment 
 Just as was the case with many M5 opponents, M5 supporters often wrote of their 
personal, family connections to rural, outdoor recreation and lifestyles. However, where 
supporters differed was in their view that such opportunities were under threat not from 
out-of-state liberals and environmentalists, but from the oil and gas industry and its 
enablers in state and local government:  
With a wink of an eye and a contribution to the administration in Bismarck 
these billionaire oilmen were able to gut and lay waste to this pristine area 
[Western North Dakota]. The administration in Bismarck turned and looked 
away … Now we, as residents of North Dakota, need to save what little of 
this environment is left … I am voting “yes” on Measure 5 to keep a small 
portion of North Dakota North Dakota [emphasis added by author] 
(Evenson, 2014a). 
 
What exactly do they [API] have against clean water? What is their problem 
with North Dakota wildlife? And have they ever set foot in any kind of park? 
Further, one would like to think that, given the oil industry’s extreme impact 
to western North Dakota’s natural and human environment, they’d be 
among the amendment’s biggest supporters, if for no other reason than to 
feel less guilty about the monumental diminishment of the quality of life that 
they are causing out here in what I euphemistically call Bakken Hell (Heiser, 
2014). 
 
Along these same lines, many writers were particularly angry about the fact that politicians 
were attempting to tar M5 supporters as out-of-state, overfunded elitists, when they were 
so quick themselves to take contributions from oil companies and lobbying groups such 
as API, all of whom they felt did not have North Dakota’s best interests at heart: 
API is a big-time, Washington, D.C., lobbying group for big oil. So far, they 
have dumped more than $1 million into North Dakota to promote oil, part of 
which has gone to fund its website in an effort to diminish the work of CWWP 
[Clean Water, Wildlife and Parks Amendment, aka M5] to reclaim 
landscapes that big oil despoiled in the first place. So what does the API 
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proclaim? It says CWWP gets contributions from out-of-state interests. 
Really! Now, isn’t that the pot calling the kettle black (Upgren, 2014). 
 
The arguments against Measure 5 boiled down to some very contrived 
ideas. The most prominent was how rich “outsiders”, long-haired, posy-
sniffing hippies, a part of the Ducks Unlimited/Nature 
Conservancy/Pheasants forever conspiracy, were going to impose their will 
on besieged local farmers … Then I saw who was against Measure 5 – the 
oil industry, builders, bankers, … etc. And these guys were calling the posy-
sniffers deep-pocketed? (J.D. Taylor, 2014). 
 
When the dust settles, the out-of-state corporate industries will have come 
and gone … they have a history of that. Our families will be here to continue 
our lives without them. I hope we will have chosen to have preserved and 
improved our water, air, and land resources, and made a better life for 
ourselves, our children and our grandchildren (Goetz, 2016). 
 
These and many arguments demonstrate the disdain of M5 supporters for - and 
fatigue with - arguments about the supposed radical overspending and bureaucracy that 
M5 represented. These appeals were seen as hypocritical given how governmental and 
business groups had effectively prostrated themselves at the feet of energy corporations 
and rewritten the rules to facilitate large transfers of wealth to private, out-of-state 
individuals, many of whom had no vested interest in North Dakota beyond accumulation. 
Such a rhetorical strategy seeks to flip the anti-M5 narrative about who is violating North 
Dakota traditions; under the pro-M5 version, those who want to protect the environment 
and resist its destruction are the state’s true champions, rather than those M5 opponents 
who cynically cherry pick which “Washington” actors are good and bad. For many M5 
supporters, labeling something or someone as “out-of-state”, and therefore likely 
undesirable, is unproductive. In fact, many M5 supporters spoke positively of DU and 
other national non-profit groups in the pro-M5 coalition, as well as specifically mentioning 
conservation programs from neighboring Minnesota (often cast by conservatives as the 
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encroaching, elitist, and liberal) that they felt proved the efficacy of M5’s model. In contrast 
to M5 opponents, many M5 supporters did not view being a native Dakotan as 
automatically conferring respect for the state and its landscape, particularly when many 
in the state were so quick to compromise their values at the prospect of financial gain 
through oil. 
This charge of strategic invocation of the essential characteristic of North 
Dakotans, a “Dakotaness,” by decision makers for political convenience was leveled at 
Gov. Dalrymple’s attempts to pass off the OHF as a viable alternative to M5. Many writers 
saw this as a weak attempt to undermine arguments that bolstered M5 by deflecting 
attention back to the supposed goodness of the state Republican leadership without 
making any significant commitments to conservation. One particularly animated writer 
argued that Dalrymple only committed to such an idea after the public began to take the 
pro-M5 coalition seriously, noting that the “convoluted” OHF expansion was not truly 
sincere, but merely an attempt to deliver a defeat to M5 given its announcement only 
weeks before the election (Oppegard, 2014). Other writers also echoed such sentiments, 
arguing that while it was encouraging to see Dalrymple and Majority Leader Carlson put 
forward conservation-funding proposals, such attempts were either ill-conceived, 
dishonest or overdue, with readers describing them as, “welcome, but somewhat tardy” 
(Upgren, 2014) and “not proactive enough to meet North Dakota’s increasing demands 
and needs” (Brauhn, 2014). Indeed, many argued that the reference to OHF was nothing 
more than a long line of conservative attempts to deflate opposition movements by co-
opting conservationist language to mislead the public about their true intentions. In 
particular, the noted local blogger Jim Fuglie stated that it was extremely hypocritical and 
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disappointing to see North Dakota Farmers’ Union President Mark Watne claim to be a 
champion of conservation while publicly vilifying farmers who voiced support for M5 
(Fuglie, 2014b). 
Thus, what irked many M5 supporters was the notion that because they would 
collaborate with groups other than those that are either explicitly conservative and/or 
claim to uphold traditional, rural North Dakota values, they were somehow suspect or 
disrespectful. Many writers felt that the ways in which conservation was defined by 
Republicans and conservative-leaning groups was both woefully inadequate in scope 
given the environmental problems faced by the state, while also excluding the possibility 
of most public-sector intervention. Under this narrow conception, M5 was essentially a 
non-starter, not because its ideas were wrong, but because it went against the anti-
government, pro-corporate style of conservation that is so prominent in North Dakota and 
the American West more generally. Such tensions between more conservative, 
Sagebrush-lite approaches and more full-throated conservationist/environmentalist ones 
animate the following subsection. 
5.2.3.2. Supporting farming through oil 
 For M5 opponents, M5 represented a direct attack on the entwined homesteader 
ethos of respect for private property and support for agriculture. Many M5 supporters, 
though, saw the amendment as a way to bolster many successful conservation programs 
that have either been over-enrolled and/or underfunded. Specifically, many writers felt 
that M5 could either be used to expand the state’s PLOTS (Private Land open to 
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Sportsmen) program or help to establish a state-run alternative to the federal 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which pays farmers to plant erosion-resistant 
crops on environmentally sensitive land in lieu of production crops. While each of these 
programs was also popular with many conservative letter writers, those individuals felt 
that a choice needed to be made between either funding M5 or devoting money to 
PLOTS/CRP. M5 supporters felt that such arguments were fundamentally flawed, as 
PLOTS and CRP, which both have farmers ready to participate immediately, would be an 
easy target for any of the mandated spending. Writers also felt that given the steadily 
diminishing funding and long waitlists for CRP, the fact that the state would help to enroll 
more acres under conservation would send a signal to Washington regarding the efficacy 
and necessity of the program. One M5 supporter also argued that expanding voluntary 
conservation programs at the state level would ultimately reduce federal control and 
purported overreach in the state, by demonstrating that farmers are capable of self-
management and that new regulations are not needed: “The amendment will allow North 
Dakotans to design programs that work best for us instead of waiting for the federal 
government” (Monson, 2014). 
 Beyond the expansion of land-sparing programs, writers also felt that conservation 
funded through M5 would have a more basic and self-evident benefit for future farmers 
and ranchers: the availability of more pristine acreage and water sources for farmers to 
use. Many letter writers noted that for young Dakotans, the costs for both entering the 
agricultural profession and for large-scale conservation were extremely daunting. Yet 
these same writers also felt that spending under M5 would prove to be a fiscally 
responsible method for meeting both of these goals: 
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The bottom line is that conservation on a scale that has broad societal 
benefits is expensive. Fortunately, North Dakota is in a position [because of 
oil] to be able to afford such an investment while still providing for our 
schools, infrastructure needs and other priorities. That’s why Measure 5, 
and the amount of money it would provide for conservation, makes sense 
to me (Ringelman, 2014). 
 
I’ve been in conservation for 30 years and the most effective bang for the 
buck is on the ground conservation practices. North Dakotans have a 
unique opportunity [because of oil wealth] to make a substantial investment 
in conservation and wildlife habitat to keep these traditions alive … without 
raising a single cent in taxes on anyone (R.S. Smith, 2014). 
 
The rewards received from the amendment are numerous and would cost 
citizens nothing to achieve … It’s time to take a portion of the financial 
surplus from the oil boom and put it towards resources that sustain and 
nourish our communities (Willand, 2014). 
 
Many letter writers countered the notion that M5 was a cultural break from the traditions 
of fiscal conservatism and individual property rights, arguing instead that M5 would 
provide citizens and the government more flexibility in productively managing both 
budgets and agricultural land. In fact, former Lieutenant Governor and veteran syndicated 
columnist Lloyd Omdahl argued that such rights, as well those to hunting and outdoor 
recreation, would become increasingly less viable without effective conservation:  
The owners of wetlands have a property right that they should be able to 
convert into income … yet we need to acknowledge the loss of millions of 
acres of outdoor recreational space. The constitutional right to bear arms 
and the right to hunt will have little meaning when we have no game to 
shoot. So perhaps there is a need for the state to shore up its hunting habitat 
(Omdahl, 2014). 
 
The concept of preserving tradition through financially sound conservation strongly 
animates our next subsection, that of preserving Theodore Roosevelt’s conservation 
legacy. 
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5.2.3.3. Upholding Theodore Roosevelt’s legacy 
 Although Theodore Roosevelt spent only 4 years in western North Dakota 
adventuring and ranching during the 1880s, his time there is often said to have inspired 
his zeal for conservation and the expansion of federal public lands. Roosevelt’s rugged, 
masculine image and promotion of conservation for outdoor recreation makes him an oft-
invoked image among North Dakotans on both the right and left of the political spectrum 
(NPS, 2017).  However, those with a more interventionist mindset tend to heavily 
emphasize his public lands legacy (concretized in North Dakota’s living memorial of 
Theodore Roosevelt National Park), arguing that conservation is both an individual and 
collective responsibility shared by all North Dakotans:  
People of the Western Edge think very highly of Theodore Roosevelt, in no 
small part due to his conservation efforts as president. All North Dakotans 
need to consider whether T.R. was right when he said: “I recognize the right 
and duty of this generation to develop and use the natural resources of our 
land; but I do not recognize the right to waste them, or to rob, by wasteful 
use, the generations that come after us” (Moore, 2014).  
 
Such a spirit animated many M5 supporters, who argued that the measure was an integral 
part of strengthening the preservationist movement in the state, especially given the 
threats placed on the landscape by oil and gas. 
 Many of these Rooseveltian enthusiasts felt that not passing M5 would not only be 
bad for the North Dakota environment, but would also directly dishonor the Roughrider 
spirit that Roosevelt and other early-20th century conservationist icons worked so hard to 
protect. A writer who went out of his way to describe his life history vis a vis hunting in the 
Badlands, noted that M5 was specifically needed to honor Roosevelt, as he had “made 
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North Dakota the cradle of conservation” (Feininger, 2014). One CCW, who appeared to 
take a neutral stance by not directly declaring whether readers should vote “yes” or “no”, 
posited that the correct choice could be arrived at by comparing the bill’s goals to 
members of the aforementioned group, such as Roosevelt, John Muir and Gifford Pinchot. 
If M5 and these leaders’ visions matched, then M5 would be, “roaring an opportunity for 
conservation” (Carter, 2014). Indeed, another CCW argued that supporting M5 was a 
direct Rooseveltian challenge to entrenched anti-environmental interests in the oil and 
gas lobby, noting that Roosevelt and his disciples “speak the truth”, while “API has not 
been speaking the truth on Measure 5” (Myerchin, 2014b). Thus, many writers felt that 
that not honoring Roosevelt’s charge by supporting M5 would be tantamount to selling 
out and corrupting the purity of both people and prairie that make North Dakota special. 
 Writers also argued that approving M5 would be equivalent to acting as Roosevelt 
would, were he still alive and faced with the same situation. Several essentially took the 
line of WWTD? or “What Would Teddy Do?,” assigning Roosevelt an almost spiritual 
omnipresence: 
North Dakota has outstanding natural beauty and incredible opportunities 
for outdoor activity. Because of the efforts and sacrifices of many, we are 
able to enjoy much of what our Creator saw fit to put here: wildlife, fish, 
wildflowers, rivers, wetlands, prairies and Badlands … These are things we 
all need to live, and they make living here magnificent. Theodore Roosevelt 
knew (Kutka, 2014). 
 
So, I am thinking it is time to be progressive, like former President Teddy 
Roosevelt, who established millions of acres for parks and visitor centers, 
including preservation of our magnificent Badlands … This makes not just 
common sense, but good sense (Goetz, 2014). 
 
Teddy Roosevelt must be cheering up in heaven (Monson, 2014). 
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Although such declarations may seem hyperbolic, they are in keeping with many 
rhetorical styles frequent in the frontier romanticizing of North Dakota and its rural, 
outdoor heritage, specifically the tripartite loyalties often emphasized as being at the core 
of a humble North Dakotan: faith, family and community. Indeed, for liberals, whose “real 
American” bona fides are often called into question both by conservative letter writers and 
in broader political discourse, the ability to so closely link their own values and practices 
to such an icon of self-reliance provides yet another opportunity to prove that 
conservatives do not have a monopoly on “common sense” thinking. As mentioned in 
chapter 1, in North Dakota, being branded as irrational and/or out-of-touch can be the 
kiss of death for one’s credibility, regardless of the actual merits of one’s argument. 
5.2.3.4. Cautious opposition 
 Deviation from “common sense” thinking, especially for those on the liberal side of 
the political spectrum, often leads to an immediate dismissal of one’s standing and 
credibility to intervene in meaningful debates. M5 supporters, many of whom were self-
identified Democrats or affiliated with perceived liberal interest groups, tended to be much 
less forceful in their arguments than M5 opponents, often taking great pains to emphasize 
how moderate and non-radical M5 was. The tone of many pro-M5 editorials gave the 
impression of trying to appear as logical and non-threatening as possible, perhaps as a 
counter-weight to the angry and at-times conspiratorial tone used by some anti-M5 
writers, although it is not clear why such styles might have been adopted. This strategy 
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was employed frequently by those writers seeking to debunk claims made by M5 
opponents through the use of fact-and-figure laden arguments. 
 One of the major areas of M5 support was the attempt to downplay the 
amendment’s overall cost and emphasize its supposedly negligible impact on 
infrastructure and social service funding. As mentioned in section a, M5 opponents often 
cited the highest possible estimates for the amendment’s cost without broader context, 
thus making M5 appear to be extremely expensive and therefore imprudent. Supporters 
sought to demonstrate how the actual amount was small when compared to the overall 
oil-related taxes collected by North Dakota. In particular, writers rarely mentioned the 
actual dollar amounts (some as high as $175 million per year) and instead focused on the 
fact that M5’s budget was only 5% of one of many oil-related taxes. This gave the 
impression of M5 being fiscally prudent at the 5%, regardless of actual dollar amount, 
looking very small against the anti-M5 talking points. 
 The second major area in which M5 supporters sought to normalize the 
amendment was in its argument that M5 would be about promoting choice and 
competition by allowing farmers, conservation organization and the state government 
more flexibility in choosing how best to manage land and allocate resources for 
conservation programs. Several writers argued that M5 policies would be a method for 
rural North Dakotans to re-assert their rights in the face of dismissal from urban, 
governmental elites in cities such as Bismarck, Fargo and Grand Forks. One Bismarck 
attorney wrote that M5 was not, in fact, solely a conservation measure, but a tool for rural 
economic growth and the protection of outdoor livelihoods:  
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When these rural communities have hunters and anglers visiting, they see 
the benefits in their gas stations, cafes and bars, as well as helping to 
provide clean water and flood control. Simply put, the Clean Water, Wildlife 
and Parks Amendment makes North Dakota common sense because the 
benefits to our rural landowners and rural communities will be felt far and 
wide (Myerchin, 2014a). 
 
Another writer, who self-identified as a rural property owner, argued that M5 would directly 
benefit her by allowing her to make better decisions about who she could sell and rent 
land to, whether Ducks Unlimited or otherwise: “As a farmer/rancher I believe I should be 
able to sell my land to whomever I want to. If a farmer wants to retire farm land for 
conservation Measure 5 is another tool for doing it” (Anderson, 2014). Such arguments 
place M5 in line with arguments about free enterprise, private property rights, competition, 
growth and rural, “real American” family values and wholesomeness, a strategy which 
was taken to its logical conclusion by Evan Nelson, then president of the North Dakota 
Environmental Law Society:  
First and best, it [M5] does not raise taxes … Second, this is a local and 
state solution, not a federal government intrusion … Third, the bill ensures 
the state can only spend money it already has on conservation … In other 
words, this is the fiscally conservative way to conserve (E. Nelson, 2014). 
 
 However, casting M5 as the “conservative” choice had several downsides. First, it 
played directly into the opposition’s hands: if the measure was really that conservative, 
then why would it even be necessary in a state dominated by conservative Republicans 
and industries who stood united against any major challenges to low-cost, low-regulation 
orthodoxy? Why not, as many M5 opponents suggested, expand the OHF voluntarily, 
rather than mandate spending? Second, along these same lines, veteran liberal 
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commentator Jack Zaleski argued that making the amendment more conservative in 
order to appeal to voters ultimately both hindered the campaign and would have distorted 
M5’s effectiveness had it actually passed. In particular, Zaleski felt that by giving the 
governor veto power over land sales, as well as creating a committee of overseers 
dominated by state officials, Ducks Unlimited and other M5 drafters had undermined their 
position. Third, M5 proponents were constantly on the defensive, trying to downplay the 
measure’s supposed radicalness and counter talking points, and thus did not craft an 
effective, winning narrative of their own: “One of the legacies of North Dakota Measure 5, 
the conservation amendment, will be that lies writ large and told often can carry the day 
… opponents of the measure were proponents of the big lie. It worked” (Zaleski, 2014). 
Thus, it did not matter what the actual effects of M5 might have been, as opponents were 
more successful in both setting the terms of the debate and in spreading their version of 
the truth, which factual or not, resonated better with many North Dakotans. 
5.3 Analysis of Keystone XL editorials 
5.3.1 The Keystone XL debate in North Dakota 
While North Dakota has been one the epicenters of the shale boom, another major energy 
expansion has occurred in Canada: the harvesting of the oil/tar sands.16 One of the major 
proposals for the transportation of oil sands has been Keystone XL (KXL), an expansion 
                                                 
16 “Oil sands” is the preferred is industry term, while “tar sands” is usually a pejorative used by opponents 
to emphasize the sands volatility and “dirtiness” when compared to other types of oil. The use of tar 
sands, though, has become so widespread in popular culture, that even the respected Argonne National 
Laboratory (2012) uses the term instead of oil sands in its information sheets on heavy oils. This 
dissertation will make use of oil sands, except when directly quoting other authors. 
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of the existing Keystone Pipeline system (a section of which currently runs through North 
Dakota) which brings sands from Alberta to refineries in Illinois and Texas. KXL in 
particular would bring sands south through the Great Plains to a junction point in 
Nebraska where it would connect up with existing parts of the Keystone system 
(TransCanada, 2018). 
 KXL, which was first announced in 2008, attracted a broad coalition of opponents 
concerned about environmental issues such as climate change impacts and the potential 
contamination of water sources in the Ogallala Aquifer. This public movement against 
KXL, as well as various legal disputes regarding pipeline route and eminent domain 
issues, were contributing factors to the long delay of approval for KXL, which received 
tentative federal approval from the Trump Administration in March 2017, but has yet to 
begin construction as of June 2017. As this nine-year period of indecision and uncertainty 
wore on, a significant partisan divide emerged, with many Democrats and liberals, 
especially in non-oil, Democratic-leaning states, strongly opposing KXL and many 
conservatives and Republicans strongly supporting it (Gravelle & Lachapelle, 2015). It is 
not surprising that KXL was a second leading topic of discussion in the editorial section 
of North Dakota newspapers according to our sample (see Chapter 3.6.2).  
5.3.2. Arguments supporting KXL 
 The major arguments for KXL were largely premised on the assumption that KXL 
was a proxy for the oil and gas industry, with particular implications for North Dakota, 
which has become especially reliant on the industry for jobs, revenue and development.  
Most KXL supporters viewed KXL as a matter of vital importance and framed it as a 
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microcosm of the success or failure of the entire petroleum industry. Much of this 
exuberance was due to optimistic or erroneous assumptions about North Dakota’s role in 
constructing and supplying crude oil to KXL. In particular, two notions about KXL were of 
particular importance to understanding the rationale behind the thinking of many KXL 
supporters: the unofficial agreement to use up to 100,000 barrels/day of Bakken crude to 
lighten the transported sands as they pass through a junction point at Baker, Montana; 
and the incorrect notion that KXL would pass through North Dakota and/or directly 
transport North Dakota crude. Although many KXL supporters did not express support for 
all or any of these ideas, nearly all writers in this sample felt that North Dakota would be 
significantly negatively impacted without KXL. 
 The five major arguments used by writers in support of KXL are as follows: 
1. Transporting oil via pipeline is far safer and more desirable than via rail 
or truck (19 articles). 
2. KXL is good for overall energy security (18 articles). 
3. KXL is a bipartisan project (14 articles). 
4. KXL presents little to no environmental risk (13 articles). 
5. Opposition to KXL is anti-Canadian and bad for national security (8 
articles). 
 
The overall goal of most KXL supporters was to use these arguments to prove that KXL 
was not only important for the oil industry and North Dakota’s economic survival, but that 
its benefits were so patently obvious and indisputable. Writers sought to demonstrate that 
KXL opponents were some combination of irrational, ill-informed or devious promoters of 
an inflexible and absolutist environmentalist agenda. Indeed, environmentalism is often 
portrayed as incompatible with the North Dakota Way, thus appeals against it are often 
highly effective. 
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5.3.2.1. Pipelines over rails 
 While North Dakota has become the second-largest oil producer in the United 
States after Texas, the state is generally considered to lack adequate pipeline and refining 
capacity. Thus, a major portion of Bakken oil is shipped out of state via rail, and to a lesser 
extent by truck.17 Although KXL does not directly transport sweet crude, the expected 
100,000 barrels/day (approximately 10% of the daily crude extracted in North Dakota) of 
Bakken oil that would be added to the Alberta sands as a conditioner, which is seen as a 
major step towards lessening the pressure on the state’s rail and road networks. Pro-KXL 
writers, many of whom heavily promoted the Bakken’s supposed role in the pipeline, 
specifically felt that this was important for 2 major reasons: lessening the frequency of 
accidental spills and avoiding catastrophic rail accidents. 
 News coverage of the oil industry frequently focuses on rail, truck and pipeline 
spills of various types, including crude oil, unused fracking fluids and produced water (the 
mixture of crude oil, water, used fracking fluids and potential natural contaminants that 
flow back to the wellhead after fracking has been completed).18 Despite these fluids being 
of wildly different composition and the spills occurring from different methods of transport 
                                                 
17 The construction of the Dakota Access and Sandpiper pipelines, both of which are designed to directly 
transport Bakken crude to refineries in the Midwestern United States, is viewed by many pro-oil individuals 
as the major way to solve this issue. Although Dakota Access - which became a source of international 
interest due to protests against its construction during the fall of 2016 - has become operational as of June 
2017, it had not yet become a significant topic of public debate until several months after November 2015 
(when the Obama administration officially rejected KXL) and is thus mentioned only in passing by KXL 
writers. Sandpiper, which would have brought Bakken oil across Minnesota to Lake Superior, was 
indefinitely suspended in September 2016 due to intense public opposition and expected lack of return on 
investment due to continued low oil prices. It, too, was rarely mentioned. 
18 In 2016, The Fargo Forum, the state’s largest newspaper by circulation, published 68 stories about the 
oil and gas industry using the word “spill” and 102 stories about the industry using the word “leak.” 
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(i.e. crude is spilled far more often from pipelines and rail cars, whereas fracking fluids 
are most often trucked and produced water spills in a myriad of ways), such spills are 
often reported after the fact, often with little context provided as to what was spilled (and 
how) and the potential health and safety impacts. These spills happen so frequently (745 
official spills in 2016 [North Dakota Department of Health, 2018]), that it becomes difficult 
for one to keep track of specific incidents. Many interviewees for this research complained 
of fatigue and confusion due to the near daily reporting of oilfield incidents. Several pro-
KXL writers argued that KXL, by virtue of being a pipeline (and thus inherently safer than 
other transportation methods), would reduce spills (an inherently ambiguous term, as 
shown above): 
Do we think spills will still happen? Yes, we do. Actually, we’d bet on it. But 
we also believe that no matter how oil is shipped, that thick black liquid will, 
without a doubt, somehow make its way to market. Nothing can stop it, so 
it might as well be transported through the safest and most reliable method 
(Wenzel, 2014). 
 
For one thing, both trains and pipelines are safe, as long as "safe" is 
understood to mean very low risk (as opposed to no risk at all). For another, 
should we care to zero in on that area of very low risk, we'd see that modern 
pipelines might be termed "very low risk" and probably are the safest way 
to move oil … And in any event, now that the comparative safety of pipeline 
transport is clear, Keystone XL opponents have one less argument against 
the pipeline. All that's left is their claim that the oil should be left in the 
Canadian ground, forever (Dickinson Press Editorial Board, 2013). 
 
I know pipelines do make messes … But at least you know where that spill 
is going to occur, more or less … Once you see the sausage get made up 
close, you realize the business of transporting the gooey goodness 
becomes a choice between the lesser of two evils — pipelines or trains. 
Now I’m no expert, but it seems pretty clear that given that choice, I’ll take 
the pipeline evil every time (Hickman, 2015). 
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Lurking under the surface of all of these quotations is the notion that fossil fuels are 
inevitable, a concept that Unruh (2000) has referred to as “carbon lockin” and that 
Widener (2013) has more recently called “a protracted age of oil.” Thus, standing in the 
way of their exploitation is not only pointless, but also suspicious, as the DP Editorial 
Board quip about KXL opponents wanting to leave Canadian oil in the ground 
demonstrates. Such hyperbole and deliberate misstatement of the facts – regarding both 
the actual effects of KXL, as well as those who argue against it – serves to paint 
opponents as obstinate and unwilling to engage in efforts to find “reasonable” solutions. 
 Such notions of insincere pipeline detractors animated many of the pro-KXL 
arguments regarding the pipeline’s role in reducing oil-by-rail traffic, and therefore 
catastrophic accidents. Many of these arguments reflected nervousness about so-called 
“Bakken Bombs” - the name for trains carrying crude from the oil patch to out-of-state 
refineries – two of which had recently derailed.  One was a visually spectacular, yet non-
casualty explosion in Casselton in rural Eastern North Dakota (Jul. 6, 2013) and a more 
severe explosion causing the death of 47 people in Lag Megantic, Quebec (Dec. 30, 
2013). Pro-KXL writers sought to argue that, since oil had to be moved somehow, not 
supporting KXL, and by proxy other pipelines, meant that opponents (stereotyped, as 
usual, as out-of-touch, enviro-zealot, pro-“Washington” dupes) effectively endorsing the 
dangers of Bakken Bombs. A case in point was Brian Kalk (R), then-chairman of the North 
Dakota Public Service Commission (the agency in charge of approving and regulating 
state infrastructure), who tied North Dakota’s safety woes directly to the intransigence of 
President Obama and federal pipeline regulators. Kalk implied that Obama was punishing 
North Dakota, whose energy economy is “the envy of the nation”, out of jealousy, by 
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publicly claiming to support North Dakota’s quest for safe oil transport while secretly 
working to block KXL:  
Currently, we do not have adequate pipeline capacity, a situation that is 
exacerbated by the refusal of the Administration to approve the Keystone 
XL pipeline … We need to have the ability to move product, via pipelines, 
so as to lessen the dependence on rail transportation. The Casselton 
accident was too close for comfort (Kalk, 2014). 
 
A Canadian CCW was less subtle in casting blame, arguing that Obama had the power 
to stop future train accidents by approving KXL, yet chose to hide behind the 
smokescreen of environmental concerns while simultaneously expanding far more 
unsustainable offshore and arctic drilling (Church, 2015). 
 Still others promoting the Obama hypocrisy thesis took a far more conspiratorial 
tone, alleging the existence of a sinister plot between Obama and Warren Buffett, a 
frequent target of criticism among conservatives. Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway 
corporation has fully owned BNSF (one of the largest rail transporters of crude oil) since 
2009, shares somewhat of a mixed reputation in North Dakota, being alternately praised 
for his business acumen – especially due to his foresight in buying the moribund BNSF 
early on in the boom - and derided for his association with the Democratic Party and 
President Obama. This latter source of animus was used by several writers to pile onto 
the already significant blame placed on Obama as one of the chief reasons for the non-
progress made on KXL approval and construction. William Triplett, a long-time 
Washington insider and Republican operative, argued that it was precisely Buffett’s 
behind-the-scenes needling that led Obama to delay the pipeline and would ultimately 
cause him to reject it (he had not yet done so at the time this editorial was written):  
 183 
 
It may be entirely coincidental that a lot of Buffett cash continued to the flow 
to the Obama money machine right when Mr. Obama delayed Keystone XL 
and continues to flow right when he may be blocking it permanently. There 
is no doubt, however, that every day Keystone XL is delayed, Berkshire 
Hathaway makes a lot of money. A chart of dollars out of Berkshire 
Hathaway and into the Democratic National Committee would look very ugly 
… In short, Mr. Obama is about to hammer the American energy industry, 
and he's doing it for money (Triplett, 2013). 
 
William Balgord, a petroleum engineer, echoed this view in arguing that despite the 
inherent good of building more railroad tracks and tank cars to bring more oil to market, 
Obama has been unwilling to consider KXL and other pipelines due to not wanting to risk 
the funding and support of Buffett. Balgord argued that this delaying directly put North 
Dakota and other rail-heavy areas at risk for another Lag Megantic-type disaster (Balgord, 
2014). The editors at the FF summed up such sentiments rather pithily: “If President 
Barack Obama backs away from his ‘all energy sources’ pledge and stops Keystone  
XL, the winner will be railroads, not the environment” (Fargo Forum Editorial Board, 
2013). 
5.3.2.2. KXL is a net positive for energy security 
 Anti-rail (and to a lesser extent anti-truck) attacks reflected a strong dislike of 
“Washington” regulation of the energy industry, which they felt would ultimately cripple 
the Bakken, and therefore the national, economy. Many of these critics were not so much 
arguing against rail transport (many admitted as much, since they felt that all crude 
transport was ultimately positive), but were using it as a straw man to prop up KXL, which 
would at most transport ~20%of all Bakken crude. Such a strategy was also consistently 
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employed in attempts to paint KXL as a major component in ensuring the U.S.’s long-
term energy and national security. 
 KXL was seen by many pro-KXL writers as a line in the sand for the American 
energy sector, with its approval or defeat being one of the principal determinants of the 
future success or failure of both the industry and the U.S. as a major economic power. 
Specifically, many writers were fixated on the notion that the fracking boom had finally 
returned the United States to its long-lost – and unquestionably deserved – position of 
the world’s top oil and gas producer, as well as restoring all of the symbolic geopolitical 
muscle that comes with it. Deliberately limiting such a favored position by torpedoing KXL 
would be the equivalent of a self-inflicted wound, simultaneously destroying America’s 
recession-busting dynamo and giving a permanent economic boost to foreign (non-
Canada) oil producers whose agendas were seen as inherently anti-American. Many 
writers argued that KXL was an antidote to American over-reliance on Middle Eastern oil, 
which is akin to indirectly funding terrorism and supporting dictatorship:  
And getting the price down further, to say $60 a barrel, would make it 
impossible for Iran to continue spending on nuclear weapons and terrorist 
groups abroad without lowering the already abysmal living standard of those 
Iranians who are not members of the ruling elite. That could be a milestone 
on the road to regime change from within (May, 2011). 
 
By decreasing the U.S. reliance on these Middle Eastern imports, the United 
States  
has a greater capacity to pursue a foreign policy that is not subject to the 
whims of oil producers in the Persian Gulf … For far too long America's 
energy supply has relied upon regimes that are unstable and in many cases 
hostile to our interests. The Keystone XL pipeline is an important step to 
break this unhealthy situation while creating good-paying jobs at home 
(Reeves, 2011). 
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The Keystone XL pipeline is good for the nation, and the American people 
agree … A strong infrastructure plan is particularly important as we are 
locked in a battle with OPEC to see who will supply energy to the United 
States in the future (Hoeven, 2015). 
 
Such arguments then serve to push KXL beyond the realm of the mere economic, and 
into the more universally identifiable concerns of both national and international security. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, flattering North Dakotans by placing them as key characters 
in the narrative of American exceptionalism is an oft-used and effective tactic for 
generating support the energy industry. Within such a narrative, industry apologists seek 
to create a simple, binary choice, between right and wrong and between good and evil, 
with international dictators and nebulous terrorist groups in far off, mystified regions often 
filling these roles.  
Another major object of derision for security-minded writers was Vladimir Putin, 
who has long been viewed as one of the U.S.’s chief adversaries and a major threat to 
U.S. interests in the Middle East and Europe. During the 2008 election campaign, 
presidential candidate John McCain referred to Russia as “fueled by petro-dollars that 
has basically become a KGB apparatchik-run government” (Reuters, 2008). Arguments 
for KXL and against Putin reflected this animosity, with Russia cast as the Cold War 
communist villain. The editors at the MDN argued that by not approving KXL and 
exporting its oil, Obama was forcing our European allies into the hands of Putin, a cruel 
man who was punishing these states by withholding oil and gas due to their support of 
Ukraine’s Western-backed government (Minot Daily News Editorial Board, 2014b). 
Similarly, Grand Forks Herald editor Tom Dennis (writing in the DP), argued that Obama’s 
foot dragging was completely unnecessary as he would have bipartisan support in taking 
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on Putin. Moreover, he argued that it was in fact Putin who was the decisive one, seizing 
the opportunity to invade Ukraine and subsequently receiving no major pushback from 
the U.S. or the rest of the international community:  
The U.S. Senate has given Obama the opening he needs. The president 
should seize the moment and very publicly act … If the president acted fast 
on key energy issues, including Keystone, he easily could win bipartisan 
congressional support. That’s the kind of unity that makes for second-
guessing in the Kremlin, and that’s the kind of decisiveness Ukraine and 
America’s other allies need (Dennis, 2014). 
 
 In summary, security arguments pushed KXL beyond the realm of mere good 
economic sense, recasting it as a vital project without which the U.S., and therefore the 
“free world”, will be far less safe. Such a tactic then framed opposition to KXL as not only 
a classic case of environmentalists selfishly standing in the way of free market growth, 
but also as weak on national security and, at worst, disloyal to the United States and its 
interests.  
5.3.3.3. KXL as a bipartisan project 
 Although political support for the oil and gas industry was generally framed as a 
conservative and Republican domain, many Democratic politicians from conservative 
states, especially those from oil-producing states strongly supported KXL. In fact, support 
for KXL was seen as such a necessity for oil-state Democrats that following the 2014 
midterm elections, a vote to force approval of XKL was hastily called in the U.S. Congress 
to bolster the chances of  incumbent Sen. Mary Landrieu in her upcoming runoff election 
(Barron-Lopez, 2014). Although such a strategy both failed to pass the motion or to earn 
Landrieu re-election, it demonstrated how strongly politicians felt support for or opposition 
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to KXL was for their political fortunes. The potential power of this narrative was not lost 
on KXL supporters who framed KXL as a bipartisan project (despite limited support from 
the majority of national Democrats) and opponents as obstructionists:  
The news that Hoeven, Heitkamp and Sen. Mary Landrieu had failed to get 
the 60 supporters needed to pass the legislation written by Hoeven was 
disappointing in North Dakota, where the pipeline remains popular and 
where it would be used to transport crude oil from the Bakken to refineries 
in Houston (Minot Daily News Editorial Board, 2014c). 
 
 Many KXL supporters in this bipartisan framing felt that Obama’s delay and 
ultimate rejection of KXL was foolish and merely a form of pandering to liberal interest 
groups.  The fact that various XKL approval measures have received backing from all 
Senate Republicans and approximately one quarter of Senate Democrats was cited to 
support this claim and used an example of politicians’ attempts to overcome partisan 
gridlock and make the federal government “work” again. North Dakota’s Republican 
senator, John Hoeven, wrote a series of op-eds both before and after the 2015 Obama 
rejection, each one lauding “the bill I introduced” and its “44 co-sponsors” (2012, 2015). 
Hoeven, who in the 2012 article also referenced “our bill” (in reference to all of the co-
sponsors), argued that Obama was directly and unreasonably standing in the way of 
progress, and going against his own party, because the Department of State under his 
own administration had cleared the way for KXL to be built. Such arguments were also 
mentioned by the editors of the FF, who lauded attempts by Sen. Heidi Heitkamp (D), the 
bill’s other principal sponsor, to tone-police arguments made by anti-KXL Democrats in 
favor of a “why can’t we all just get along” approach, the result of which would have been 
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passing the bill. Heitkamp was elevated to the role of a veritable Superwoman, waging a 
brave, Dakota-values infused quest to single-handedly solve “Washington” problems:  
One speech can’t by itself change the mess in the Senate. But it can begin 
an evolution from today’s bitterly partisan mud pit to restoration of the comity 
that is supposed to distinguish the U.S. Senate as the greatest deliberative 
body in the world. If Sen. Heitkamp can play a part in that process, she can 
be proud of her work. And North Dakotans can be proud of her (Fargo 
Forum Editorial Board, 2014b). 
 
This same sentiment was expressed by Heitkamp herself, who, in an editorial in the FF, 
stated that “President Barack Obama's decision to reject the Keystone XL pipeline is the 
wrong decision, and another example of what's wrong with politics and Washington these 
days. It's time to put partisanship aside, do what's right for the country and build this 
pipeline” (Heitkamp, 2012).  
Thus, this focus on supposed “bipartisan” agreement, the only logical result of 
which is the approval and construction of KXL, becomes yet another way to hammer the 
Obama administration and further narratives of liberal jealousy and intransigence as the 
major reasons for the pipeline’s delay. These narratives were reinforced in several articles 
citing the “44 Republicans, 9 Democrats” statistic, featuring titles such as “Obama is out 
of excuses” (Minot Daily News Editorial Board, 2013) and “Taking a Big Step Backward” 
(Minot Daily News Editorial Board, 2014a), all of which sought to place the blame for 
KXL’s failure on “Washington” liberals, while celebrating the brave Republicans and 
minority of Democrats seeking to approve the pipeline, the bravest among them being 
North Dakota’s senators Hoeven and Heitkamp. Railing against “partisanship”, therefore, 
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serves the purpose of reinforcing the superiority of the common-sense “North Dakota 
Way” over the smug, profligate “Washington Way.” 
5.3.3.4. KXL represents little-to-no environmental risk 
 A separate, yet related, argument to human health and safety frequently made by 
KXL supporters was that KXL posed little to no risk to the environment, whether through 
stimulating oil production (and therefore emissions) or through any sort of contamination 
due to spills, leaks or other pipeline accidents. While most of these arguments cited State 
Department assessments to make their case (mentioned in 12 of 13 articles on this topic), 
there was also a strong current of anti-environmentalism present, with skeptical 
statements made regarding climate change and the environmentalist movement in 
general. The general thrust of many of these arguments was that if it were not for the 
meddlesome environmentalist movement and their insincere, or supposedly false, 
objections, KXL would have been approved long ago. 
 A case in point was DP editor Korrie Wenzel, who argued that KXL opponents 
were displaying selective outrage against KXL and Sandpiper despite purported 
clearance from the State Department and other regulatory agencies because 
“environmentalists have realized that they just can’t stop oil use, so they instead are 
putting their focus on the infrastructure that delivers the oil to points around the world. If 
the beast cannot be stopped, then gum up the beast’s lifeline” (Wenzel, 2015). Similar 
sentiments were echoed by writers from the Grand Forks Herald (publishing in the DP), 
arguing that environmentalists are standing in the way of KXL by “crowing about 
environmental concerns and worries that proponents are exaggerating the number and 
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importance of the jobs involved.” The authors continue by comparing the progress of XKL 
with that of the Interstate Highway system, a project that has been very important to the 
economy of North Dakota while contributing thousands of “temporary” jobs. Since 
attacking highways was unthinkable, the authors argued, so too should attacking KXL 
and other pipelines (Grand Forks Herald Editorial Board, 2015). This was a continuation 
from a previous attack about the insincerity of protestors and their distraction from “real” 
environmental issues:  
There’s a story that anti-Keystone activists should remember before they 
launch yet another round of anti-pipeline claims. It’s the story of the boy who 
cried “Wolf!” The boy’s alarm mobilized the town, but no wolf could be found. 
Then the pattern repeated itself again and again. Before long, the 
townspeople stopped trusting the boy. And he regretted that fact mightily 
when a real wolf bounded onto the scene (Grand Forks Herald Editorial 
Board, 2014). 
 
As above, while authors note that there are legitimate concerns about the safety of 
pipelines, but they were miniscule compared to those posed by transporting oil by rail or 
truck. Moreover, any potential damage was the cost of oil-related growth that funded the 
lifestyle that many Dakotans enjoyed. Thus, opposing KXL on environmental grounds 
(something that many pro-KXL writers consider foolish from an objective standpoint) is 
not only deeply antithetical to the pragmatic, pro-business and anti-government culture of 
North Dakota, but also selfish and hypocritical, two mortal sins under the doctrine of the 
North Dakota Way. 
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5.3.3.5. KXL opposition is anti-Canadian 
 While many KXL supporters argued that opponents are anti-Dakotan (and by 
extension, anti-American), another strain of writers showed that opposition to KXL is 
effectively a form of stealth anti-Canadianism. These arguments are based on three major 
premises: Canada is the United States’ (especially North Dakota’s) geographically closest 
neighbor (Mexico does not receive such recognition) and one of its major military and 
cultural allies; support for Canada is vital for creating pan-North American solidarity and 
security; and allowing Canadian oil and gas to bypass America is both an economic and 
diplomatic tragedy and symbolic of American weakness. Each of these rationales is 
rooted in notions of Canada and its resources being instrumental to the United States’ 
national security, thus rejecting KXL is akin to rejecting Canada as a whole and therefore 
putting America at risk. 
 Much of the writing harping on this theme argued that by not approving KXL, 
“Washington” (i.e. Obama) was both destabilizing a longstanding relationship with 
Canada and simultaneously driving much needed oil into the hands of the Chinese, a 
convenient foil because of fears about the decline of American hegemony and the rise of 
Communism. Obama was, yet again, the major target for columnists. DP editor Tom 
Dennis sought to contrast Obama’s decision making regarding the raid that killed Osama 
Bin Laden with that regarding KXL, arguing that Obama’s decisiveness in the former 
situation (“this president’s finest hour”) was the exact opposite of his indecisiveness 
towards the latter (“a timidity that borders on cowardice”) and a giant black mark on his 
legacy as one willing to “put his political fortune on the line in defense of the national 
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interest.” Dennis concluded by arguing that in addition to harming national security, 
abandoning KXL was, “an insult … to our neighbor to the North” (Dennis, 2014). Similarly, 
the MDN placed the blame for any delays in KXL construction squarely on Obama:  
Obama insists more studies are needed. That is rubbish, and the president 
knows it. His opposition to the pipeline is purely political. Never mind the 
very real consequences of not building it. They include depriving Americans 
of oil from a reliable ally, Canada, as well as encouraging that country to 
sell the oil abroad, possibly to China (Minot Daily News Editorial Board, 
2015). 
 
In an earlier editorial, Sen. Heitkamp sought to frame this possibility as a certainty, arguing 
that because Canadian oil production is both inevitable and beyond amounts Canada 
uses domestically, Canada has no choice not to sell it, and banning KXL leaves China as 
the only acceptable option (Heitkamp, 2012). These sentiments were also echoed by 
Michael Reeves, president of the Ports-to-Plains Alliance, whose stated goal is to support 
tri-national trade between the three North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) nations by 
lobbying for the development of overland trade through the U.S. Great Plains, which the 
company refers to as, “securing the benefits of commerce to North America’s energy and 
agricultural heartland” (Ports-to-Plains Alliance, 2018). Thus, for Reeves, whose 
organization receives funding directly from the Government of Alberta, KXL and related 
Plains oil infrastructure are key to both boosting development along the trans-continental 
trade corridor and shoring up our “comforting” relationship with Canada, the added bonus 
of which is sticking North America’s collective thumb in the eye of “hostile” and “unstable” 
regimes (Reeves, 2011). 
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 This rhetoric provided an interesting counterpoint to much popular nationalist 
rhetoric that paints Canada as somewhat of a backwards, effeminate, “socialist” cousin 
to the strong, militaristic, free-market United States (Allan, 2009). Indeed, in these pro-
KXL arguments, Canada and its oil industry are a bulwark against Islamist terrorism, Anti-
American despotism and Chinese economic expansion. Also lingering unwritten behind 
this strident, pro-Canadian rhetoric is the key role that Canadian trade and tourism play 
in North Dakota’s economy. Business Roundtable (2013) notes that North Dakota’s 
expanding agricultural and petroleum industries, proximity to the border and trade 
liberalization under NAFTA have allowed North Dakota to become a premiere 
import/export and tourism destination for Canadians, ranking in the top 20 of all US states 
on both measures despite being ranked 48th and 45th, respectively, in terms of population 
size and total economic output. Foreign exports of North Dakota goods and services have 
grown from ~$700 million/year in 1999 to ~$5.3 billion in 2016, with exports to Canada in 
particular seeing tremendous growth as both a function of real dollar amounts and a 
percentage of total exports, from ~340 million in 1999 (49% of total exports) to ~$4.4 
billion in 2016 (83% of total exports) (United States International Trade Administration, 
2018). Furthermore, North Dakota (and Minot, specifically) have become major retail 
destinations for shoppers from neighboring Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Rattray, 2015). 
Thus, in addition to the strong impetus to support Canada (as embodied through KXL) for 
broader - and sometimes less tangible -  economic and security reasons, North Dakota-
based writers have a host of local, concrete reasons to argue for KXL on Canadian 
grounds. 
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5.3.4. Arguments against KXL 
 The arguments against KXL trended less toward national security and more toward 
the environment. Many of the expected environmental concerns about the pipeline such 
as leaks/spills, broad-scale contamination and climate change impacts featured strongly 
among KXL opponents. However, writers also sought to address some of the local 
political aspects of KXL, arguing that politicians, the majority of whom were Republican, 
were acting more for the benefit of oil-industry allies than for their constituents. 
 The five most prevalent objections to KXL were: 
1. KXL presents significant environmental risk (20 articles). 
2. Political leaders negotiating KXL, especially Republicans, are corrupt (20 
articles). 
3. KXL will be a prelude to export of American oil and gas (17 articles). 
4. KXL is a net negative for energy security (15 articles). 
5. KXL will raise gas prices (11 articles).19 
 
Many of these arguments run contrary to those advanced by pro-KXL writers, in that they 
focus far more on the domestic, everyday ramifications of KXL, rather than high-level 
political machinations or international geopolitics. Thus, these arguments point to a 
localization of the KXL struggle that seeks to go beyond questions of how much oil is 
being transported and by whom. 
  
                                                 
19 Objections 1, 2 and 4 will receive their own subsections, while arguments 3 and 5 will be combined into 
one subsection due to significant overlap. 
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5.3.4.1. KXL is environmentally risky 
 Many KXL opponents were animated by what they saw as false claims about the 
project’s environmental impact in North Dakota, correctly noting that KXL will not directly 
pass through North Dakota and that it will not be a significant spur to existing Bakken 
crude pipelines. Writers instead sought to address two separate areas of concern: the 
challenges that KXL places to the Plains environment at large and some potential 
challenges that KXL might pose to North Dakota in particular. 
 Many writers worried about the specific type of oil (oil sands) that was being 
transported and the increased risks that it poses over more traditional crudes.20 Oil sands 
reflect their name, being a mixture of sand, clay, water and an extremely thick, sludgy 
and sour form of oil known as bitumen. These sands are so “heavy” and flow-resistant 
that they must be heated while still in the ground to allow extraction. Thus, recovered oil 
sands are extremely difficult and expensive to transport when compared to conventional 
crude, even after many of the non-petroleum components are removed in a process 
referred to as upgrading (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2017). Writers specifically felt 
that the oil’s extreme sourness (which leads to corrosion) and its heaviness made it 
especially dangerous to transport due to an increased likelihood of leaks and difficulties 
in spill remediation. Multiple writers echoed each other nearly word for word about how 
oil-sands-based oil was “toxic” (Gay, 2011; Evenson, 2014b; Altenbernd, 2015), “highly 
                                                 
20 Although Bakken oil and gas is considered unconventional due to its being extracted via horizontal drilling 
and hydraulic fracturing, once the crude is extracted it is considered to be among the purest forms of light, 
sweet crude, meaning that it is a largely free-flowing liquid (light) and contains very little hydrogen sulfide 
(sweet). Such crudes fetch a market premium as they are easier to transport and refine. 
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corrosive” and “sinks in water” (J. Richardson, 2012b; Larsen, 2014, 2015a, b; Evenson, 
2014b) and is among the dirtiest, most environmentally damaging petroleum source in 
the world (Hulse, 2011; Gay, 2011; LaDuke, 2014; J. Moen, 2012). While there were 
various opinions among this group about oil pipelines as a whole, all of the writers sought 
to show that KXL and its contents (refined oil sands potentially mixed with conventional 
crude) had the potential to create a far greater environmental and human safety disaster 
than nearly any other conventional oil and gas pipeline. 
 Chief among these writers’ fears was groundwater contamination, which would 
threaten both household and agricultural water users. However, writers tended to focus 
on two separate sites of potential contamination: the Ogallala Aquifer (which underlies 
much of KXL’s proposed route through the Plains) and the Yellowstone-Missouri River 
system (which KXL crosses at two separate points in Montana). The former water source 
served as a rallying cry against KXL more generally, with writers being specifically 
motivated by the threats posed to the ways of life of fellow Plains agriculturalists outside 
of North Dakota. Discussions regarding the latter water source served to emphasize the 
potential environmental risks that KXL might pose to North Dakota despite bypassing the 
state completely. 
 The Ogallala Aquifer covers portions of 8 Plains states (North Dakota is not among 
them) and is a significant source of both drinking water and agricultural water for residents 
of the region.21 Given that KXL crosses through Ogallala at several points along its route 
                                                 
21 It is estimated that nearly 1/3 of all irrigated land in the United States is situated on top of – and draws 
water from – the Ogallala Aquifer (Natural Resources Conservation Service, 2012). The Aquifer is also 
estimated to supply drinking water to 82%of residents in the High Plains region (United States Geological 
Survey, 2000). 
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(including the heart of the aquifer in Nebraska), writers argued that pipeline leaks – 
depending upon size – could result in significant localized and/or regional damage to both 
groundwater and surface land covers such as crops or surface water. Perennial candidate 
Tom Potter (D), who briefly ran against Sen. Heitkamp in the 2012 primary to provide a 
counterweight to her pro-KXL stance, argued that the pipeline was being rushed through 
solely on economic grounds, without proper attention given to the threats posed to 
Ogallala: “The potential for a devastating pipeline accident in that region must be part of 
the risk/reward analysis included in the process of deciding whether or not to build the 
pipeline. This is the kind of analysis that cannot be rushed” (Potter, 2012). A similar 
objection was raised by a CCW, who argued that boosters were purposely overinflating 
job numbers in order to force KXL through over environmental concerns:  
I was dismayed on the morning of Sept. 12 when I opened The Forum and 
saw a pro-Keystone XL pipeline advertisement about how the construction 
of the pipeline would lead to the creation of 600,000 jobs … Tar sands oil is 
among the dirtiest fuels on earth, and a spill along the pipeline's route would 
be catastrophic for American farmers and residents in the region, fish and 
wildlife, and the food supply … so yes, the construction of this pipeline 
would create jobs, but the extreme destruction that would come about from 
the pipeline's construction would far outweigh this benefit (Gay, 2011). 
 
Collin Evenson, a local farmer CCW and veteran anti-KXL activist, sought to further 
elucidate the rushed nature of the pipeline, arguing that the use of cheap, Chinese steel 
(which, he believes is being dishonestly sold to the public as American-made) will push 
the specter of leaks from “if” to “when”: “The pipeline will cross Nebraska over one of 
North America’s largest aquifers, the Ogallala Aquifer. When the pipeline fractures, the 
toxic tar will sink into one of our most important water sources” (Evenson, 2014b). 
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 Many writers expressing concern about the contamination of Ogallala were also 
motivated by the potential devastation of the rural, agricultural Plains way of life (see the 
quotation from Gay in the preceding paragraph), something that many rural CCWs felt 
was already under way across the region due to mounting pressures from the oil and coal 
industries, rural depopulation and a lack of interest in farm life and culture. In a separate 
article following Obama’s now-overturned decision to cancel KXL, the above-mentioned 
Collin Evenson sought to draw connections to – and express solidarity with – the threats 
faced by Nebraska farmers along the KXL route and those faced by North Dakota farmers 
in the Bakken: 
Proponents say it will reduce train traffic of oil cars through cities like Fargo 
and Devils Lake. The pipeline would do that because it would be … 
replacing 800,000 barrels of Bakken oil … One forgotten issue is the more 
than 100 landowners, ranchers and farmers in Nebraska and South Dakota 
that don’t want to have the pipeline transporting toxic tar through their land 
over the Ogallala Aquifer. The bill Sens. John Hoeven and Heidi Heitkamp 
are pushing would allow a private company from Canada to claim eminent 
domain over land owners in the United States … I talked to one farmer who 
turned down a $250,000 offer to have the Keystone XL pipeline cross his 
land. He did not want the risk of toxic tar ruining his family farm. They 
threatened him with eminent domain. What is Heidi Heitkamp going to say 
to him about landowner rights if her bill gets passed over the veto? 
(Evenson, 2015a). 
 
This theme of violation of property rights, which, as mentioned in (section 1.a.i 
(placeholder for final numbering scheme)) is viewed by many North Dakotans as the 
bedrock of rural independence, was expounded upon by several additional writers. One 
CCW felt that TransCanada’s use of eminent domain was an attack on rural property 
rights, but also both an erosion of American sovereignty and a way for the company to 
avoid responsibility in the event of a KXL accident: “I find it troubling that a foreign country, 
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even friendly Canada, will be given the power to impose eminent domain on American 
soil. The first oil spill should be interesting to watch when the responsible party is a foreign 
entity” (Altenbernd, 2015).  Long-time Native American environmental activist and former 
Green Party vice-presidential candidate Winona LaDuke related the struggles of rural 
farmers (especially South Dakota’s Native population) with KXL (a usurpation by an 
outside identity) to the legend of the Black Snake, an outside force that, much like a giant 
serpent, brings destruction to the land. LaDuke argued that Native Americans have often 
invoked the Black Snake as a metaphor against socioeconomic and environmental 
challenges posed by the United States and Canadian governments, especially when 
these threats, KXL included, violate existing land tenure agreements (LaDuke, 2014).22 
These general feelings of violation and dispossession were well summarized by a CCW 
from Fargo: “Are we a petro-colony now that has to risk our vital water resources for a 
couple hundred post-construction jobs?” (J. Richardson, 2012b). 
 The notions of petro-colonialism extended to arguments about the potential local 
effects of KXL in North Dakota through potential contamination of the Missouri and 
Yellowstone Rivers. While KXL crosses both of these rivers at separate junctures several 
hundred miles west and upstream of North Dakota in Montana, these two rivers converge 
soon after entering North Dakota and are a significant source of drinking and agricultural 
water for the western and central portions of the state (US Army Corps of Engineers, 
2017). Although it is not clear what the effects of a KXL spill might be on communities 
                                                 
22 For further background on the Black Snake legend and its connection to KXL, see Moe (2014). The Black 
Snake legend has also been applied more recently to the struggle against Dakota Access (Harris, 2017). 
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significantly downstream, much of this fear appears to be a reflection of past negative 
experiences with spills – some of which have entered the Missouri and other water 
sources - related to both the existing Keystone Phase 1 (which traverses North Dakota 
north to south in the eastern third of the state) and the industry more generally. Phase 1 
was a specific point of contention, as several writers felt that its purportedly poor safety 
record would be replicated by KXL. Fargo-based activist and rural memoirist Dean Hulse 
(2012) criticized what he viewed as a hypocritical push on the part of normally progressive 
labor unions to fast track KXL in the name of jobs, noting that a recent editorial in the FF 
by a Laborers’ International Union of North America (LIUNA) staffer (Mackey, 2012) had 
ignored all of the spills related to Phase 1 (much of which was constructed by LIUNA-
affiliated workers). In an earlier editorial, Hulse (2011) also noted  that TransCanada 
received a Corrective Action Order (CAO) (the most severe safety violation US-based 
pipeline operators can receive) for a 2011 Phase 1 spill in Southwestern North Dakota, 
arguing that this proves the unreliability of the Keystone system given that pipelines 
subject to CAOs have been 45 years old on average. These safety concerns were echoed 
by another writer, who noted that former TransCanada employees had exposed the poor 
quality of construction materials and the lax health and safety culture endemic to Phase 
1’s construction (Sherman, 2012). Gay (2011) expressed similar skepticism, noting that 
TransCanada’s promises to use “state-of-the-art technology” when building and 
monitoring KXL lacked substance, given that these same claims were also made about 
Phase 1, which she felt had a weak first-year safety record. 
 In addition to these Keystone-specific issues, writers were wary of yet another 
pipeline being built across the Yellowstone-Missouri system, given two recent spills: a 
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2011 spill from the Exxon Mobil Silvertip pipeline released over 60,000 gallons into the 
Yellowstone, while a 2015 spill from the Poplar pipeline spilled over 50,000 gallons and 
contaminated the drinking water supply for the city of Glendive, Montana (pop. ~5,000). 
Editorials written after the 2011 spill, but prior to the 2015 spill, often did not mention that 
spill by name, but often mentioned potential contamination of the Yellowstone-Missouri 
by the especially disastrous “tar sands.” Many of these editorials argued that such a spill 
from KXL would have the same effect on North Dakota’s water supply and broader 
environment as the 2010 Kalamazoo River spill, which released ~1 million gallons of 
upgraded oil sands and has led to over $1 billion in ongoing remediation efforts (National 
Resource Damage Assessment and Research Program, 2018). Gay (2011) argued that 
both the 2011 Yellowstone (river system-crossing) and 2010 Kalamazoo (oil sands) spills, 
“show the dangers of this type of pipeline [KXL].” LaDuke (2013a), argued that, in the 
event of a similar incident, rural North Dakota would likely not receive the same level of 
attention or recovery funding as urban Kalamazoo, given it being a politically-unimportant 
“low population zone.” Another CCW somewhat echoed LaDuke’s notion of North 
Dakota’s rurality posing a challenge to cleanup, but also argued that North Dakota was 
especially vulnerable due to its landscape – and its rural, non-“Washington” population - 
being unspoiled: 
The pipeline will not enter North Dakota, but it will cross the Missouri and 
Yellowstone rivers, which flow into pristine Lake Sakakawea. Heavy, dense 
semifluid tar sands oil sinks in water, rendering surface oil containment 
skimmers nonfunctional. The lake is a boating and fishing paradise, and a 
source of drinking water for many municipalities. Why are the senators 
supporting such environmentally unsound, dangerous legislation? Aren’t 
they proud, native, ecological North Dakotans? Why are they willing to 
continue gambling with our unspoiled cultural heritage? (Larsen, 2015a). 
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Indeed, Larsen’s exhortation is yet another in a line of attempts to reorient the notion of a 
“true” North Dakotan away from one who blindly supports industry and political authority, 
and towards one who respects North Dakota’s rural heritage, the two pillars of which are 
the environment and private property. 
 To summarize, environmentally-minded critics have argued that it violates the 
more fundamental tenets of rural self-sufficiency, individual liberties (especially property 
rights) and community cohesion. Many were especially careful to point out that while it is 
unlikely North Dakota will face severe risks from KXL, it was irresponsible to proceed with 
a project that offered few tangible benefits, especially to Bakken residents not working in 
the oil industry, and that compromises the livelihoods of Plains residents who live and 
work more directly along the pipeline’s route. As we will see in our next section, many 
KXL opponents advanced the argument advanced by Larsen (2015a) in the preceding 
paragraph and questioned why politicians were so enthusiastic about a project that 
appeared to offer few true positives and many potential negatives. 
5.3.4.2. Politicians supporting KXL are corrupt 
 As discussed in (section 2.a), support for KXL has been seen as an article of faith 
among nearly all federal-level Republicans, as well as most centrist Democrats from Red 
states, while most Blue-state Democrats have been opposed. While much rationale has 
been provided by Dakota-based supporters as to why KXL is necessary, many KXL critics 
have remained skeptical as to the motives of state- and federal-level North Dakota 
politicians, given that KXL, even by many supporters’ admissions, is likely to have a 
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minimal direct impact on North Dakota. Thus, the general opinion of KXL opponents was 
that most Dakota politicians supported KXL for the benefit of their own political careers 
and not for their constituents of the state of North Dakota. 
 KXL critics felt that North Dakota’s U.S. Senators Heitkamp (D) and Hoeven (R) 
were purposely misleading the public about the benefits of KXL to manufacture support 
for its approval. Specifically, writers felt that Hoeven, in particular, was playing up the 
notion of KXL transporting Bakken crude to distract from the overall market displacement 
Bakken oil would suffer from KXL. Evenson (2015b), who believed that such displacement 
will lead to massive layoffs in the oil patch, felt Hoeven was insincere about KXL’s 
potential for creating economic growth, arguing that Hoeven should instead support 
infrastructure projects that would benefit North Dakota’s existing industries. These 
concerns were echoed by a Bismarck-based CCW (Stites, 2013, 2015), who felt Hoeven 
and Heitkamp were hypocritical for supporting KXL, while abandoning the now-cancelled 
Bakken-only pipelines proposed by Koch Industries and ONEOK. Stites argued that 
supporting these publicly unknown pipelines was not politically useful, as they were not 
part of the national energy conversation and did not allow for attacks on Obama and 
“Washington.” Another CCW (J. Richardson, 2012a, b) argued that Hoeven and state-
level Republicans were deliberately using confusion sowed by the media about the 
differences between KXL, Sandpiper and other unrelated pipelines in order to tout Bakken 
producers’ supposed role in supplying crude to KXL. Richardson felt that Hoeven’s claims 
of certainty regarding Bakken crude transport were nothing more than a cover to distract 
from KXL’s negative effects on the Bakken: “My guess is there is no such deal … Without 
such a binding agreement, this is all political vapor that could send Canadian crude to 
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Texas [and then] to China. Good deal for Texas refineries, nothing to us” (J. Richardson, 
2012a). 
 Several writers targeted Hoeven for his supposed loyalty to deep-pocketed 
campaign donors and foreign oil interests. Gustafson (2014) felt that Hoeven’s strong 
support from American oil companies was leading him to push KXL, despite his knowing 
full well that it would have a negative impact on the Bakken:  
What has supporting the pipeline done for Hoeven? As the lead proponent 
for an out-of-state pipeline that won’t help North Dakota crude producers, 
it’s helped him earn more than $300,000 in campaign contributions from the 
oil and gas industry in the past five years, according to OpenSecrets.org. 
But I’m sure that’s just a coincidence. Right? (Gustafson, 2014). 
 
Echoing this theme, two CCWs (Hulse, 2015; D. Richardson, 2015) argued that Hoeven 
was indebted to the Koch Brothers, whom both writers pointed out were significant 
stakeholders in Alberta oil sands production. Hulse, though, also argued that Koch 
donations were of little importance compared to those made by foreign oil sands investors 
seeking to profit from KXL moving oil to American, and potentially Asian, markets, the 
latter of which Hulse felt would undermine attempts to create domestic energy 
independence. This foreign meddling theme was elevated to near-conspiracy levels by 
Evenson (2014b) and Larsen (2015a), who felt that Hoeven and other congressional 
Republicans were being tricked by the Canadian government into accepting a dangerous 
pipeline that Canadian residents, who have fought fiercely against cross-Canada tar 
sounds pipelines, were smart enough to reject due to their understanding of the 
environmental and climate risks. Larsen even went as far as to pose the dubious rhetorical 
question, “Is the Canadian government dictating American foreign policy?”, 
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demonstrating his frustration with what he viewed as Hoeven’s seemingly endless use of 
patronizing talking points minimizing KXL’s potential damage to the American 
environment and existential risk to Bakken crude production. 
Despite these relentless assaults on Hoeven and the Republicans, Heitkamp, too, 
was severely criticized by KXL opponents. Many opponents of KXL felt that she, as a 
Democrat, should have joined her party in taking a bolder position against KXL. Tom 
Potter (2012), Heitkamp’s former primary challenger who made KXL opposition a 
centerpiece of his campaign, felt that she was only supporting KXL as a matter of 
opportunism, in that it was the easiest way to gain popularity among the Republican-
leaning North Dakota voters she would need to defeat her Republican challenger in a 
Red State. Another CCW, Christopher Nelson (2012), a declared Heitkamp supporter, 
accused Heitkamp of deliberately parroting debunked Republican talking points regarding 
KXL’s effect on job growth (which he compared to the effect of building a Super Walmart) 
in order to give the appearance of being a tough-minded independent unafraid to take on 
Obama. Similarly, LaDuke (2013a) raised concerns about Heitkamp’s boasting about her 
partnerships with the Canadian ambassador to the United States and Gov. Dave 
Heineman (R-Nebraska) over their shared desire to fast-track KXL approval. LaDuke 
instead felt that the two should embrace wind energy over oil, chiding Heitkamp in 
particular given her supposed commitments to progressivism and bold action on climate-
related issues:   
In short, you've got a dysfunctional set of climate choices that Heitkamp and 
Heineman are trying to push through because they drank bad economic 
Kool-Aid. Heitkamp and Heineman have astounding opportunities. North 
Dakota and Nebraska are some pretty sweet undeveloped wind regimes. 
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Heitkamp will be in office for six years, but her decisions will affect countless 
generations. She has an opportunity to do something visionary and 
courageous (LaDuke, 2013a). 
 
Many KXL critics echoed these themes, with the general tenor being that Heitkamp was 
squandering a chance to move North Dakota forward by aligning herself with the same 
set of policies that she claimed to be opposing in her electoral campaign. 
 Critics also felt that the public bipartisanship of Hoeven and Heitkamp was 
disconcerting. Rather than praise this cooperation, as many KXL supporters did, KXL 
opponents argued that it was emblematic of their true loyalty not to their parties or their 
constituents, but to their big-oil backers. Evenson (2014b) and Hulse (2015) separately 
asserted that such contributions negatively impacted Hoeven and Heitkamp’s judgment, 
causing them to push questionable claims about topics such as the Baker, Montana spur 
and KXL’s potential to create jobs. Hulse, obviously skeptical of such promises, made a 
folksy allusion to his rural upbringing to describe the pair’s “olfactory moments”: “As a 
former farm boy, I can recall my Saturdays with Dad when we’d clean the barn. After a 
while, I stopped noticing the smell” (Hulse, 2015). With an equally dry wit, former State 
Rep. Ray Meyer (D-Bismarck) mocked the senators’ repeated declarations about KXL 
being “shovel ready”: “It is time for politicians of both political parties to quit shoveling 
smoke and be honest with the people. We may not be as stupid as they seem to think we 
are” (Meyer, 2013). 
 Other critics, however, thought Hoeven and Heitkamp’s faux-bipartisanship was 
no laughing matter. J. Richardson cautioned the pair and other North Dakota politicians, 
“awash with petro dollars,” to “stop trying to fool the public on Keystone XL” (J. 
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Richardson, 2012b), while D. Richardson went a step further, exhorting the senators to, 
“Stop lying about (fake) jobs and oil independence. It is about money, pure and simple, 
and everything else isn’t that important.” Along these same lines, LaDuke (2014) 
questioned Hoeven and Heitkamp’s “vision and long-term commitment to the state” do to 
their prioritizing of short-term gains from KXL over their state’s residents’ long-term 
prosperity and wellbeing. This critique was then brought to a familiar conclusion by Stites 
(2015) who was disappointed that the senators had, “chosen politics over focusing on 
meaningful solutions” declaring this was, “not the North Dakota way.” 
 
 Thus, what was perhaps most disappointing to KXL critics was not so much that 
politicians such as Hoeven and Heitkamp supported the pipeline (predictable given the 
pervasiveness of the oil and gas lobby), but that they were so willing to continuously push 
dubious, and often outright false, claims to do so. Given that many of these dishonest 
politicians were also strong proponents of “real American” values and standing up to the 
“Washington” consensus, their hypocrisy and self-serving behavior was doubly irritating. 
Indeed, while critics had likely come to expect this behavior from Hoeven and other 
Republicans, there was palpable anger with Heitkamp, whom many expected to better 
reflect the anti-KXL mood of many federal Democrats, or at least maintain a healthy 
skepticism of such grandiose claims about the project as she has since come to endorse. 
Such status-quo-affirming conduct from Heitkamp thus served as a final blow to the hopes 
of many KXL opponents, who yet again felt betrayed by politicians unwilling to take a 
stand against the destructive largesse of the fossil fuel industry. 
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5.3.4.3. KXL is a prelude to US oil export and/or higher gas prices 
 Although North Dakota has seen unprecedented levels of oil production due to the 
fracking boom, many critics on both sides of the pro-/anti- divide have argued the Bakken 
is at a tremendous disadvantage compared to other oil-producing regions in North 
America because of its distance from major refining centers and having a lack of 
transportation infrastructure. Many KXL opponents in the sample argued that due to 
Bakken oil being “stranded” and isolated from markets, projects such as KXL, which put 
the Bakken at a further competitive disadvantage, should be rejected. KXL, in particular, 
was seen as emblematic of this trend, as writers felt that it would directly displace Bakken 
oil, with the supposed Baker, Montana spur seen as a corrupt bargain intended to pacify 
politicians and Bakken producers. Moreover, this foreign intrusion into the domestic 
midstream sector was viewed as an inevitable prelude to the rolling back of the decades’ 
long prohibition on export of US-based crude oil, which occurred in December 2015, after 
the majority of sampled articles were published.23 The spillover effect of the ban’s end 
was seen as an increase in retail gasoline prices due to competition with European and 
Asian markets willing to pay a premium for this newly available fuel source. This prospect 
was seen as bitterly disappointing for many critics who felt that North Dakota already paid 
exorbitantly high prices.24 Both of these major quibbles (the prelude to export and the 
                                                 
23 It is important to note that the ban did not cover refined gasoline, which was already being exported at 
record levels in the year before the ban was overturned (Plumer, 2014). 
24 This claim is largely not born out by data from major gas price tracking services, which show that retail 
prices in North Dakota for the 10-year period from September 1, 2007 – September 1, 2017 have been 
roughly equal to, if not slightly lower than, the national average price (American Automobile Association, 
2017). 
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increase in gas prices) were so intertwined, that this section will approach the two 
arguments together. 
 Although many critics writing prior to December 2015 noted that the export ban 
was likely to be overturned for a variety of reasons (waning domestic demand, huge 
oversupplies due to the fracking boom, higher prices in foreign markets, etc.), they argued 
that KXL would help finalize the decision as it would bypass Midwestern refineries and 
storage areas in favor of those on the Gulf Coast, which were seen as already being re-
oriented for the exports. Several critics repeated the oft-used, though questionable, 
talking point that the Keystone terminus (a separate, non-XL expansion of the system 
completed in 2014) was (being) built in the Port Arthur, Texas, Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) 
so that petroleum companies doing business there could avoid normal tax rules.25 Hulse 
(2015), for example, stated that KXL will transport oil sands “through America’s heartland 
to the U.S. Gulf Coast, where it will be refined and sold. If sold in a foreign trade zone, 
the products would not be subject to U.S. taxes.” Similarly, Brandt (2013) argued in a 
confusingly worded statement that Valero was seeking to exploit Port Arthur’s FTZ status 
to bypass US taxes and regulations, thus making KXL an even worse economic blunder 
                                                 
25 This claim was first advanced by Oil Change International (2011), a left-wing pressure group, who claimed 
to have clandestinely obtained internal documents from a Valero Energy investor conference which outlined 
that company’s export strategy and financial stake in the Keystone system. There has been major debate 
regarding the validity of this report and its claims (see Richardson, 2012; American Petroleum Institute, 
2012; Swift, 2011), however, it should be noted that nearly all Gulf Coast refineries are located near FTZs 
and petroleum imports from Canada already have low import duties under NAFTA (Parilla, 2017). Thus, 
while there are perhaps other economic reasons to locate at Port Arthur, the Port Arthur FTZ is not an 
exceptional Gulf Coast port and its FTZ status is likely not the major reason TransCanada chose it for the 
Keystone terminus. While Valero itself has made conflicting statements about its export goals, in an email 
to the Daily Signal, the media arm of the conservative Heritage Foundation, it did not deny that it sees 
Alberta oil sands delivered via Keystone as a key replacement for declining heavy oil supplies from Mexico 
and Venezuela (Markay, 2011). 
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than other pipelines: “Valero, the key recipient of that oil [Alberta oil sands from Keystone] 
has said it plans to ship that oil to a foreign market, since they are a foreign entity and the 
money coming from it will be tax free to that company.”  
Hulse and Brandt’s arguments were echoed by other writers, who took on an even 
more paranoid tone, arguing that KXL was being used by the aforementioned shadowy 
TransCanada-Koch Brothers-“Foreign” cabal (see section ii) to push China-bound energy 
exports of all sorts at the expense of the United States government and its citizens. 
Frequent letter writer J. Richardson (2012b) postulated that Middle Eastern interests were 
deliberately buying up “Gulf-area tax-free zone, export ready refineries,” in a plot to further 
their global market domination by forcing U.S. consumers to pay higher prices for gasoline 
by exporting KXL oil sands to China instead of re-selling it domestically. This point was 
seconded by Evenson (2014), who further argued that the Saudis were seeking to 
specifically damage Bakken producers by exporting oil sands to their own Saudi-based 
refineries and then selling the finished gasoline back to the US, thus making Bakken-
derived gasoline more expensive. Others such as Chyle (2014) and Larsen (2014) felt 
that the Koch Brothers and TransCanada were accomplishing this goal well enough on 
their own, arguing that these groups were pushing KXL in order to block all possibility of 
Bakken-based refineries (thus safeguarding the profitability of their own infrastructure) 
while simultaneously achieving their ultimate goal of selling oil to “Communist China.” On 
a similar yet more sinister note, the prolific wordsmith Dean Hulse saw KXL as merely the 
first stage in a broader attempt to destabilize domestic commodity markets under the 
guise of energy independence:  
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In Greek mythology, the beautiful Cassandra received the gift of prophecy, 
but when she refused Apollo, he caused her to be disbelieved. In other 
words, Cassandra could see the future, but no one believed her, even 
though she spoke the truth … Greek mythology has been replaced by greed 
mythology … the promise, coming from politicians and others, of "energy 
independence" is a lie, unless the United States is willing to be the highest 
bidder. And not only with respect to oil: Profit-maximizing fossil fuel barons 
also are intent on exporting U.S. natural gas and even coal (Hulse, 2013a). 
 
Others, writing in more staid terms, expressed concern about what they viewed as 
misleading claims being used to obscure the secret end run around export restrictions. 
Davis (2014) felt that pipeline versus rail arguments being used to push KXL were 
disingenuous, as he felt transport of Bakken crude to the Gulf Coast, either for refining or 
export, was neither inevitable nor desirable.  Furthermore, he argued that as KXL met 
none of the stated goals of reducing gas prices, improving the Bakken economy or 
improving national security:  
How pleased are you about the prices of heating oil, gas at the pump, diesel 
or any other petroleum product you need in North Dakota? We have all 
heard the cry for the United States to become energy independent. We have 
also heard the cry to build the Keystone XL pipeline. The truth is, building 
the XL pipeline will not make the United States energy independent 
because our country is selling oil on the world market. Since the oil is in 
North Dakota, the smart and logical choice would be to build a refinery in 
North Dakota, a large refinery. How much sense does it make to send 
Bakken oil south where it's processed and then sent back north, where we 
pay the added cost? (Davis, 2014). 
 
LaDuke (2013b) also sought to take on the notion of KXL being the Bakken’s safest (and 
greenest) transport choice, arguing that any such gains in transit safety and emissions 
reductions attributable to KXL could also be made by better enforcing existing regulations. 
She also argued that such arguments were patently false, since reducing emissions in 
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North Dakota only to increase them through oil sands production and potential exports 
elsewhere was not a net positive: “North Dakota does not live in a bubble where we can 
claim greenhouse gas reductions within imaginary borders. … Enabling larger markets 
for more destructive oil projects and emissions is not a bragging right” (LaDuke, 2013b). 
Another CCW writer sought to upend what he saw as the entire farce surrounding who 
was actually benefiting from KXL by posing a very direct rhetorical question: “If the 
purpose of the pipeline is to provide oil for Americans, why is one of the ends of the line 
at a refinery at a deep-water port in Texas? It doesn't require a port to get oil to North 
Dakota” (Sherman, 2012). 
 Many of these same concerns about who benefited from sending Bakken crude 
(and oil sands) away from the Midwest animated the arguments of those more specifically 
concerned about gas prices. In particular, many were suspicious of the claim that shipping 
Bakken crude out of North Dakota would somehow improve the price situation within the 
state. Gustafson, who was strongly critical of the present Bakken situation, argued that 
KXL would do nothing but make life worse for oil patch residents:  
It won’t lower gas prices for Americans because it will make the oil easier 
to ship overseas. It won’t affect gas prices here in North Dakota because 
not even the unregulated fracking wasteland that is now western North 
Dakota has accomplished that … It will not help North Dakota oil producers 
earn more money, as they’ll get less for shipping it to the Gulf than they do 
shipping it to the East Coast currently (Gustafson, 2014). 
 
Local activist Pat Hedstrup of Fryburg (location of a major rail terminal where Bakken 
crude would potentially be shipped to the Baker spur) viewed gas prices largely as a 
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function of supply and demand, arguing that increased exports, which she noted were 
already happening, will restrict domestic supply and increase price: 
The top export of the United States is now fuel -- gasoline, diesel and jet 
fuel. This explains why our gasoline and diesel fuel are so expensive. The 
more fuel is sent overseas, the less supply there is for the United States. In 
the first 10 months of 2011, the U.S. exported 848 million barrels of fuel and 
imported 750 million. Where is the energy independence in those numbers? 
What happened to reducing our dependence on foreign oil? (Hedstrup, 
2012). 
 
This argument was also advanced by C. Nelson (2012), who argued that due to the U.S. 
already being a net gasoline exporter, there was no reason to believe that KXL-carried oil 
sands would be earmarked for domestic use. However, perhaps the most emphatic 
argument against KXL as a reducer of fuel prices was CCW Jeanne Johnson. Johnson 
claims to have received a “push poll” from TransCanada, in which she was asked the 
following question: “Do you think gasoline prices are too high?” When she answered 
affirmatively, she was then told that KXL would bring down gas prices, followed by a 
question asking whether she then approved of KXL. Johnson described her disgust 
thusly:  
You think you've just answered an innocent survey, but you've actually been 
subjected to a subtle kind of advertising … In this reincarnation, the fake 
poll is pushing the listener to make a kind of psychic commitment to a project 
they probably don't understand …. Pipelines do not reduce gasoline prices. 
World demand for oil largely drives the price of gasoline. Independent oil 
analysts claim XL is clearly an end run around the less lucrative Upper 
Midwest refineries (Johnson, 2011). 
 
To conclude her diatribe, Johnson offered this bit of sage advice: “When you get that call, 
JUST SAY NO [emphasis in original].” 
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 Thus, the driving force behind many of the anti-KXL arguments center around the 
potential effects on exports and gas prices was the sense of being deceived. While this 
deception, depending upon the writer, ran the gamut from deceitful politicians to a 
nebulous, new world order-type cartel, it was clear from the statements made by many 
critics that they had little patience for specious arguments and easily disproven, “common 
sense” arguments. Writers were particularly irked by arguments which they felt over-
inflated the Bakken’s role in supporting KXL, as they felt that the Bakken would likely 
suffer far more under KXL than would other oil-producing regions. When writing about the 
specific problems KXL would cause for the Bakken economy, critics repeated facets of 
the core charge they had leveled against disingenuous politicians: KXL critics have been 
fooled (or cajoled via financial inducements) into effectively underwriting North Dakota’s 
demise. This notion of demise will also play a strong role in the arguments advanced in 
our next subsection on KXL’s supposed damaging effect on national security. 
5.3.4.4. KXL is a net negative for energy security 
 As mentioned in subsection iii, many KXL critics were strongly convinced of various 
enemies, both foreign and domestic (to borrow a phrase), who were intent on using KXL 
to destabilize both the Bakken and broader energy markets. Many of these same critics, 
though, also took this line of reasoning a step further, arguing that KXL strongly 
jeopardized national security. Although participants had various grievances in support of 
this theme, nearly all arguments touched on a specific key concern: the erosion and 
abandonment of America’s political and energy sovereignty.  
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Several critics often tied this to the Bakken, arguing that their region was one of 
the most important shale plays driving America’s energy resurgence. Leland Davis, who 
as mentioned in section ii was strongly opposed to transporting any oil at all out of North 
Dakota, argued that by not supporting the growth of more local refineries, were effectively 
ceding any advantage they had accrued and dooming the oil patch to poverty26:  
If anybody in this world deserves the benefits of Bakken oil, it is the 
residents of North Dakota. Do we not hold all the cards? This is North 
Dakota oil we are talking about. Shouldn't the residents of North Dakota 
have a say about what we want done with our oil, or have our elected 
officials already squandered our rights? What is happening in North Dakota 
is less than a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity (Davis, 2014). 
 
This was echoed by Heitkamp opponent Tom Potter, who argued that some of shale’s 
biggest Republican supporters were, in essence, killing the shale miracle by supporting 
KXL:  
I am delighted to note that U.S. oil production has increased for the first time 
in 30 years. This increase is largely due to the added production from the 
oil fields in western North Dakota. I cannot understand why North Dakota 
lawmakers would have the slightest interest in transporting foreign oil 
across the U.S. from Canada to the Gulf Coast. It seems to me that our first 
priority ought to be capturing the value of North Dakota crude by increasing 
the capacity of local refineries to turn our product into gasoline and diesel 
fuel for our local farmers and motorists (Potter, 2012). 
                                                 
26 While Davis’ dream is somewhat coming true with the September 2017 permitting of the Davis Refinery 
(no apparent relation) in his hometown of Belcourt, it should be noted that most KXL opponents, and even 
many of its supporters, oppose refineries in North Dakota, albeit for different reasons (environment v. 
economic, respectively). Many oil industry supporters and critics point to the myriad struggles of Dickinson’s 
diesel-only Dakota Prairie Refinery since its opening in 2015 right at the start of the oil price slump (see 
Scheyder (2016) for a good summary). Skepticism has been expressed as to whether the Davis Refinery 
will suffer the same fate (Monke, 2016). In several interviews with industry-affiliated individuals, I was told 
that regardless of the price of oil, building refineries in North Dakota makes little economic sense given that 
demand is greater in higher population areas and that existing refining hubs in the Midwest and Gulf Coast 
are able to refine cheaply due to infrastructural advantages and economies of scale. 
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Other critics in this vein were specifically concerned about KXL’s job displacement on 
both Bakken crude production and North Dakota’s economy as a whole. J. Richardson 
(2011) took issue with a column by fellow CCW Evan Wilcox (2011), which stated that a 
significant portion of KXL’s 20,000 potential jobs (a figure from Fox News, with 
TransCanada predicting only 13,000) would be in North Dakota. Arguing that such a 
figure would be impossible given that the pipeline will never enter the state, Richardson 
responded, “Let's look beyond Fox for the facts. The Keystone XL pipeline might indeed 
be the project that keeps adding more jobs. Jobs trucking and piping clean water to where 
there once was plenty? … Why take the risk to possibly pay Canada when we can grow 
so much fuel ourselves?” (J. Richardson, 2011). In more hyperbolic tone, another CCW 
(who seemed more accepting of grander claims about KXL’s potential Bakken impact) 
stated that Western North Dakota’s economy and tax base would collapse due to massive 
jobs displacement in the trucking and railroad industries. The author went on to state his 
case rather succinctly: “Pipelines cost jobs … North Dakota’s red hot economy is based 
on jobs being available, take them away and the decline will begin” (Bishop, 2014). 
 Critics arguing for Bakken exceptionalism, though, were only a portion of those 
objecting to eroding sovereignty, with the latter group of writers taking a far more critical 
view of the oil industry and its enablers. Several of these critics were concerned with what 
effects allowing foreign governments to participate in the US energy sector would have 
on national security. Greg Stites, who in subsections ii and iii argued that politicians have 
promoted KXL at the expense of Bakken-exclusive pipelines, advanced the theory that 
politicians were specifically abandoning the Bakken and, by extension, American energy 
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independence, in order to score cheap political points with their donors and base: “The 
Keystone XL pipeline does nothing for U.S. energy independence because the Chinese 
and Canadians own the Keystone XL product. Is it possible our politicians have promoted 
TransCanada's pipeline simply to discredit President Obama?” (Stites, 2013). Pat 
Hedstrup also brought back the reflexive Chinese conspiracy, arguing that the significant 
stake of Chinese corporations in tar sands projects in Alberta combined with their desire 
to have the oil for their own domestic uses made KXL too risky for the United States: “Is 
the Keystone pipeline going to carry oil owned by China across the United States to the 
Gulf? Who is going to build the pipeline? The U.S.? Canada? China? … Is national 
security no longer a concern?” (Hedstrup, 2012). The ever-present Dean Hulse (2015) 
also sought to draw attention to the perils of this Asian connection, asking, “Do Japanese, 
South Korean, Thai, Indonesian, Chinese and Norwegian corporations really want to 
ensure energy independence for North America? Or, is there something else at play?”  
China bashing served a rhetorical purpose by allowing KXL critics to paint 
themselves as the true guardians of economic security, national sovereignty and the 
Dakotan (and by extension, American) way. Indeed, many of these same “freedom” 
arguments were also used by those questioning KXL’s security on environmental 
grounds.  Larry Larsen, one of the key letters writers among the Chinese conspiracy 
fringe, argued that not only did we have to worry about these foreign enemies and their 
designs on KXL’s oil, but that the very existence of such a publicly-known concentration 
of volatile hydrocarbons was in and of itself an existential security risk:  
Every day, the thick semifluid tar-sand oil will be thinned, allowing it to better 
flow through the pipeline, by adding 100,000 barrels of highly explosive 
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methane saturated Bakken crude at a Baker, Mont., terminal; which, in truth, 
will turn the pipeline into a Timothy McVeigh-type person's dream (Larsen, 
2014). 
 
Such an invective thus has the effect of moving from the threat of foreign oil funding 
terrorism to directly causing terrorism, a theme which was also seized on by other writers 
who wrote about KXL as if it were a literal invasion force lying in wait to decimate the 
Heartland at a time of no one’s choosing or convenience. LaDuke (2014), who related 
KXL to the legend of the Black Snake, employed another serpentine metaphor to address 
the pipeline’s three-headed challenge to sustainability: 
The hydra of pipeline proposals across North America should give us pause 
… That decision is destabilizing North American infrastructure. Spending 
money on what will be “stranded assets” of pipelines will destabilize our 
economy, as oil spills, climate change and a lost opportunity to become 
energy efficient and self-sufficient with renewables and post petroleum 
choices throw us into a downward economic spiral. 
 
Jennifer Moen (2012), too, seized on this theme of carbon lock-in, arguing that KXL was 
being used as a “devious dagger” by congressional Republicans to hold up critical 
infrastructure spending while simultaneously precluding the future possibility of 
renewable energy development. Indeed, for many of the above critics, KXL felt like 
multiple metaphorical stabs in the back, as it simultaneously opened up the beloved 
prairie to economic, environmental and, in a worst case scenario, terrorist, upheaval, but 
also foreclosed emerging forms of productive rural livelihoods based on a transition away 
from fossil fuel. 
 KXL, therefore, represents a major affront to the values of security-minded KXL 
writers as it is viewed as violating many of the stable arrangements (property rights, 
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freedom from outside influence, effective political representation) that these writers feel 
make North Dakota an exceptional place to live. Many writers specifically expressed 
feelings of loss and hopelessness, arguing that the benefits of the Bakken (“our oil”) were 
being taken away from them and wasted on a project that will, as Moen (2012) states, 
“not bring us closer to energy self-sufficiency, but further line the already bulging pockets 
of Big Oil.” Thus, while some of the arguments regarding internationalist, power elite 
conspiracies and the threat of massive economic collapse (many of which were also 
employed by pro-KXL writers to advance a diametrically opposed vision) may have been 
overblown, they are a reflection of the intense feelings of frustration that many of these 
Cassandras felt in trying to persuade an increasingly complacent set of North Dakota 
policy makers, not to mention their fellow residents. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Analysis of letters to the editor and editorials published in North Dakota 
newspapers between August 1, 2011 and July 31, 2016 revealed the Measure 5 and the 
Keystone XL pipeline debates to be two of the main vehicles through which writers 
interrogated and contested deeper questions about Dakotan identity, the role of the fossil 
fuel industry and the proper present and future direction of North Dakota’s economy and 
society. Views on M5 were divided between measure supporters who emphasized 
environmental preservation as integral to preserving North Dakota’s unique identity and 
lifestyle and measure opponents who argued that mandated attempts at conservation 
would endanger this very same lifestyle (See Table 17 (p. 220) for a full description of 
themes and discourses). Views on KXL were similarly split. Supporters argued that the  
 220 
 
Position Theme Discursive purpose 
M5 Support - Preserving the environment (n=74) - Taxation for mitigation 
- Supporting farming through oil (n=26)  - Expanded, sustainable 
agriculture 
- Upholding Theodore Roosevelt’s 
legacy (n=11)  
- Oil can support 
conservation/recreation 
- Cautious opposition (general strategy) - Proper regulation without 
radicalism 
M5 Opposition - Out-of-state takeover (n=51) - Outsiders seek to take oil 
wealth 
- Underfunding Bakken communities 
(n=44) 
- Environment over wellbeing 
- Attack on property rights and farming 
(n=37) 
- Property rights as bedrock 
of values 
- End run around legislature (n=28) - Legislature reflects popular 
will 
Table 17: Themes and Discourses in Measure 5 Editorials 
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pipeline was crucial not only to the success of the Bakken, but was also a bellwether for 
the fate of the entire North American petroleum industry. Opponents, though, viewed KXL 
in quite different terms, arguing that the pipeline presented significant environmental risk 
and was a way to lock in fossil fuels and strangle the US’ nascent renewables industry 
(see Table 18 (p.223) for a full description). Debates over these issues thus expanded far 
beyond their original subjects into broader referenda about support or opposition to the 
petroleum industry in North Dakota and the status quo politics that underlies the industry’s 
continued dominance of the state’s economy and political scene.  
These findings broadly conform to arguments from critical discourse analysis 
advanced in Chapter 3 (Research Design) that assert that newspapers serve as key 
spaces for struggles over ideology and values. In the case of the M5 and KXL debates, 
these struggles centered on notions of the proper behavior of Dakota residents vis a vis 
established norms and institutions, many of which were seen as under threat due to social 
upheaval resulting from the fracking boom and bust. These anxieties were particularly 
evident in arguments about the role of non-Dakotan outsiders in state and local decision 
making processes, as well as the threats boom/bust related changes pose to bedrock 
Dakota ideals such as private property rights and community cohesion and consensus 
(see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the code of behavior known as “The North 
Dakota Way”). Thus, following arguments advanced in a previous article asserting that 
interest group-dominated events provide physical safe spaces for contentious debate 
among elites (T. Loder, 2016a), it can be argued that the editorial sections of North Dakota 
newspapers serve as metaphorical safe spaces for similar contestation among a broader 
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cross-section of the population (i.e. CCWs and professional writers both contribute to 
editorials). 
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Position Theme Discursive purpose 
KXL Support -Pipelines better than rails (n=19) 
 
- Other transport methods 
unsafe, should not be 
inevitable 
 
- Net positive for energy security (n=18) - KXL locks in existing 
Bakken economy 
- Bipartisanship (n=14) - No rational reason for 
political opposition 
- Low environmental risk (n=13) - Environmental objections to 
KXL are invalid  
- KXL opposition is anti-Canadian (n=8) - Rejecting KXL hurts our 
closest ally  
KXL Opposition -High environmental risk (n=20) 
 
- KXL is a distinct threat to 
lifestyles 
 
- Corrupt politicians backing KXL (n=20) - KXL is not otherwise 
worthwhile 
- KXL leads to oil export/higher gas 
prices (n=28) 
- KXL does not support the 
public good 
- Net negative for energy security 
(n=15) 
- KXL prevents renewables 
development 
Table 18: Themes and Discourses in Keystone XL Editorials 
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6. MINOT RESIDENTS’ VIEWS ON THE OIL BOOM 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a corrective to the literature on activism inspired by oil booms 
through analysis of views of purposively sampled Minot residents who have no direct or 
indirect harm or benefit from oil operations in the in Bakken (i.e. environmental 
disturbances to property, mineral estate disputes with neighbors or oil companies, 
encroachment on tribal sovereignty, etc.). The chapter argues that this group of residents 
views oil as a secondary concern to the cultural and quality of life changes in boomtown 
Minot, with oil a means to express grievances on this topic.  While Chapter Four showed 
how North Dakotan identity is compatible with the Bakken oil boom and Chapter Five 
showed how Bakken oil infused policy-relevant views published in newspaper texts, this 
chapter changes geographical scale to Minot and focuses on a different set of 
respondents, defined here as longer-term residents who have lived in Minot for more than 
five years. This chapter first situates Bakken oil boom Minot within the city’s more than 
100 year history of booms and busts that have occurred as a result of Minot’s 
entanglement in various extractive and industrial processes. Situating the current boom 
and bust cycles within these past cycles is important not only for drawing economic and 
political parallels, but also for demonstrating how discourses used by respondents to 
interpret the externalities of the oil boom often mirror those used by previous city residents 
to interpret the externalities of these previous periods of cultural change. 
Residents were unwilling to directly criticize the oil and gas industry for many of 
the city’s negative externalities, but this chapter identifies four specific discourses that 
 225 
 
underlie most of the grievances that respondents expressed: 1.) The privilege that the oil 
boom brings for longer-term Minot residents; 2.) Who or what is to blame for negative 
aspects of the boom; 3.) the role of oil in financing an improved post-oil future; and 4.) the 
specific political culture of Minot and North Dakota that discourages criticism that might 
upset community cohesion. Following the explication of these inward discourses, chapter 
analysis focuses on specific themes (or outward discourses) that emerged through the 
coding of interview transcripts. These three themes are: 1.) the effects the oil boom has 
had on housing cost and availability, especially in relation to recovery from the 2011 
Souris River Flood; 2.) the decline of moral values and increase in crime during the boom; 
and 3.) Minot’s economic and cultural future following the end of oil as a viable economic 
engine. This chapter concludes that residents view oil- and gas-related problems as an 
outgrowth of longstanding political economic issues and cultural changes, rather than as 
a direct result of the oil boom or as the specific fault of the oil and gas industry. The 
absence of this specific political dimension of fracking booms and the trend against 
contentious political debates present in Minot helps explain the lack of anti-fracking 
activism in the Bakken when compared to activist movements that have arisen in similar 
situations in other American shale plays. 
6.2 Population and economic growth in Minot 
 Although the majority of the North Dakota Bakken - especially sites of extraction - 
remains rural, cities in the region have seen tremendous growth between the 2010 census 
and 2015 population estimates, in terms of both population and the built environment. 
This growth has been particularly acute in the core production cities in the Montana border 
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counties (the MonDak region), with the populations of the larger cities of Williston and 
Dickinson growing by 83% and 33% respectively (with both now surpassing 20,000 
residents) and the smaller city of Watford City ballooning nearly four-fold from 1,700 
residents to 6,700.27 However, this growth has also affected the region’s cultural and 
commercial hub of Minot, a city on the less productive eastern edge of the Bakken (see 
Figure 5 (p.227) for a detailed map of the city). Minot’s role as a base for white collar 
industry-related employment and oil-by-rail transport (elaborated further in section 6.3) 
has allowed it to grow by more than 20% since 2010 to nearly 50,000, the threshold 
needed to qualify as an official “urban area” under US Census Bureau rules (US Census 
Bureau, 2017). 
 While this rapid urbanization placed strains on the Bakken’s housing, infrastructure 
and social services sectors, it has also allowed for the revitalization of formerly declining 
agricultural communities through their integration with globalized socio-technological 
regimes in agro-resources, transportation, finance and telecommunications. Minot serves 
as a prime example of this type of urbanization, as it has morphed from a static, 
geographically- and socially-isolated city dependent on declining military investment and 
constantly fluctuating grain markets in the mid-2000s into a dynamic, rapidly-growing city 
with widespread fiber-optic internet, the state’s largest airport, a booming real-estate 
market, hundreds of new retail locations and restaurants and more than 50 oil and 
                                                 
27 It is important to note that these estimates only include those in permanent housing (owned or rented 
homes, apartments or mobile homes with a fixed address). Hodor and Bangsund (2013) have estimated 
that the inclusion temporary direct and indirect petroleum industry workers, many of whom live in crew 
camps or illegally squat in areas such as parking lots and vacant lots, would push Williston’s population 
over 50,000. 
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Figure 5: Key features of Minot, North Dakota. Map adapted from City of Minot, 
2018 
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gas-related companies by January 2016 (Minot Area Chamber of Commerce, 2017). 
Indeed, respondents specifically argued that Minot did not experience as many growing 
pains as Williston and Dickinson (which were often invoked as cautionary tales of the 
downsides expansion), precisely because its government and business community 
aggressively leveraged the city’s existing advantages (banking, interstate highway and 
rail networks, greater experience with white collar jobs than MonDak) to make itself 
attractive to outside investors.  
 Yet, for Minot, the Bakken boom has not been a seamless transition from prairie 
hinterland to neoliberal Petropolis (Bhatia and Casper, 2013). Its growing pains have 
been more than a mild discomfort to some of its more incredulous residents. Respondents 
spoke of positive economic and technological benefits of the boom being outweighed by 
negative social and cultural developments such as increased crime, moral and cultural 
decline resulting from differing values of newcomers and a general sense of the city losing 
its identity by catering to the needs of the oil industry over those of its long-term residents. 
Similarly skeptical responses were also provided by Williston residents to Kyle Conway, 
as recounted in his recent essay “Notes from the Global Hinterland: What it Feels like to 
be Global in North Dakota”: 
The Bakken is embedded in a number of overlapped, criss-crossing global 
economic networks involving oil, technology, and the materials necessary 
to support the boom. Many residents feel as a result that large corporations 
without roots in the region now have an outsized influence over their lives. 
Money gives people living at a distance power over western North Dakota. 
But what is the nature of that power? (Conway, 2016, p. 37). 
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  Additionally, Minot has suffered through several crises since the start of the oil 
boom in 2007, including the 2011 Souris River flood and a prolonged economic bust since 
2015 due to declining oil prices, which have served to interfere with Minot’s re-incarnation 
as the industrial “Magic City” of the late 1800s. Indeed, Minot and North Dakota as a 
whole have been subjected to many periods of boom and bust throughout their history, 
leading to a discontinuous development trajectory. This chapter’s next section will 
critically examine Minot’s history in order to demonstrate how booms and busts, and the 
related social and economic changes they have brought, have greatly affected the city’s 
political, social and economic landscapes. 
6.3 Minot: city of booms and busts  
Appreciation of Minot’s booms and busts is critical to understanding the ways in 
which residents view Minot’s relationship with the Bakken oil boom and bust.   Minot is 
frequently stereotyped, both by long-term residents and casual outside critics, as a city 
that has changed little since the mid-20th century. Although Minot saw modest, yet stable, 
economic and population growth between 1960 and 2000 (increasing from ~30,000 
residents in 1960 to ~37,000 in 2000), from its founding in 1887 until the late-1950s, Minot 
experienced a series of economic booms and busts that defined the prevailing economic 
landscape and the political and cultural milieu that has persisted to the present day. Of 
particular salience to this chapter’s case study is Minot’s repeated encounters with boom-
and-bust related newcomers and the often hostile reception these individuals receive from 
the city’s permanent population, who view newcomers more as symptomatic of crime and 
moral decay than as evidence of economic growth.  
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In summation, the booms and busts from the 1870s to the 1950s have shaped the 
cultural, economic and political atmosphere in which the current Bakken boom and bust 
has taken place. Many of the same boom and bust trends (massive in-migration, 
inadequate infrastructure, crime and disorder) that have been the hallmarks of each cycle 
Minot has undergone have become major topics of debate among Minot residents during 
the present cycle. As will be discussed in greater detail in section 6.4, the moral panic 
associated with rapid change continues to condition narratives about the role outsiders 
play in Minot’s social fabric during the current fracking boom and bust. Provided below is 
a brief overview of Minot’s booms and busts, with an emphasis on the moral elements of 
the city’s response to these periods of upheaval. 
Major settlement in North Dakota began after the creation of the Dakota Territory 
in 1861, the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862 and the early stages of the building 
of the first cross-prairie railroad, the Northern Pacific Railway (currently operating as 
BNSF), in the early 1870s.28 However, this settlement boom was itself tempered by a 
corresponding bust, the Panic of 1873, which led to the bankruptcy of the railroad’s chief 
financier, Jay Cooke, resulting in multiple changes in the railroad’s ownership and a 
decade-long construction odyssey marked by frequent work stoppages. Yet much as 
North Dakota’s boom-and-bust economy prospered during the recent Great Recession, 
so too did the state’s economy prosper during the post-Panic downturn which lasted until 
1879. Indeed, “The Great Dakota Boom” began in 1878 as speculators connected to 
                                                 
28 It should be noted that these advances were aided by the displacement of Native Americans due to the 
aggressive escalation of the Indian Wars in the Northern Plains by the US government, especially after the 
Sioux uprising of 1862. 
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Northern Pacific developed bonanza farms (considered to be more than 5,000 acres) in 
Eastern North Dakota to supply wheat to the burgeoning milling industry in Minneapolis. 
These farms attracted many laborers to North Dakota. In addition, many homesteaders 
and land speculators began to flock to the state in the 1880s to capitalize on these newly 
favorable economic conditions. However, many of the rapidly growing settlements 
attracted temporary residents hoping to make quick fortunes and then return to their home 
states. These residents, then as now, were often blamed for the crime and disorder that 
plagued these frontier towns, offering historical parallels to reports of increased crime due 
to new oil drilling in the Bakken (Robinson, 1966). 
 Although the Boom peaked in 1883 (eventually ending in 1886), population growth 
remained strong throughout the 1880s because of further railroad expansion and a 
generally favorable economy. Much of this growth was directly and indirectly spurred by 
the actions of industrialist James J. Hill, who financed the expansion of the St. Paul, 
Minneapolis and Manitoba Railroad in 1879-1880 and the construction of a second and 
more northern cross-prairie railway, the Great Northern Railway (today also owned by 
BNSF), which was built between 1883 and 1886. Emerging directly as a result of the 
Great Northern’s construction was Minot. The harsh winter of 1886 (the same winter that 
ultimately caused Theodore Roosevelt to abandon cattle ranching in the state) and 
difficulties constructing a bridge over the nearby Gassman Coulee, Hill’s corporation 
decided to overwinter in the site that is now Minot. The camp, which grew to over 8,000 
men and 6,000 horses in a matter of weeks, was said to have sprung up “as if by magic” 
leading to the nickname Magic City. After Hill and his associate Henry Minot (the town’s 
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namesake) negotiated a large land purchase from wealthy local homesteader Erik 
Ramstad, Minot was incorporated on July 16, 1887 (Robinson, 1966). 
Yet shortly after Minot arose at the tail-end of the Boom, it, like the rest of North 
Dakota, was hit hard by the late-1880s bust. The crash of the over-inflated land market 
as well as a dramatic price decline for wheat due to oversupply and the monopolistic 
market control of the Minneapolis railroad and milling cartels caused many to leave North 
Dakota by the late 1880s. Thus, much as has been the case with the recent downturn in 
oil prices, North Dakota’s 1880s rush to develop in order to take advantage of favorable 
commodity markets led to the state falling victim to what Robinson (1966) refers to as the 
oft-repeated, “Too-Much Mistake”: “In the speculative frenzy the pioneers had done too 
well. Led on by expectations that were not to be realized, they had equipped their new 
society with more towns, stores, newspapers, churches, and banks than it could support 
… Retrenchment and abandonment soon followed” (p. 155). Thus, the first major boom 
and bust cycle for both Minot, and North Dakota as a whole, was complete. 
Despite a recovery of wheat prices by the late-1880s, the population decline and 
closure of businesses had been so severe that the economy made no real recovery, 
leading to the Depression Nineties. However, concerted efforts on the part of railroad 
impresarios continued to attract settlers to the state, with its promise of some of the last 
“free” land in the United States. Indeed, despite an overall negative trend in the national 
economy following the Panic of 1893 and strong public and government backlash after 
the discovery of a rail-freight price-fixing scheme in 1896, the population of the state grew 
from just under 200,000 in 1890 to over 300,000 by 1900 and the total value of the state’s 
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2,500 miles of track was assessed at nearly $13 million (the equivalent of $300 million as 
of October 2017).  
All of this recession-era growth, as well as a dramatic grain freight price reduction 
following the 1896 scandal, served as the preconditions for growth in the 1900-1915 
period known as the Second Boom. Western North Dakota as a whole did particularly 
well during this period as settlers, speculators and robber barons turned their attention 
away from the Eastern bonanza lands and towards the semi-arid regions west of the 
Missouri River. Minot in particular saw its role cemented as northwestern North Dakota’s 
pre-eminent rail hub through the building of a main terminal for the Great Northern and 
the upstart Soo Line Railroad’s “Wheat Line” that crossed the northern half of the state. 
The city also saw its fortunes rise politically during this period because it became the 
headquarters of the state’s burgeoning Socialist Party of North Dakota, which was 
eventually folded into the Non-Partisan League (NPL) that would dominate North Dakota 
politics from the mid-1910s to the early 1920s. The Party’s intellectual leader and chief 
apologist, Arthur Le Sueur, was elected as the city’s mayor in 1912 and promptly worked 
to dispel Minot’s crime-ridden, frontier town reputation by beginning a campaign of urban 
renewal and public works projects, which mirrored much of the eventual platform of Sewer 
Socialism (or “Le Sewer” Socialism) adopted by the Socialists in Midwestern cities during 
the 1930s – 1960s (Le Sueur, 1955, J.A. Loder, 1985). Le Sueur and the Party, including 
future NPL founder Arthur Townley, also worked strongly to organize socialist-leaning 
German and Norwegian immigrant farmers into agricultural cooperatives to combat the 
strength of the railroad and milling cartels. The fortunes of both Le Sueur and the Socialist 
Party would decline significantly after the Party’s ill-fated alliance with the Industrial 
 234 
 
Workers of the World (reviled by farmers) and its alienation of much of its ultranationalist, 
ethnic German base through ill-timed anti-military and anti-Catholic screeds after the 
outbreak of WWI in 1914. However, the core concepts of “Minot Socialism” were used by 
Townley to draw many rural Socialists into the NPL in 1915, thus allowing the NPL faction 
of the state’s Republican Party to win control of the state legislature and all statewide 
offices in the 1916 election (Putnam, 1956; Pratt, 1988). 
The Second Boom was short-lived for both Minot and North Dakota. Despite high 
crop prices from 1914-1917, North Dakota was unable to take advantage of this good 
environment because of poor wheat harvests that averaged nearly 50% below average. 
Even though harvests began to recover by 1917, the US government fixed the price of 
wheat nearly one third below its market value upon their entry into WWI, yet did not do 
so for flour, allowing even more profit to flow to the Minneapolis milling complex and 
stoking much anger among rural Dakota farmers. Western North Dakota was particularly 
disadvantaged in the late-1910s due to both extreme drought and rampant inflation of 
land prices due to intensified competition following the claiming of all “free” land. These 
twin pressures caused many farmers to go bankrupt and led to a rash of foreclosures in 
the early 1920s, forcing many families into the cities. Indeed, despite suffering mightily 
from rural deflation and the near collapse of the agricultural credit sector (which caused 
many bank failures), Minot’s population exploded by more than 50 % (growing from just 
over 10,000 to nearly 17,000) from 1920 – 1929, a period during which the state as a 
whole grew by barely 5% and many rural areas, especially the northwest, lost residents 
by the thousands, a period which Robinson (1966) refers to as the Rural Exodus (p. 378). 
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Despite this population growth, the 1920s was mixed for Minot. After finally ousting 
the increasingly unpopular and scandal-plagued NPL from power in 1922, the new 
conservative Republican government sought to simultaneously provide relief for 
struggling farmers and gain autonomy over the grain markets by constructing the state-
owned North Dakota Mill and Elevator.29 This oft-mythologized “breaking the strangling 
by Minneapolis” (see section 4.3) helped boost Minot tremendously, as it became the 
leading grain shipping terminal for the western half of the state. This dominant shipping 
position grew so attractive to outside investors that a Minneapolis-based consortium 
constructed two flour mills, allowing Minot to become the state’s second-leading producer 
of flour by 1928 (Dickson, 1985). Minot also benefited tremendously from the automotive 
revolution, becoming a major trucking thoroughfare because its strategic location at the 
intersection of 3 multi-state highways, which also helped to further underscore its role as 
the leading center of commerce for western North Dakota. 
Yet these same advances that contributed heavily to Minot’s prosperity during a 
time of general deprivation also enabled many of the criminal elements that had long 
sullied the city’s reputation. The increased stature of the railroads and growing highway 
network made Minot a hub for many vice elements, particularly Prohibition-related liquor 
smuggling between Canada and Chicago, earning the city, especially the working-class 
High 3rd district, the nickname “Little Chicago.” Although such activities were officially 
                                                 
29 Although the NPL occasionally won major elections up until the late 1930s, it effectively ceased to exist 
as a major organization following the rout of 1922. Many of the NPL’s most popular policy proposals were 
co-opted by the non-League faction of the Republican Party, which attracted support from the state’s 
wealthier farmers after 1925. Most of the NPL’s isolationist old guard, including Townley, were forced out 
during the 1930s by younger activists sympathetic to the New Deal and President Roosevelt’s 
internationalism, culminating in a still-extant merger with the state’s Democratic Party in 1952. 
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condemned by city leaders (who often responded with show raids on speakeasies and 
brothels, as well as largely insignificant Chinese-run “drug dens”, to appeal to public 
sentiment for a strong crackdown), open corruption and collusion with criminals by city 
and county law enforcement and similar suspected, yet clandestine, behavior by the city 
commission (which had neither elected, nor independent, oversight) resulted in the 
formation of a strong public crusade against vice that dragged on through the late-1930s. 
This crusade, led by many of the city’s prominent Protestant citizens, successfully 
agitated to replace the commission system with a mayor-council-manager system in 
1932. The new reform-minded city council chose as city manager a non-Minot native and 
career civil engineer, Jay Bliss, who quickly set about slashing city expenses, 
aggressively curbing vice activities and ending the city’s patronage system. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this made Bliss, widely viewed as someone with an eastern North Dakota, 
rather than western North Dakota, mentality,  many enemies among the city’s political old 
guard. Chief among these opponents was mayor Jack Patterson, who sought to 
undermine Bliss and the reformists at every turn until Bliss agreed to return Minot to its 
previous “open town” (gambling-friendly) status, which he refused (Dickson, 1985). 
During the 1930s, though, Minot faced much more dire problems than vice and 
political intrigue. The US as a whole was reeling from the effects of the Depression and 
North Dakota was no exception. As was the case in many Plains states, North Dakota 
farmers went bankrupt in droves due to poor growing conditions and inability to pay debts, 
with many choosing to either migrate to local cities in hopes of New Deal-related 
employment or to abandon the state entirely and migrate west to states such as California, 
Oregon and Washington. Minot, in particular, received ~500 rural arrivals (an increase of 
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3% to a population of approximately 16,000), which furthered added to the ranks of the 
unemployed already filling the city (Gillette, 1940). All was not lost, however, as Minot 
and North Dakota as a whole were undergoing an uncharacteristically progressive phase 
in the post-NPL era. Former state Attorney General William Langer, an erstwhile League 
ally and chief ideologue of the League’s right-wing (anti-socialist) bloc, was elected 
governor in 1932. Known as “Wild Bill” due to his colorful personality, checkered ethics 
record and idiosyncratic political behavior, Langer represented the newer breed of NPL 
politicians and explicitly sought to use both the powers of the state-owned Bank of North 
Dakota and the expanding federal relief portfolio to bring much needed relief to North 
Dakota. While much of the relief secured under the Langer regime came in the form of 
the Interior Department’s purchase of more than 1,000,000 acres of farmland in the 
Badlands region (much of which was leased back to its former owners at pennies on the 
dollar to encourage them to remain on the land (Cunfer, 2001)) and a statutory ban on 
farm foreclosures, North Dakota’s cities also received significant federal relief money. 
Minot city manager Bliss was extraordinarily aggressive in his partnership with Langer, 
securing more than $1,000,000 from the Works Progress Administration (WPA) for 
community beautification and improvement efforts. Bliss’ “pride projects” employed 
hundreds of jobless men and helped to build badly-needed infrastructure for Minot 
including dozens of parks, a new downtown bridge, 50 blocks worth of street paving and 
a sewage treatment plant which the city’s public health officer called the “greatest 
sanitation improvement which the city of Minot could have made” (Dickson, 1985). 
Thus, while Minot certainly struggled during the Depression, it fared far better than 
other parts of the nation and certainly better than North Dakota did overall, which 
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Robinson argues, “plainly faced much greater hardship … than the nation as a whole” (p. 
400). Indeed, Minot was one of the few areas in North Dakota that did not lose population 
during the 1930s (growing at a then abnormally sluggish 3%) while the state as a whole 
lost nearly 40,000 residents (almost 6% of the population), the beginning of a bumpy, 
eight-decade period in which North Dakota ultimately lost ~8,000 permanent residents, a 
trend bucked only during the present decade largely on the back of the Bakken boom.30 
Yet despite entering the post-Depression era in relatively good economic shape, Minot, 
too, would eventually feel the pinch of population loss and rural decline. 
The 1940s and 1950s began a period of relative stability for Minot, punctuated by 
several major events that would define the city’s future path. WWII was a boon for North 
Dakota, as the state’s farmers were finally able to take advantage of high wartime 
commodity prices.31 Tremendous military enlistment also largely ended unemployment, 
with many rural areas being so affected by loss of young men that city folk began working 
the fields to harvest record crops. However, during this same period North Dakota failed 
to attract significant war industry investment or significant industrial development of any 
kind, becoming more dependent on agriculture than at any time in its history. 
Simultaneously, farms began consolidating and mechanizing at record rates, creating 
fears of mass rural unemployment after enlisted men returned from the war. To head off 
this scenario, the state government created the North Dakota Postwar Planning Board, 
                                                 
30 Although some of Minot’s stability can be attributed to its century-long hub city status, Minot has largely 
defied North Dakota’s population trends and has never posted a negative population growth decade in its 
130-year history. 
31 Despite this overall positive trend, one fifth of all farms were foreclosed on due to the end of the Langer 
moratorium. 
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which drew up an aggressive development strategy based on economic development of 
the Missouri River, highway construction, rural electrification and modernization of the 
housing and infrastructure of North Dakota’s aging cities. Many of these changes came 
to fruition in the 1950s due to an influx of federal spending, with Minot benefiting heavily 
from the construction of the Central Power Electric Cooperative in 1949, Minot Air Force 
Base in 1957 and the nearby Garrison Dam on the Missouri River in 1953, each of which 
generated over $200,000,000 of economic impact for the state by 1966 (Robinson, 1966). 
However, despite the major boost that these projects provided to North Dakota’s 
economy, North Dakota still failed to attract major industries and permanent investment 
to the state. Indeed, it was during this period that young, college-educated residents 
began leaving North Dakota for opportunities in cities such as Minneapolis, Denver and 
locations further afield.32 Thus, it became clear that long-term development would require 
attracting outside investment and the creation of a fully-fledged industrial sector, as well 
as finding ways to compete with other regions of the country with fewer logistical and 
geographical disadvantages to overcome.  
Enter the first oil boom. Although wildcatters had been drilling in the Williston Basin 
(the parent formation of the Bakken) since 1916, it was not until 1951 that the first wells 
began producing in Tioga.33 From that point on, oil became a big business, with over 
100,000,000 barrels of oil produced within the first decade, placing North Dakota in the 
                                                 
32 This “brain drain” is still, as of 2018, a major area of concern for both policymakers and local Minot 
residents. 
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top 10 oil producing oil states for the first time. This first boom shares many similarities to 
the present boom. The frenzy over the possibility of earning quick riches in the hinterland 
drew many outsiders to western North Dakota, many of whom began squatting in 
makeshift living quarters due to a lack of available housing. Though oil production in Minot 
was modest, the city quickly began attracting investment and became a logistical support 
center due to strong production in bordering counties. Yet this oil boom, too, was not to 
last. As has been the case during the current Bakken boom and bust, North Dakota’s 
isolation, lack of transportation networks and low refining capacity made getting oil to 
market difficult. Then as now, massive over-production of oil and gas in both North Dakota 
and other parts of the world led to a steep drop in prices that made the expensive Bakken 
oil a less attractive option compared to more conventional plays, with the boom largely 
over by 1959 (Robinson, 1966; Bluemle, 2000). Although a short-lived second boom 
occurred in the early 1980s (to be discussed in greater detail in section 6.4), development 
in the Bakken, much as in the rest of North Dakota, stagnated for the next four decades. 
The newfound, though discontinuous, prosperity of the 1950s also re-invigorated 
many of Minot’s vice elements that had remained subdued during the 1940s. During this 
decade, Minot experienced a relative rash of vice-related crime (mainly 
prostitution/solicitation, liquor and gambling offences)34. To combat this resurgence, 
community leaders involved with the Minot Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees) 
convened a taskforce to investigate vice activities and enforcement, the result of which 
                                                 
34 Indeed, during the entire 1950-1959 period there were a total of 265 vice arrests (leading to 171 
convictions, nearly all of which were misdemeanors), an average of less than 30 incidents per year.  
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was a widely-disseminated informational pamphlet with the provocative title of “Why 
Minot?”, a play on the city’s longtime unofficial motto “Why not Minot?” used to tout the 
city’s positive qualities (Minot Junior Chamber of Commerce, 1961).35 This pamphlet, 
which publicized the names of the city’s various “pimps, prostitutes, pushers, and 
hoodlums”, contained a series of lurid interviews with local prostitutes, as well as 
sanctimonious statements from legal and police officials, business leaders and clergy, all 
of whom sought to cast Minot as a city with an especially serious vice problem atypical of 
other cities of similar size and demographic composition. The prostitute interviews in 
particular painted a picture of an intensely moral white Protestant community that had 
become a den of iniquity through the concerted efforts of career criminals such as “Baby 
Frank” and “Big Broxie” who sought to trick “hardworking” young white “girls” and naïve 
“colored women” into lives of debauchery. These criminals, many of whom were from 
implicitly less moral areas of the country such as the South and notorious urban crime 
hotbeds such as New York, Chicago and Detroit (as well as the oft –invoked bugbear, 
Minneapolis), were said to be attracted to Minot due to both the new air force base and 
its ready market of young men hungry for sex and drugs, as well as the city’s nationwide 
reputation as a “wide open town” where low-level criminality was openly tolerated, 
harkening back to Minot’s “Little Chicago” era in the 1920s.  
                                                 
35 In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that my grandfather, LeRoy Loder, who was at the 
time the county district attorney, was one of the prime movers in initiating the taskforce, as well as 
coordinating the aggressive legal response to the vice community following the pamphlet’s publication. 
Many of the Jaycees involved with the taskforce are still living and are among the respondents for this 
project. 
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Also mirroring the Bliss reform struggles was the report’s conclusion that the vice 
problem was allowed to fester due to the city government’s unwillingness to take law 
enforcement issues seriously (possibly because they were protecting themselves or their 
boosters due to alleged involvement in solicitation) and lack of a concerted effort to 
promote Minot as a wholesome, law and order-based community. These accusations of 
a laissez faire attitude toward crime led to an aggressive crackdown under the collective 
name Community Committee to Eliminate Vice, popularly referred as the “cleaning up of 
3rd Street”, due to many of the “houses of ill repute” being located in this infamous section 
of Minot. 
 Many of the above-mentioned boom and bust discourses continue to be used by 
Minot residents in order to explain the disruption they have experienced during the 
present Bakken Boom. However, despite involving some similar boomtown trends 
(population growth and demographic changes, infrastructure and crime woes, etc.), much 
of what is occurring now in the Bakken is fundamentally different than booms of 50 or 100 
years ago in terms of the scale and pace of change and in terms of the composition and 
social structure of Minot’s “longer term community.”  Thus, Chapter 6.4, which reviews in 
detail the major ways topics of concern among longer-term Minot residents, will argue 
that Minot’s historical geography of booms and busts continues to condition how Minot’s 
permanent community conceptualize their identity and in how this community interprets 
and understands the rapid, often uncomfortable, changes the city has undergone due to 
the fracking boom. This section will begin by reviewing the key discursive themes that 
emerged during qualitative analysis, specifically those that seek to mythologize Minot as 
a moral, business friendly community free of the sort of political strife that residents 
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identify as plaguing other communities with weaker moral values. Such preference for 
traditional standards of behavior and a deference toward strong business and private 
property rights, helps explain why residents view Bakken oil as a secondary concern and 
as a means to express grievances, rather than becoming the objective of political 
contention in and of itself. 
6.4 Minot under the Bakken boom and bust 
 Despite its storied history of booms and busts, Minot’s population and economy 
remained stable, and possibly stagnant, during the 1960-2007 period. This period, though 
marked by the hallmarks of North Dakota’s overall slow decline (farm consolidation and 
foreclosure, lack of major investment and job creation, brain drain, out-migration and 
population loss, etc.), is often remembered fondly by many long-term resident 
respondents due to the city’s supposedly strong, unchanging identity as a community 
based on clear, conservative moral values, respect for authority, property and the rule of 
law and a high level of unselfish mutual support between neighbors and strangers alike. 
While historical evidence may contradict this myth of polished cohesion, the ups and 
downs of the fracking era (2007-present) have led to both real and imagined shifts in 
Minot’s culture and economy that have led many respondents to question whether the 
perceived benefits from the boom have been outweighed by the negative aspects they 
feel have resulted from the city’s reorganization around the oil and gas industry. This 
section, then, will examine long-term residents’ reactions to this shift, paying critical 
attention to ways in which previous boom and bust discourses are being recycled to 
construct specific narratives about Minot. The section will be structured around three 
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specific thematic areas which provoked significant debate among respondents: (1) 
availability and cost of housing, which was viewed as being exacerbated by both boom-
related changes as well as damage caused by the Souris River flood in 2011; (2) the 
purported rise in crime in the city, which was seen as both directly related to the boom 
and bust, as well as emblematic of a general decline in Minot residents’ moral values; 
and (3) the longer-term problems faced by the city such as job availability and quality, 
lack of amenities and general economic and social opportunity and poor management on 
the part of the city regarding infrastructure and social service provision. 
 However, while each of these three thematic areas may be how residents 
outwardly express their disapproval of boom-related changes, this chapter argues that 
Minot’s culture toward consensus and against behavior that would upset the prevailing 
economic and social order (which provides older, longer-term residents with certain 
privilege over community youth or newcomers) causes residents to focus on specific 
grievances they have against boom-related externalities, rather than to criticize the oil 
and gas industry and its role in creating the conditions for social problems to fester. 
Additionally, despite the negative externalities that oil and gas industry might be the 
catalyst for, many residents in this sample are aware of the significant number of benefits 
that oil and gas provides both for them and their community in terms of economic growth, 
opportunities for professional advancement and the possibilities of creating a future Minot 
that will not succumb to many of the misfortunes that rural areas outside of the Bakken 
have suffered from. Therefore, before our major analysis, this subsection will identify four 
key discursive themes that structure how residents express disapproval without directly 
blaming the oil and gas industry: 1.) The privilege that comes from being a Minot resident, 
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as well as the specific privileges that oil and gas has provided for permanent Minot 
residents; 2.) Where blame should be placed for political, economic and social ills 
residents view as caused by the boom; 3.) What Minot’s post-oil future will be, especially 
in terms of the bifurcation of expectations between Minot’s permanent adult and youth 
populations; and 4.) The specific political culture of Minot which upholds Minot as a 
morally pure, patriotic and capitalist city struggling against the pernicious influence of 
outsiders who would seek to destroy this culture in favor of the liberal, morally bankrupt 
cultures that residents argue exist outside of North Dakota. As oil and gas is framed by 
many North Dakotans as an integral part of a patriotic, capitalist identity (See Chapters 4 
and 5), oil and gas is often not viewed as being part of these suspicious outside 
influences, despite the majority of money and equipment necessary for extraction coming 
from outside of the state. 
 Residents in the sample were largely politically conservative, with many being 
business owners or directly connected with local Republican politics. As a result, these 
respondents were very supportive of free-market and pro-growth economics. Thus, 
residents felt that despite some negatives resulting from the oil boom, they were 
privileged to live in Minot because of the positive changes they feel the boom had brought 
in terms of jobs and retail opportunities. Additionally, several of the older respondents felt 
that Minot had suffered far worse in the past (such as during the Depression) and that 
younger residents who sought to complain about the boom were misguided. One 
respondent, a 94-year-old WWII veteran who grew up on a farm during the Depression, 
also felt that Minoters would not have the luxury to debate the positives and negatives of 
the boom were it not for the very prosperity that the boom provided for them. He also 
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argued that it was not oil that was causing Minot’s current problems, but the outsiders 
and youth not willing to work hard and/or avoid anti-social behaviors. Therefore, longer-
term, mostly older, residents felt that they were doubly privileged by the boom in that they 
were able to reap the positive changes the boom had brought over a several year 
timescale, as well as by possessing the positive reputational and social ties that being an 
established community member carried during a time of massive in-migration by suspect 
individuals. 
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, residents sought to blame specific groups of 
people, rather than the oil industry, for the negative externalities that occurred during the 
boom. Respondents were particularly incensed about the behavior of two groups: 
newcomers and the city government, both of which have been common targets during 
past boom periods from Minot’s history (see 6.3). Newcomers were targeted by residents 
as their worldviews and personalities were seen as out-of-sync with Minot’s law-abiding, 
family-values-oriented culture. These newcomers were also seen as one of the primary 
vehicles through which crime (especially vice crime) was introduced into Minot, and 
through which susceptible local youth were corrupted into a criminal lifestyle. City 
government was similarly targeted, with respondents accusing members of being 
unprepared for both the oil boom and the aftermath of the 2011 Souris River Flood, the 
effects of which were both made worse through the city’s poor management of housing 
and infrastructure issues. While the city government was also criticized for catering too 
heavily to the oil industry and its workers (such as its $100,000,000 expansion of the city 
airport), most residents were loath to directly criticize the oil industry. Although firm 
reasons were not always provided for this hesitation, several residents had either been 
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employed by oil and gas businesses or stated that their employment depended on 
business from oil-related firms, thus suggesting that residents were unwilling to speak ill 
of those who provided them with economic opportunity despite potential misgivings. 
 A third major discourse was Minot’s post-oil future (i.e. when oil is no longer the 
city’s main economic driver). Despite respondents often expressing misgivings about both 
the spillover effects of the boom or the negative environmental and geopolitical 
consequences of America’s continued reliance on fossil fuels, they also believed that the 
economic benefits and increased social capital that oil has created would be key to 
allowing Minot to develop into a prominent, wealthy city with a diversified economic base 
beyond agriculture and the military (both of which residents felt were unstable and in 
decline). In connection with the above-mentioned discourse of blaming Minot’s city 
government for mismanagement of boom-related development, respondents argued that 
the city would only be able to break free from its history by using newfound tax revenue 
to invest in resources such as education, workforce development and business and 
tourism promotion in the manner that benchmark cities such as Fargo and Minneapolis 
were already engaged in. Respondents, all but one of whom were over 35, felt that while 
their futures were relatively secure, such changes were necessary in order to provide 
better futures for Minot’s young population, which would either be doomed to low-wage, 
service-sector employment in Minot or would leave for jobs and education in larger cities. 
However, much as with the privilege debate, respondents often stereotyped Minot’s youth 
as unwilling to prioritize education and job-skill acquisition due to their misguided beliefs 
that they would be able to make easy livings in the high-paying, oil industry (a prospect 
which many respondents argued was in doubt given the post-2014 bust). 
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 The final major discursive theme, one which underlies all three of the previous 
themes, is North Dakota’s and, Minot’s, specific political cultures. Chapter 4 describes in 
detail the tenets of the “North Dakota Way”, a code of conduct that emphasizes strong 
support for keeping North Dakota a business-friendly state in which residents are willing 
to put group needs ahead of their own. Although residents almost never invoked the Way 
by name, they often spoke of the pressures of conformity that come with living in a city 
such as Minot, including not being able to express their feelings on contentious issues for 
fear of the social repercussions for doing so and the strong levels of groupthink they see 
around issues such as crime and fiscally conservative budgeting at the city and county 
levels. Additionally, Minot has its own specific cultural history as a morality-centered city, 
having several times in its past stamped out vice activities during boom periods (see 6.3). 
This moralistic attitude was strongly present among many older respondents, who felt that 
alcoholism, drug addiction and street crime were the outgrowth of a permissive boomtown 
culture that was anathema to Minot’s values. Respondents, however, sought to argue 
that oil itself could not be blamed for this cultural change, as they argued that such periods 
of moral decline had accompanied previous busts and had been defeated by upright 
citizens willing to take a public stand for decency. Thus, respondents sought to frame 
Minot’s problems not so much as due to political economic conditions, but due to 
behavioral problems caused by outsiders with suspect values (as mentioned in the 
privilege and blame themes). 
 In each of the three subsections below, respondents will frequently make reference 
to the three outward discourses mentioned above. However, these residents will rarely 
directly criticize the oil and gas industry, instead blaming various cultural factors as the 
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reason for negative externalities that have arisen during the boom. This chapter then 
argues that these externalities provide a vehicle for longer-term residents to express 
grievances about long-standing issues that were neglected in the pre-boom landscape. 
6.4.1 Housing and the flood 
 Minot’s relative stability and slow growth in the nearly five-decade period preceding 
the boom explains why housing in Minot was not a major topic of debate for either policy 
makers or ordinary residents. John MacMartin, the longtime director of the Minot Area 
Chamber of Commerce, recalled that before the boom era, Minot was seen as a very 
unattractive destination for people to live and work, with homes being undervalued when 
compared to similar units in other cities (personal interview). Indeed, the Minot-Williston 
area had flat housing growth in both the single-family house and rental markets from 
2000-2008, with construction of new units in both categories averaging between 150-200 
per year, compared to an average of 750 housing units and 1,150 rental units constructed 
per year from 2009-2013, peaking in 2012 with the construction of ~1,400 homes and 
~2,100 apartments. (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013). 
However, massive boom-related growth post-2007 as well as damage to Minot’s existing 
housing stock from the 2011 Souris River flood has made housing, especially its cost, 
quality and availability, the topic that nearly every respondent had a strong opinion about. 
 Of particular salience to the Minot housing debate is the impact of the Souris flood. 
Whereas other Bakken cities such as Williston and Dickinson have also faced a housing 
crunch due to boom-related in-migration, they have not had to deal with the repercussions 
of having significant portions of their permanent population temporary or permanently 
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displaced due to natural disaster right as the boom was nearing its zenith. Case in point, 
three years of record rainfall from 2009-2011, combined with record snowfall in the winter 
of 2010 caused the Souris River to overtop its banks on June 22, 2011. This event led to 
the mandatory evacuation of more than 11,000 Minot residents (between one fourth and 
one third of the population, depending upon which estimates are used). However, the 
worst was yet to come. After the river’s peak flow held at 11,000 cubic ft. per sec. for the 
next 3 days (still well above the average of 5,000), the all clear was given and many 
residents returned home. Yet localized extreme rain upriver in Saskatchewan caused 
peak flow to increase to over 30,000 ft. per sec., causing a second flood event in which 
the river reached its highest level since 1881 and portions of Minot along the floodplain 
were under up to 10 feet of water (North Dakota Agricultural Weather Network, 2014). 
The City of Minot (2016) estimates that over 4,000 homes (27% of the total housing stock) 
were either destroyed or damaged beyond repair. Additionally, the impacts of the flood 
were not distributed evenly among all sectors of the population, with the poor and the 
elderly being hit especially hard due to the fact that much of the city’s lower income 
housing is located at the bottom of the Souris Valley directly on or adjacent to the river. 
Many of these residents were also burdened by the inability to afford either temporary or 
permanent alternative housing (the price of which was already greatly inflated due to 
housing competition) or to rebuild their homes (due to a combination of lack of flood 
insurance or inadequate claims payments for those that did have coverage), causing 
many residents to leave Minot altogether (City of Minot, 2016).  
Several respondents had firsthand experience with these flood-related 
phenomena, either through their own families’ struggles or through those of friends and 
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neighbors. E.T., a 38-year-old speech therapist and Minot native who has spent most of 
her adult life outside of the city, was forced to leave a high-paying job in Bismarck, the 
state capitol, and return to Minot to help her elderly father whose house had been flooded. 
As this unit was a condominium (and thus technically a rental unit), her father did not 
receive any money from his flood insurance policy and E.T. and her father were forced to 
finance and conduct most of the repairs themselves:  
There was 7 and a half feet of water in the building and after flood the prices 
of help skyrocketed, so I came back for the Summer and I helped my Dad 
gut the sheet rock, the carpet, the insulation and then he rebuilt it on his 
own. He’s 70 years old and did it by himself (personal interview). 
B.S., an 84-year-old widow, also faced age-and-income-related struggles with her late 
husband due to the impacts of the flood, despite ultimately not suffering significant flood-
related damage to her home: 
The flood was devastating for us. I was not flooded, but the flood shoreline 
came to within 6 feet in the backyard. No matter how well the drains were 
plugged, the force was so great that we still got backup. We evacuated the 
house, which, looking back, probably wasn’t necessary. But, the mayor said 
there would possibly be 7 to 12 more feet. And given that it was already 
across the street, it was devastating. One thing, my husband had 
Parkinson’s. It was difficult for him and it was a big burden for me. And we 
still have a basement full of boxes that I haven’t been able to get at (personal 
interview). 
A somewhat different story was recounted by J.A., a 68 year-old retired Minot High School 
music teacher. J.A.’s house, which was not flooded, is located at one of the highest points 
in Minot on top of South Hill, universally considered to be the most desirable residential 
area in the city. Yet during the worst of the flooding, J.A., felt compelled to help some of 
his friends and neighbors who had lost their homes:  
 252 
 
That day the dikes went out, we were sitting here and I told [wife], “Geez! 
We’ve got to do something. We’re sitting here high and dry and all these 
people are being flooded.” And so, we started calling around to people that 
were floodplain and, long story short, we had some people that moved in 
with us. We had someone upstairs. We had someone downstairs. And it 
was a long haul [laughs] … But, I just couldn’t imagine being flooded 
(personal interview). 
 
 A common theme that emerged among respondents was sympathy for the flood 
victims, with some blaming landlords for exacerbating the post-flood housing shortage by 
raising rents to cater to higher income renters connected to the oil industry. J.S., a 27-
year-old insurance agent and son of a prominent evangelical pastor, noted that while the 
flood did not affect his family to any significant degree, many congregants from his church 
were badly affected by gouging in the rental markets, which he argued functioned far 
better for real estate investors and speculators than for the tenants themselves. E.T., who 
complained of already paying $1,600/month for her previous 1-bedroom apartment in 
Bismarck, largely concurred with J.S., arguing that had she not had been able to stay at 
her father’s secondary residence outside city limits upon her return to Minot, she would 
likely have been unable to afford a Minot rent equivalent to that of Bismarck due to her 
diminished salary. Likewise, state Rep. Andrew Maragos (R), whose district includes 
many lower income areas that were badly affected by the flood, argued that because local 
homebuilders and landlords were so focused on catering to the needs of the oil industry 
that they effectively forced many poor, elderly residents out of Minot following the flood 
due to the exorbitant prices they were charging, especially for temporary rentals. Maragos 
stated that this and other examples of putting profit over community led to Minot failing its 
most vulnerable:  
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We couldn’t take care of these people. We couldn’t house them. We lost a 
lot of them. There was no place to stay and what was left, because of the 
market forces, was so expensive. You know how these market forces are: 
if there’s a much larger demand than there is supply, then it’s impossible for 
fixed-income people to not be adversely affected … Unfortunately, the oil 
companies had so much money, they got their way with everything. And so, 
it was always very disappointing that we lost part of our aging population 
from this section of the state (personal interview). 
 
Despite these open denunciations of landlords as profiteering from the oil and gas 
industry, other respondents felt that the industry deserved more praise than criticism for 
the way it behaved in the wake of the flood. C.B., a 59-year-old nurse and life-long Minot 
resident, argued that despite the downsides of increased housing competition from oil-
employed in-migrants hurting locals needing temporary post-flood housing, if it were not 
for the infusion of money from these very same residents and the oil companies 
themselves, Minot as a whole would have suffered a sharp downturn, rather than record 
growth, during the flood recovery period (personal interview). Similarly, L.A., a 96-year-
old retired property manager and former Republican state representative, felt that despite 
oil-related growth and newcomers being responsible for some of Minot’s recent ills such 
as infrastructure burden and rising crime, he could not blame the struggles of the flood’s 
“not financially secure” victims on “petroleum economics.” Indeed, L.A. argued that even 
though the city had suffered due to the post-2015 downturn in oil prices and the resulting 
layoffs, Minot citizens would not even have the privilege to engage in such a debate were 
it not for the overwhelming prosperity that was generated almost solely by oil-related 
economic activity (personal interview). L.A.’s sentiments were supported by K.N., pastor 
at a local Lutheran Church, who felt that despite the existence of too much “profit taking” 
by businesses looking to make quick profits off the infusion of oil-industry money into 
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Minot’s economy, the city would not have been able to recover were it not for this 
extraordinary economic boost that this money provided. K.N. concluded that, “the oil 
boom saved Minot” (personal interview). 
While most respondents fell into these mostly pro- and anti-industry camps 
regarding fault for the slow flood recovery, a sizable minority felt that the city government 
bore much of the blame due to poor decision making and reckless spending, both before 
and after the flood. B.T., an 88-year-old retired sales manager for Minot’s coal-based 
utility and a former Republican state representative and senator, felt that the city 
government did a poor job in the years before the flood by not investing in proper flood 
control, as they took for granted the chance that any large flood could happen following 
the previous 100 year-level flooding of 1969. This lax attitude, he argued, caused the city 
government to not properly warn floodplain residents of the dangers they faced and the 
need for adequate flood insurance coverage. Additionally, B.T., a longtime advocate for 
limited government and one of the most vocal backers of the ultimately successful 2016 
referendum to reduce the size of Minot’s city council, argued that the city could better help 
low income flood victims by giving them property tax relief (which would in turn allow them 
to afford proper flood insurance). This, he felt, would not only encourage residents to 
remain in their own homes, but would allow the city government to stop applying for “easy” 
federal grants for low-income housing that most Minot flood victims are too proud to live 
in (personal interview).  
L.H., a 38-year-old freelance event planner and Iraq War veteran, was also 
concerned with the city’s penchant for using and abusing federal money. She argued that 
although the city was right to continue applying for relief money from HUD despite being 
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five years post-flood, she felt that the city’s lack of previous attention to flood control and 
the concerted push to develop Minot’s downtown would lead to the money being spent 
on non-essential construction:  
2011 we got hit with the flood. It’s 2016 and there are still a lot of flooded 
homes. There are still a lot of people complaining. They [the city 
government] only have a certain amount of time from when that check is 
issued to go and figure out what the plans are for a better infrastructure. 
Look, you know that money’s going to go towards the jail. It’s going to go 
towards that or that parking garage downtown that nobody asked for. It’s 
just not going to work” (personal interview). 
 
Many of these same concerns were echoed by 85-year-old R.S., Minot’s long-time former 
city manager. R.S. has been publicly and privately advocating for nearly two decades for 
the construction of the Northwest Area Water Supply (NAWS) project to divert water to 
Minot from the Missouri River. He argued that because NAWS is in legal limbo due to 
Canadian objections and because the city is so focused on business development and 
growing its population at all costs, it is unlikely that NAWS or any other water management 
projects, such as flood protection infrastructure, will be built in the near future.36 
 Thus, to summarize, while respondents disagreed with the reasons as to why 
Minot struggled so mightily to rectify its housing troubles and recover from the flood, there 
was near universal agreement that the situation was poor and that the response on the 
part of the city was inadequate. Indeed, while some chose to cast blame on private sector 
profiteers or the demands of the increasingly politically powerful oil industry, every 
                                                 
36 The city government has in the past illegally diverted sales tax money collected expressly for the building 
of NAWS into the economic development-based MAGIC (Minot Area Growth through Investment and 
Cooperation) Fund. In 2003, the city lost in court and was forced to refund NAWS more than $1,000,000 
(Associated Press, 2003). 
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respondent who commented on the flood expressed some measure of dissatisfaction with 
the city’s myopic focus on supporting oil-related growth at the expense of long-time 
residents badly in need of help. As we will see in our next section, this shift away from 
established community protocols of shared morality and mutual support has contributed 
to a sense of alienation from the perceived successes of boom-based development. 
6.4.2 Crime and morality 
 Chapter 4 discussed the tenets of patriotism, morality and mutual support that 
collectively make up the North Dakota Way. Although many critics in that chapter have 
argued that the Way is either a fallacious appeal to a nostalgic past that never existed or 
a tool to enforce conformity and the pro-business/pro-fracking status quo, many Minot-
based respondents expressed support for the ethos that underpins it. Additionally, the 
majority of respondents felt that the re-organization of the city’s economy around the 
demands of the oil industry, such as the proliferation of industrial contractors and the 
growth of the service industry, combined with the purportedly negative behavior of some 
in-migrants, who are linked to the oil industry, had irreparably damaged the culture that 
made Minot a special community. This section will critically examine the grievances that 
respondents have had with these cultural changes, as well as the discourses that 
respondents use to justify their arguments, many of which mirror those used during 
previous booms to police morality. In these narratives, oil is not viewed as the ultimate 
cause for cultural change in Minot, but merely as a catalyst for the changes in the social 
landscape (including demographic changes related to in-migration). Indeed, while many 
respondents argue that expanded oil industry and support sector employment has 
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attracted many criminals to the area, most respondents would not argue that the oil boom 
was the reason for the purported increase in criminality and decrease in personal safety 
that has occurred since the boom began in the late 2000s. 
 Crime has become one of the most publicly recognizable negative externalities in 
Minot of the Bakken boom. Much of this is due to a strong media fixation on criminal 
activity in the region, especially more lurid stories of human trafficking, drug trafficking, 
armed robbery and murder, much of which is reported as being connected to gang 
activity. Indeed, Minot’s own major newspaper, the Minot Daily News, features a “Daily 
Records” section that reports city government business in which crime features as the 
most emphasized component.  The Daily News also frequently runs feature-length crime-
related pieces with prurient titles such as December 2017’s “Crime Wave” (Schramm, 
2017). This feature included pictures of Minot’s new jail and an interview with the city 
police chief, who argued that Minot’s “doubled” violent-crime rate was due to the 
existence of a criminal pipeline between “the Bakken and Bakersfield [California]”, thus 
furthering the outsider-as-dangerous stereotype. 
Despite the media’s painting of Minot as a city overrun with criminality, the crime 
statistics support a different narrative. While Minot has seen an overall rise in the total 
number of crimes committed, the concomitant population growth renders the increase in 
the crime rate statistically insignificant. The per capita rate for Minot’s peak boom years 
of 2012-2016 (224 crimes per 100,000 residents) is similar to the per capita rate for the 
pre-boom years of 2002-2006 (223 crimes per 100,000 residents), with the former rate 
being skewed higher by an abnormally high crime year in 2015 (303 crimes per 100,000 
residents). Even though Minot may currently be experiencing a rash of property crime 
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during the post-2015 slowdown, crime rates in the city have been consistently at or below 
the national average for the past 15 years (280 crimes per 100,000 people). Indeed, even 
though the city’s murder rate for the years 2010-2016 was nearly double that of the years 
2003-2009 (3.9 versus 2 per 100,000 residents), the total number of murders only 
increased from 6 to 12, with 6 of those happening in 2011 alone (City-Data, 2018). Thus, 
while headlines about a doubling of the murder rate may make for attractive headlines, 
Minot’s image as a crime-ridden city appears largely over-stated. 
 Yet despite crime perhaps not being as severe as reported, many respondents still 
felt that it was one of the major issues facing Minot, even though none had been 
personally victimized and most did not have any friends and neighbors who had. Many of 
these respondents argued that their sense of alarm was due precisely to feeling alarmed 
by the constant reporting of particularly heinous crimes in either the local media or through 
gossip on social media. J.A., who felt that the constant barrage of conflicting stories made 
him unsure of which sources could be trusted, succinctly expressed the anxiety of many 
respondents:  
We read the paper [Daily News]. I read the police reports and there are 
more people in the police reports than there were 5, 10 years ago. It was a 
small little paragraph. Now it’s a full page. So, you have to believe it’s true 
that those things are happening just by what you read in the paper. I’ve 
never seen somebody shot. I’ve never seen anybody rob a bank. You 
know? Or break into somebody’s home. But, it must be happening. You 
know? And if it’s happening, it’s scary (personal interview). 
Indeed, J.A.’s framing of the erosion of Minot’s identity as a once secure small town where 
truth and order were taken for granted and peace of mind was assured was also advanced 
by L.H. and her friend, C.P., a 42-year-old IT professional, who were interviewed jointly:  
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L.H.: Well, lately with the way that they’ve been doing the media, it’s 
reminding me of the Donald Trump campaign [laughs]. Donald Trump’s 
whole thing is he’s relying on the fear of Americans. That’s what’s going on 
here in Minot. Another drug bust. Oh, yep. Another murder. This! This! This! 
It’s front-page news. Somebody’s sentenced to 40 years. Or somebody’s 
on $2 million bond. You know? It’s like, “Ok. Why push that?” Shouldn’t you 
be working on the growth? Something positive that’s impacting things. 
Putting more positive spins on this rather than the negative. 
C.P.: I think people are focused on it [crime] because prior to this [the boom] 
it was buried [laughs]. It really was! It was Mayberry! [the archetypical 
wholesome, crimeless rural town depicted on the 1960s TV show The Andy 
Griffith Show]. People didn’t get shot! Maybe once in a while there’d be 
domestic abuse or maybe somebody got killed. But that was even pretty 
rare … Now I’m getting desensitized to it. Somebody mentioned last night 
that there was a home invasion where a gal got attacked in her home. Prior 
to this I probably would have really freaked out over that, but now I’m just 
like, “Eh” (personal interview). 
 
This purported shattering of the image of Minot as a blissfully unworldly, rule-of-
law community with clear, traditional notions of right and wrong (where violations of the 
latter were previously shocking) pervaded the responses of many middle-aged and 
elderly respondents, especially when related to matters of personal safety and security. 
B.H., a 45-year-old IT professional and laid off pipeline safety manager, expressed 
concern that many of the inviolable values of courtesy and respect that he had been 
raised to practice were seen as either unnecessary or threatening by many in Minot’s 
current environment. He recounted that while recently while he and his son were driving 
to the grocery store, he had seen another car driving without its headlights on after dark. 
B.H. said that while normally he would have politely flashed his lights to alert the other 
driver, he ultimately decided not to do so after his son informed him that flashing was now 
being interpreted as a gang sign and a show of aggression. Although B.H. questioned the 
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validity of his son’s claims, this potential sea change in previously unquestioned norms 
deeply troubled him:  
It’s kind of strange that the mentality is that we don’t help each other out of 
fear. I’m pretty sure you [interviewer] wouldn’t have tried to jack my car, 
would ya? [laughs] … But yeah, now you think twice about helping 
somebody out. Whereas ten years ago it would’ve been a no brainer if 
somebody was stuck on the side of the road you’d pull over and help ‘em 
out (personal interview). 
 
S.M., 86 and the widow of a former North Dakota Supreme Court justice, also argued that 
she had seen a dramatic behavioral shift among local residents since she and her late 
husband had first arrived in Minot in the 1950s. However, S.M. argued that much of the 
community decline was due not to younger residents being less moral or inherently 
deviant (in fact stating that much of the negative behavior has always existed, but has 
been hidden from public view), but due to a general decline in social capital and civic 
participation that previously defined Minot:  
There may be bad eggs, so to speak, nowadays among the newcomers, 
but our own culture has had its fair share of bad eggs, too … I think what 
would really help is if we still had organizations to connect new people to 
the community, especially women … back when we first came to Minot they 
had the Welcome Wagon where all of the mothers would get together to 
teach new mothers in town about schools and things. 
 
S.M. felt that although economic growth related to the boom had helped improve 
Minot’s art scene and led to better quality of reporting at the Minot Daily News 
many of the good things about the pre-boom lifestyle she had come to love (peace 
and quiet, little concern for personal property, etc.) had disappeared and that she 
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now felt the need to be more vigilant in securing her own home due to the fear of 
violence:  
It wasn’t the North Dakota way to lock a door. If someone got stalled out in 
a blizzard, and we weren’t home to let them in, they needed to be able to 
get in where it’s warm. We didn’t see any of that as dangerous since it was 
just the right thing to do. There hasn’t been much crime out where we live 
[outside of the city limits to the southwest of downtown], but now we hear 
about elderly people being attacked and we can’t be too careful. That’s why 
I have my son and daughter stop by to check on us every day … It’s clear 
that we aren’t a little town on the prairie anymore and we just have to accept 
that (personal interview). 
  
 Indeed, many older respondents lamented the increased securitization of their 
everyday lives because of the panic over boom related crime. Y.P., a 60-year-old 
housekeeper, argued that the uncomplicated lifestyle and the fact that she could take her 
safety and security for granted was one of the chief reasons she had moved from 
California to Minot:  
When I first got here, my daughter took me to Walmart and everybody 
leaves their car running. Now nobody leaves their cars running. And they 
lock their doors. You read about this crime that they never had. It was 
unfortunate to me because after growing up in LA, this was the dream place. 
You could go out a bit and not worry about leaving your door unlocked, or 
you could leave your car unlocked. That was great. But not anymore. At 
least I don’t think it’s the smartest thing to do (personal interview). 
J.A., the retired music teacher, felt that while Minot’s heavy police presence was justified 
due the increase in violent crime, it was unfortunate that his own community needed 
measures he equated with more historically crime-ridden areas:  
But, there’s just more and more … CRIME. And people need more cops. 
And it’s a sad thing to say that, because North Dakota has been a pretty 
safe place to live. There was a day when we’d never think about locking our 
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house. Now, we wouldn’t leave the house, you know, [laughs], EVER, 
unlocked … I mean, it’s everywhere now. Fargo had their first policeman 
killed in I don’t know how long. Probably 50, maybe even 100 years … It’s 
scary! (personal interview). 
 
Echoing J.A., 87-year-old L.L., who has served as a teacher and administrator with the 
Minot Public Schools since 1955, noted that because of concerns about crime, Minot’s 
schools are now required to have their doors locked during school hours and have armed 
policemen on patrol at all times. Though L.L. felt that Minot was much safer than Williston 
due to having fewer “adult entertainment” venues such as strip clubs, he expressed great 
concern about how the increase in vice, especially sex trafficking, had sullied Minot’s 
reputation: “We used to be a clean little town.” Furthering this theme of moral decline was 
K.N., the Lutheran pastor. K.N., who had recently installed security cameras at his church 
to monitor “drug-seeking burglars”, felt that this was a great shame, as the church, in 
proper Christian fashion, had previously been one of the few places that would provide 
refuge, include a night shelter, to many of the very same people that had now become 
criminals. However, K.N. argued that the oil boom/bust was not the reason for the 
increase in criminal behavior, but merely that many more people were “desperate” due to 
the city’s general economic decline from 2015 onward.37 
  Yet despite the bittersweet emotions that Minot’s cultural changes aroused, many 
respondents were quite clear about who they believed was responsible for the city’s moral 
                                                 
37 Although it is unclear whether K.N. or someone else made the decision to suspend the overnight 
refuge, the documentary film The Overnighters (Moss, 2014) provides a cautionary tale for would be 
activist pastors. This film chronicles a Lutheran pastor in Williston who allowed homeless residents to 
sleep in the church for free for more than 2 years. This proved extremely unpopular with the local 
community and led to the pastor eventually resigning and leaving Williston. 
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decay, settling on a familiar scapegoat: the outsider. E.T., the speech therapist who 
returned to Minot to help her father following the flood, argued that even though she felt 
in-migrants had made Minot a better place overall due to reviving the failing economy, 
many of these migrants did not share her conservative Christian values:   
I’m kind of nervous how the culture’s changed. I mean, like, North Dakota’s 
kind of a hard place to meet people ‘cause everybody stays in their little 
families. But with these new people coming in there’s … I don’t know, it still 
seems like everything’s changed. Like, you don’t leave your doors unlocked 
anymore and … and even though it’s nice to have new people, you don’t 
know their values and backgrounds, so you’re not quite as friendly … a 
couple of times I took the train from Montana and it was loud. And they did 
NOT have good manners [laughs] (personal interview). 
Similarly, C.P. argued that seeing so many strangers, many of whom she believes may 
be potential criminals, is particularly unsettling, as she and her family are so used to 
intimately knowing nearly everyone in their communities:  
My mom lives in Garrison. It’s along the lake there and it’s a smaller 
community. That was a town where when you went to the grocery store, 
you knew everybody. And as they’ve built RV parks and all the people 
coming in and, of course, the rash of burglaries, my mom has said it’s a 
different feel. You go to the grocery store and you don’t know half the people 
now. It’s different. 
She also recounted that her brother, who lives west of Minot where more oil exploration 
and production take place, now keeps guns in his house for protection, which is 
completely anathema to the values with which she was raised. 
This idea of outsiders being culturally incompatible with North Dakota was also 
raised by B.S., who felt that oil-based migrants had degraded Minot because they simply 
could not leave their deviant “big city” attitudes behind:  
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With the oil boom and the crime, I just think it’s changed Minot. We’ve got 
people that don’t have a history here and they don’t treat it right. I’m sure 
many people that come are from large urban areas and they’re not used to 
smaller communities like this where we have a low crime rate. And they’ve 
added something to the crime rate [laughs] (personal interview). 
Rep. Maragos furthered this discourse, arguing that much of the crime and disorder in the 
Bakken could be traced to new residents not adapting to the small town culture that many 
North Dakotans hold dear: 
When I was growing up, when the basketball game was over, everybody 
went down to the bar. That’s where the social life was in the evening. So, 
when all that money came flying in and then we brought all of those people 
from outside of the state that came in for these jobs, they were used to 
[individually participating in] other activities [drinking] that were heretofore 
community activities … All of these people that come to North Dakota, they 
say there’s nothing to do here and yadda yadda yadda. That was a real 
culture shock for a lot of ‘em, small town North Dakota. So they found other 
avenues of spending their money and unfortunately the criminal elements 
were giving them an alternative (personal interview). 
L.A. raised an argument rather similar to what Maragos indicated, although he felt that 
the cultural mismatch was due not to newcomers finding fault with Minot’s existing 
landscape, but with these in-migrants bringing with them the same boomtown culture they 
have brought to every major oil project:  “We’ve got a problem. I don’t know if I blame that 
on the Bakken. We certainly had the same problem when they built the railroads. You’re 
always going to have hangers on and the baggage people coming in” (personal interview). 
 Indeed, many respondents took particular exception to these “boomtown values”, 
arguing that they were particularly damaging to younger Minot residents who were 
particularly susceptible to the devil-may-care attitude that seemed to accompany Minot’s 
economic rise. Rep. Maragos argued that because many of the in-migrants were single 
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men without families and with no intention of staying in North Dakota permanently, they 
did not develop positive community ties that would have discouraged them from 
participating in a reckless, carousing lifestyle, which Maragos felt was a gateway to 
criminal activity. Y.P., who had previously worked as a housekeeper at an oil industry 
crew camp, and E.T., the speech therapist at the local hospital, noted during separate 
focus groups that they saw firsthand many young, local oilworkers succumb to the very 
lifestyle that Maragos warned of, often with disastrous results:  
There’s nothing for those people to do [in the man camp], so they’d go to 
the bar. Well, then you have a safety issue because you’ve got drunk drivers 
on the road. And now kids who are 21, they get the influence of, “Oh! The 
work crew goes to the bar.” You’ve been working 16-18 hours and then 
you’re going to go to the bar before you take a shower and get to bed for 3, 
4, 5 hours before you get up and go do another shift. Which is ridiculous 
(Y.P., personal focus group). 
 
In the hospital I was kind of blown away at how many oil workers had drug 
overdoses and that wasn’t reported. I don’t know what to even say about it. 
There were a lot of 25, 30 year old guys that just couldn’t handle the money 
and once they had a stroke they honestly thought they’d be going back to 
work over the weekend. I mean just no concept of how this was different 
(E.T., personal focus group). 
C.L., a 58-year-old IT professional, and B.H. were present alongside Y.P. at the latter 
focus group and largely concurred with her assessment, arguing that they had seen these 
problems manifest themselves among Minot’s youth. C.L. noted that she saw many high 
school students drop out to work in the oilfields as they were lured by the promise of six-
figure salaries. However, she said that many of these same students were now struggling 
to maintain their previous free-spending lifestyles because they can no longer find 
industry work: “How do some of these young kids make it? They have a new house and 
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they drive a new Suburban. I keep thinking that they must live on credit cards. They’d 
have to” (personal focus group). B.H. told a similar, although far more personal, story 
about his teenage son damaging his future by focusing his post-school plans solely on 
employment as a roughneck: 
A lot of kids were seduced by the fast money and flashy trucks they saw 
rolling through town. My son kept talking about how he didn’t wanna go to 
college because was just gonna get a job in the oilfield when he graduated. 
And now, he’s one year away and he’s not gonna go work in the oilfields 
[due to lack of jobs during the slowdown]. Now they’re going to be very 
selective …So, he’s kind of in a pickle because he hasn’t been paying much 
attention to his studies as it is. So now he’s gotta come up with a different 
gameplan. And I’m telling him, “Don’t burn your bridges because there 
aren’t that many bridges anymore” (personal focus group). 
 Other respondents, though, argued that despite boomtown culture being a 
negative influence, most youth were already simply more entitled than in previous 
generations, lacking the work ethic and respect for authority upon which North Dakotans 
pride themselves. 83-year-old S.B., a former grain farmer and current shipping plant 
supervisor for an agricultural chemical firm, argues that he has trouble retaining local 
youth as employees because they lack loyalty to his employer and would rather work for 
higher salaries in the oil industry than live and work on the farm like their ancestors. 
Indeed, S.B., much like B.H. in the preceding paragraph, complained that young men only 
cared about money and were obsessed with oversized diesel “trucks” as they saw them 
as inherent to the roughneck lifestyle, unlike the small, utilitarian “pickups” that he has 
always seen as tools for work and transportation. S.B. ultimately argued that the 
immigrants that he hired on temporary work visas were better workers than local youth: 
“It’s a good thing we can hire these Mexicans, because they’re actually excited about the 
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job and show up on time” (personal interview). L.H., who worked as a manager at 
Hardee’s following the flood, also argued that she prioritized hiring foreign workers 
because she could not find reliable employees among the local youth:  
Here, being a manager, I’m like, “Ok. I’ve got this applicant coming in. They 
worked for 2 days and quit. And then went to another job.” … so, we brought 
in workers on school visas from Colombia because we were so desperate 
for help. And they were the best workers ever because they just wanted to 
make money to take home” (personal interview). 
L.H. and C.P. both noted that they never would have quit jobs or not put in their best effort 
during their own youths, with C.P. remarking, “Back when we were in high school and 
stuff, that was the thing. Everybody had such a work ethic. Even as a kid. I mean, you 
had to work. You showed up when you were supposed to. You communicated with your 
manager. If you were told to clean toilets you just did it” (personal interview).  
This narrative of willfully disobedient youth choosing leisure over accomplishment 
was also advanced by two of our most elderly respondents, L.A., 96, and L.L., 87. L.A., a 
proud World War II veteran who frequently touts the personal sacrifices he and his fellow 
service members made, argued that the present culture in which “everybody has a right 
to do their own thing” is a “privileged position” that members of his generation had to 
sacrifice their lives for. He went on to elaborate that the outcome of this ethos was 
consumption of marijuana, which, echoing Rep. Maragos, was a gateway to both hard 
drugs and criminal activity. L.L. largely replicated L.A.’s position, although he also noted 
that due to Minot not offering youth much in the way of positive employment or fulfilling 
leisure activities, drugs would naturally fill such a void. 
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In summary, the majority of respondents felt that increased economic activity 
related to the oil industry had not only changed Minot’s economic landscape, but has also 
negatively impacted the very specific culture that residents felt provided the city with its 
positive quality of life. Specifically, respondents were particularly concerned that crime 
had taken root in Minot due to a general decline in community values in favor of a libertine, 
boomtown culture. Respondents largely felt that much of this decline was due to outsiders 
bringing this negative mentality with them to Minot and corrupting local youth, rather than 
a distinct upsurge in anti-social behavior on the part of long-term residents. However, a 
significant minority argued that much of this cultural shift could also be blamed on a sense 
of entitlement on the part of Minot’s younger population, which manifested itself in a lack 
of work ethic and inclination to adopt a reckless lifestyle that mirrored that of many oil-
connected in-migrants. 
Residents, however, largely refrained from blaming the oil and gas industry for the 
decline of community values and the increase in crime. Critics such as WWII veteran L.A. 
specifically argued that while these negative externalities had happened because suspect 
“baggage people” were lured to the Bakken because of the boom, he felt that such 
problems had also occurred  for the exact same reason’s during Minot’s previous 
industrial booms such as the building of the railroads.   Indeed, while other residents were 
not as direct in making the connection to past boom and bust cycles, they frequently 
highlighted how newcomers were attracted to Minot by moneymaking opportunities 
(whether legal or illegal), which they argued were a feature of many of the boom and bust 
times that Minot had seen before, with the oil boom simply being the current vehicle 
through which the attraction happened.  
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While it cannot be said definitively why respondents chose to blame newcomers 
themselves rather than the oil boom that has caused them to come to Minot, there are 
two plausible explanations, both of which are connected to the positive role of oil 
development in strengthening North Dakota’s economy and identity. First, the successful 
penetration of the Homo Dakoticus ideology into the populace. Especially among elderly 
male respondents, Bakken oil was strongly linked with ensuring America’s national 
security through reducing oil imports from politically suspect nations. This strongly aligned 
with other productivist narratives, such as the importance of North Dakota’s agricultural 
economy as both a source of wealth creation, but also a key linchpin in ensuring Minot’s 
place as a center of cross-border trade with Canada. In short, a significant minority of 
respondents truly believed that North Dakota had a major role to play in the overall US 
geopolitical landscape and that Bakken oil was the current method through which the 
state could contribute. Second, in connection with our underlying themes of privilege and 
blame, the majority of respondents believed that despite certain grievances, the oil boom 
was a positive development for Minot, both in terms of economic benefits, as well as the 
improvement in the city’s national reputation. K.N., the Lutheran pastor, summarized such 
a feeling succinctly: “Western North Dakota has always had this end of the world 
reputation … but the Bakken lifts people’s spirits. They need us. We’re the place that 
actually has jobs. North Dakota is finally good for something other than durum [wheat] 
and sunflowers” (personal interview). Thus, while respondents will freely admit that there 
are real and significant downsides to the Bakken boom, these are far outweighed by the 
positive changes the boom has brought to Minot. 
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Yet at the same time that many respondents blamed Minot’s problems on the 
influence of outsiders, there was also a general admission that the “old Minot” that they 
viewed so nostalgically did not offer much in the way of real career or lifestyle 
opportunities for young people. As we will see in our next section, while some 
respondents felt that the Bakken boom brought much positive economic change to Minot, 
others believed that the any benefits were merely cosmetic, hiding the unaddressed 
fundamental political and economic problems that caused Minot’s post-1960 stagnation, 
which they argued would be re-exposed by a long-term decline in oil activity. 
6.4.3 What future for boomtown Minot? 
 While the preceding section (6.4.2) may have painted a rather gloomy picture 
regarding respondents’ opinions about the boom-related social changes in Minot, 
responses about the boom’s economic impacts have been far more positive. Specifically, 
respondents argued that Minot was now seen as a place to make a good living (due to 
the growth of both oil-related businesses and the service sector), rather than a place from 
which to escape due to lack of opportunity, countering the old adage that, “North Dakota 
is a place you’re from, not a place you live.” Although some residents expressed 
trepidation about the city becoming too reliant on the cyclical oil industry, nearly all felt 
that Minot would have a strong economic future if the city’s boom-related economic and 
reputational gains could be invested in securing a post-oil future.  Many respondents, felt 
North Dakota would be forced into post-oil situations sooner rather than later. 
Respondents felt that if the city were to succeed in the post-oil period, the city 
government, its business class and some of its more culturally stubborn residents would 
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need to invest in the educational, career-training and physical infrastructures necessary 
to facilitate the city’s transition toward a contemporary urban city and away from the small, 
agricultural support town model that has persisted despite Minot’s rapid growth during the 
boom years. 
 Perhaps the most serious issue respondents saw as underlying Minot’s stagnation 
has been limited education and career opportunities for young people, especially for those 
seeking white collar jobs outside of the oil and gas industry. Although political leaders 
such as Rep. Maragos have served as longtime champions (and boosters) of North 
Dakota’s students and educational system (see chapter 4), many respondents argued 
that Minot’s low-tax, anti-spending political culture has led to the city’s purportedly 
underfunded public school system being unable to adequately serve the city’s school-age 
population, which has grown tremendously since the beginning of the boom.38 During 
their joint interview, L.H. (a mother of 3) and C.P. (a mother of 2) both felt that the city 
government and Minot’s populace were not doing enough to help counter this surge in 
enrollment. The pair argued that the student population increase combined with the 
closing of several schools following the flood had made the educational experience 
significantly worse for their children:  
L.H.: The school where my 8-year-old is at is super crowded and they have 
the entire 4th and 5th graders outside in portables. 
C.P.: By the time he [L.H.’s son] went to kindergarten they had 700 
kindergarteners in the entire system. And that was before Erik Ramstad 
[Middle School] flooded. That meant there wouldn’t be enough room at 
Ramstad or Jim Hill [Middle School]. So they had to do something at that 
                                                 
38 Minot Public Schools total K-12 enrollment grew from 6,193 in May 2007 to 7,593 as of October 2017, 
an increase of 1,400 students or ~23% (Johnson, 2017). 
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point. They knew that any way. Well, then it flooded. They built the new Erik 
Ramstad … 
L.H.: Well, and then they lost Lincoln [Elementary] School. Perkett 
[Elementary School] was out for a while. And Ramstad. Longfellow 
[Elementary School]. I mean, all those schools that flooded. They had 
nowhere to put them. We flooded in June. School started in August. What 
was going to happen? 
 
Both L.H. (a vocal conservative) and C.P. (a vocal liberal) felt that much of the blame for 
the failure to provide adequately school space was due to the short-sightedness of Minot’s 
conservative taxpayers in rejecting bonds to fund school construction39:  
C.P.: The school board has made progress. But, you know, every time the 
school board has tried to make progress, they’ve been voted down 
completely. It’s the community. They don’t want to raise their taxes. 
L.H.: They don’t want our taxes to go up, because that’s what’s happening. 
You know, when they came out with that bond the people voted it down in 
December [2013] … What are they called … the old-timers. We need to kick 
the old-timers out because … 
C.P.: We’re not a progressive community. 
L.H.: We’re not progressing anywhere because they’re stuck in their own 
ways. 
 
Mark Vollmer, Minot Public Schools’ current superintendent, also felt that the 
community’s tax and spending aversions have stifled Minot’s attempted recovery from the 
flood due to the strong pressure they exerted that ultimately led to the city council slashing 
property tax rates after the flood. Vollmer, who felt that the school system would be in 
serious financial danger without the additional tax revenue created by oil-industry-related 
                                                 
39 Minot voters rejected a comprehensive $125,000,000 bond in December 2013 that would have built two 
new middle schools and a second high school. Voters did, however, accept a scaled down $40,000,000 
bond in May 2014 that solely covered the cost of two new elementary schools (Johnson, 2016). 
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construction40, argued that the chances of building either new elementary schools or a 
badly-needed second high school were extremely low given the strong antipathy voters 
had to any public projects: “This is coming from an older, conservative male, but we are 
not a progressive community. We seem to be nervous about growth … People say we’re 
trying to build the Taj Mahal. We just want a good school that won’t have the roof blow 
away every time the wind blows” (personal interview). Indeed, while Vollmer sympathized 
with struggling younger parents not wanting to pay extra taxes, he argued that apathy on 
the part of the city council and longer-term residents would ultimately push the school 
system to the breaking point:  
“We’ve lost over $2,000,000 just this year [2016] due to declining enrollment 
from people leaving town [due to layoffs/inability to find work], but we’re still 
at plus-1,600 kids since 2007 … A lot of people are just content to sit around 
and kick the can down the road. But if you sit around and make decisions, 
then the decisions are kind of made for you” (personal interview). 
 
 Another concern was for students who had already finished schooling (whether 
through graduation or dropping out) and a distinct lack of long-term career options that 
would motivate young Minoters to remain in the city as adults. B.H., the father who worried 
about his academically-disinclined son’s post-high school career prospects, argued that 
not enough was being done by the city government to attract non-service sector and non-
oil industry jobs for those without college degrees:  
                                                 
40 From 2011-2015, Minot collected an annual average of $213.3 million in building permit fees. The 
effects of the slowdown can be seen through figured for 2016-2017, in which an average of only $55 
million per year was collected. Although the dollar amount of building fees before 2011 is not readily 
available, the number of residential building permits issued from 2006-2010 was 344 per year, compared 
to 1,061 per year from 2011-2015 and 64 per year from 2016-2017 (Minot Chamber of Commerce, 2017). 
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It was just service industry, service industry, service industry. I don’t know 
if they were actually trying to bring in manufacturing or anything else. I don’t 
know if it was because they would go out and say, “We tried to bring a 
manufacturing plant,” but the manufacturing people would say, “No, we 
don’t wanna build there because all your blue collar workers can go and 
work in the oilfields. So, how are we gonna get people?” (personal focus 
group). 
B.H., who counted himself as lucky to have purchased a home before the boom when 
prices were low, also felt that such an opportunity would not be available to his son and 
other young residents due to the lack of middle class jobs outside of the oil industry 
(personal focus group). This was echoed by Y.P., who argued that many working class 
young people who would have been able to afford to live in Minot in the pre-boom days, 
were now unable to make ends meet due to being stuck in what she viewed as an over-
saturation of food service jobs: “they [business leaders in Minot] need to create an 
economic situation that benefits young people. And this being a town of hamburgers and 
hot dogs isn’t going to get you that … You need a livable wage so there’s an incentive to 
stay” (personal focus group). Similarly, John MacMartin of the Minot Chamber noted that 
while Minot (and the Bakken at large) has been successful in encouraging natives to 
return during the boom, workers in traditional blue collar jobs in construction and the 
military faced significant housing troubles due to competition from boom-enticed 
newcomers that did not exist prior to the oil boom:  
In many instances, they [Minot natives who had moved away] were 
amenable to the opportunities to come back and work in their chosen field 
at a salary commensurate to what they were making elsewhere. But 
especially for the unskilled labor, the ability to pay them enough that they 
could afford the housing became the real issue … And when they got here 
maybe there was no place to live (personal interview). 
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 In addition to concerns about blue collar employment, many respondents argued 
that there has been little to no effort to create white collar jobs, which were seen as key 
to stemming North Dakota’s longstanding reputation of suffering from brain drain (see 
section 4.3). C.P., the freelance IT consultant, noted that were it not for the increased 
demand that local telecom operators such as SRT (which previously employed both she 
and her husband) received from the oil and gas and construction agencies, her family 
would have likely migrated to either Fargo (home of a large Microsoft campus) or 
Minneapolis. Indeed, many of her friends in the tech industry had either left Minot for 
these locations or had gone to work directly for oil and gas companies in the Bakken, due 
to low wages in the tech industry. C.P., who has been trying in earnest for several years 
to create a public/private tech incubator in Minot, argued that IT and tech were not valued 
as highly as oil and gas41:  
This still isn’t a great place for IT. There’s not a lot of companies. There’s 
not a lot of great jobs. I think they got so used to paying a certain wage. 
Even when the oil companies were coming in and making this [high] wage, 
IT workers and managers and people in most industries were still kind of 
down here [lower wage] because businesses don’t want to pay what oil 
companies are paying (personal interview). 
This notion of oil and gas being the more valuable industry in Minot was also 
shared by L.A. However, L.A. felt that while not all white collar jobs needed to be based 
around oil and gas, without the prosperity the oil industry created, there would be no 
growth to support such jobs for locals in other industries and therefore no reason for 
                                                 
41 C.P. and her husband ultimately did leave Minot in the fall of 2017, as they could not find enough 
clients to support their tech startup. 
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college-educated Minoters to remain in town: “I think Minot State [local 4-year-college] 
does a reasonably good job [preparing students for the work force] … But, we’re not going 
to keep those talented people unless we have a growing industry. And right now we’re 
not having it” (personal interview). J.A. also echoed L.A.’s concerns, noting that if he were 
“a parent with a college kid right now” he would encourage his children to look for 
opportunities outside of Minot due to the city’s up-and-down economic trajectory. 
This up-and-down trajectory and the city’s unwillingness to invest in infrastructure 
and services that might alleviate it was another major point of contention among 
respondents. While many respondents felt that overall Minot was a much better place as 
a result of oil boom-related economic growth, they believed that the city was unwilling to 
spend its newfound tax wealth on necessary improvements due to lingering fears of 
becoming financially insolvent in the event of an extended low-price downturn. J.S., the 
pastor’s son, felt that such notions were overly cautious and argued that if Minot wanted 
to maintain, and ultimately improve, upon its newfound prosperity and positive reputation, 
members of the city government would need to buck their spending-averse ways in order 
to serve the city’s expanding population:  
There doesn’t seem to be any planning. If we go fully bust, we don’t want to 
be affected as badly as others [Bakken cities such as Williston] have been 
… We need general non-oil infrastructure. We need police and fire and a 
new hospital. We need resources for job seekers. If oil is low, we may not 
need these things as much. If oil is high again, quite frankly, we’ve made 
our billions and we can afford it. If not, then we should have picked better 
leaders for our city (personal interview). 
Many other respondents largely agreed with J.S.’s criticism, although they 
generally felt that the problem wasn’t a lack of spending, but funding of bad projects at 
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inopportune times. L.H. felt that Minot’s development was being held back by the city’s 
myopic focus on catering to the oil industry and its wealthier, out-of-state employees, 
especially in their overbuilding of hotels and upscale housing developments. She argued 
that the city was misusing the MAGIC Fund (a tax-funded economic development fund)  
to lure large corporations (which she felt often failed to deliver on promises of creating 
permanent jobs) at the expense of community projects such as parks and recreation and 
the city’s chronically-troubled recycling plant (personal interview). This pattern of local 
elites being enthralled with the oil industry at the expense of community-based 
businesses and organizations was furthered by J.O., a business professor and regional 
development strategist who has conducted several economic growth studies for the City 
of Minot. J.O. argued that despite oil raising North Dakota’s national profile, Minot has 
been unable to attract significant non-oil investment due to local investors being scared 
off by bad memories of the 1980s oil bust and out-of-state investors viewing the Bakken 
as, “a mining colony on the moon.” This lack of a concrete growth engine thus forced the 
city government to rely almost completely on the oil industry and support businesses 
(especially hotels) for revenue, as they were unwilling to take risks on projects that may 
not yield immediate growth (personal interview). This hotel-centric development strategy 
was seen as a foolish gamble by many elderly respondents who believed that the boom 
had already reached its zenith, with J.A. accusing developers of “panic building”, S.M. 
questioning the logic of stockpiling hotel space for a non-existent future boom and L.L. 
referring to 2012 (in which 12 hotels were constructed) as, “the year I could not believe” 
(personal interviews). 
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While this incredulity on the part of older residents about supposedly shortsighted 
growth strategies could easily be passed off as the idle grumbling of curmudgeons, 
respondents of all ages felt that the city government and business community’s rush to 
capitalize on the oil boom (through both aggressive recruitment of oil and gas businesses 
and through spending on industry priorities such as the airport expansion) had had a 
negative impact on the agricultural industry, which residents felt was frequently put at a 
disadvantage due to competition with the wealthier and higher-paying oil industry. 
Superintendent Vollmer, who is himself a part-time farmer, argued that by focusing so 
much on creating a favorable economic environment for the oil and gas industry and its 
allies in the construction and transportation sectors,, the Minot city government and the 
city’s business class had neglected the needs of agricultural producers, whom he felt had 
been hurt badly by labor and transport competition from the oil and gas industry. Vollmer 
argued that agriculture had been fundamental to Minot’s successes long before oil (and 
he argued, would remain so after oil extraction was no longer viable) and thus, “needs to 
be embraced.” Similarly, L.A., who grew up on a farm near Bismarck, felt that while oil 
had certainly been important for North Dakota during the past decade, it was, in fact, the 
agrochemical revolution and resultant increased yields in the 1990s that had fueled North 
Dakota’s success in “the capitalistic adventure” before anyone in North Dakota had ever 
heard of fracking (personal interview).42 This rugged, individualist image of the savvy 
prairie farmer was also nurtured by B.T., who argued that despite western North Dakota 
                                                 
42 The veracity of this claim is disputable.  While North Dakota usually ranks first or second in annual wheat 
production, production in the state has decreased dramatically since its all-time peak in 1992. Per acre 
yields, however, have increased dramatically in the past 25 years (North Dakota Wheat Commission, 2018). 
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being a historically depressed area, it was the farmer who, “supplied us either in good 
times or bad times.” B.T. went on to posit that while boosters in state and local 
government and the business community felt the oil boom was the vehicle through which   
the Bakken would be permanently lifted out of poverty, many more traditional residents, 
himself included, felt that the boom’s negative lifestyle changes (rising cost of housing, 
fear for one’s personal safety, traffic, etc.) outweighed any economic gains and that these 
residents would openly welcome a reversion to this previous depressed, yet “secure” 
state (personal interview).43 
 Thus, to summarize this section, while there were a variety of respondent 
viewpoints as to what sort of future Minot should pursue beyond being a boomtown, nearly 
all respondents felt that a broadening of the city’s economy beyond oil and beyond the 
service and manual-labor sectors would be a necessary pre-requisite for forging this new 
identity. Indeed, while there were clearly differences of opinion as to whether a return to 
Minot’s pre-boom landscape was desirable, there was a general consensus that any 
boom or post-boom prosperity would need to leveraged to make Minot a desirable place 
to live and work for both young and old, rich and poor, and conservative or progressive 
alike. Achieving this would require a re-orientation away from the city’s overly cautious 
approach to budgeting and general reticence to make bold decisions. 
 
                                                 
43 It should be noted that while many respondents waxed nostalgic about the supposedly better quality of 
life that existed before the boom, B.T. and a fellow Know It All, R.S., were the only respondents in the 
sample who openly stated that they wished the boom had not happened. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 The changes that Minot has faced as a result of oil and gas-related economic and 
population growth can be summarized as follows: (1) its physical and infrastructural 
landscape has been radically transformed to meet the needs of its (post-)industrial 
landscape organized around the oil and gas industry; (2) the political economic and 
technological shifts that have enabled the city’s transformation have also led to dramatic, 
and often discomforting, changes in its sociocultural milieu; and (3) recent disruptions in 
the form of flooding (physical) and the post-2015 price-related downturn (economic) have 
served to simultaneously punctuate both Minot’s newfound growth and social equilibria. 
However, despite the major changes in the city’s economic character, this chapter argues 
that contestation over moral and community values has been most important to 
determining Minot’s boomtown (or more recently, busttown) identity. This debate has 
been of particular importance to this study’s respondents, all of whom are longer-term 
(more than five years) residents of Minot with longstanding social and identity ties to the 
city that predate the fracking boom. Indeed, while all respondents had strong opinions on 
the city’s physical and economic changes (with some being personally affected by boom 
and bust cycles), the greatest anxiety was expressed in regard to boom-related changes 
to deep-seated cultural norms, especially the rapid changes that occurred as a result of 
the above-mentioned punctures. Furthermore, many respondents viewed changes in the 
economic landscape as direct reflections of a community values shift that created the 
political atmosphere that privileges the oil and gas and service industries over more 
traditional industries such as agriculture. Thus, for at least one segment of Minot’s 
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population from which this study draws (longer-term permanent residents, whose 
livelihoods are mostly not directly entangled with oil and gas), boomtown disruption has 
been largely a sociocultural, rather than an economic, phenomenon. 
In light of existing literatures on ethnographic studies of fracking boomtowns (2.3), 
this chapter serves as a counterpoint to the over-represented activist framing that is 
common in studies from plays such as the Marcellus (PA), Barnett (TX) and Niobrara 
(CO) shales. Building on analysis from Chapter 4 (Homo Dakoticus), data analyzed for 
this chapter showed a clear preference among respondents for community values of 
respect, mutual assistance and against divisive political and personal behavior.  When 
this is considered in concert with respondents being drawn from a longer-term population 
without a significant personal stake in the success of the oil industry and which has largely 
avoided many of the negative economic, environmental and health aspects related to 
proximity to extraction (each of which have been identified in 2.3 as key reasons why local 
residents turn against fracking), it becomes clear that activism is an unlikely response. 
Indeed, activism would be seen as counterproductive given the optimism respondents 
expressed about harnessing boom revenues and reputational benefits in order to spur 
positive urban development for an inevitable post-fracking future. 
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
 This chapter frames the findings of this dissertation in terms of the relevant 
literatures. First, this chapter will review the key findings from each of the dissertation’s 
substantive chapters (4, 5 and 6). Second, this chapter will examine the dissertation’s 
contributions to literatures on geographies of energy and natural resources, social 
science studies of fracking and case studies of environmental subjectivities in extractive 
landscapes that were introduced in the literature review (chapter 2). Finally, this chapter 
will discuss future research possibilities on fracking in the Bakken. 
7.2 Key findings 
7.2.1 Homo Dakoticus 
 Chapter 4 employed elite-actor interviews and participant observation to analyze 
efforts by political and business elites to create a pro-oil ideology and subjectivity among 
North Dakota’s population. This chapter built on the Homo Energeticus/Homo Alberticus 
literatures to argue that a particular pro-oil subjectivity has emerged in North Dakota, 
which I called Homo Dakoticus. The Homo Dakoticus ideology frames fracking as 
consistent with North Dakota’s existing societal values system. Elites have promoted 
fracking as a normal facet of free-market development. Specifically, elites have 
incorporated pro-oil rhetoric within existing discourses centered on North Dakota’s 
traditional character as a state which prioritizes “common sense” approaches to economic 
organization and governance over unproven, potentially complicated approaches. The 
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three major discursive themes explored in this chapter were: 1.) the North Dakota Way; 
2.) North Dakota exceptionalism; and 3.) resiliency. 
 The North Dakota Way is a behavioral code that emphasizes patriotism, tried-and-
true economic approaches and individual sacrifice for the greater good. This chapter 
discovered that oil and gas elites used the Way to argue that fracking-led development is 
compatible with North Dakota’s existing cultural and economic landscapes as it produces 
immediate and tangible economic results and promotes widespread prosperity for 
economically depressed Bakken communities. Moreover, the Way was assigned causal 
power, as elites argued that North Dakota’s welcoming, business-friendly environment - 
which allowed the oil and gas industry to succeed - was a natural outgrowth of citizens’ 
devotion to the tenets of the Way. Additionally, this chapter found that elites used the Way 
to frame opposition to extraction as inappropriate. Fracking opponents were cast as 
directly violating North Dakotans’ preference for consensus and community cohesion over 
contentious debates that have the potential to destabilize the successful economic 
conditions that oil and gas has produced. 
 American exceptionalism is the belief that the United States and the American 
people are exceptional when compared to other countries and other populations. I posited 
that a particular variant of this ideology – Dakota exceptionalism – can be found among 
North Dakotans regarding their own exceptional status when compared to other states. 
This chapter found that political and oil and gas elites view North Dakota as doubly-
exceptional due to both the tremendous resources of the Bakken and the state’s highly-
educated, hardworking and moral population. (Notably, other states are said to be jealous 
of this characteristic.) The careful investment of the gains from the Bakken, these elites 
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argue, is yielding new opportunities that allow for the state’s tremendous human capital 
to be used in the most efficient way. In what can best be described as hubris, an oil and 
gas lobbyist described these intertwined blessings of Bakken and citizen as the driving 
forces behind the revitalization of rural America. Thus, this chapter determined that 
appeals to Dakota exceptionalism serve to flatter North Dakota’s population with the goal 
of normalizing the Bakken as an indispensable part of what makes Dakota - and Dakotans 
- exceptional. 
 In the case of North Dakota, resiliency refers to the supposedly exceptional 
toughness that North Dakotans possess, which grants them the ability to endure and 
recover from any hardship they may face. This stereotype is derived from the purported 
moral and physical toughening North Dakota homesteaders endured in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. This chapter discovered that the resiliency stereotype was used by 
policy elites to convince the public of the importance of supporting the oil and gas industry 
despite any negative externalities that it might produce. Indeed, this point was 
emphasized by elites during the 2015-2016 production slowdown to convince North 
Dakotans that the sluggish economy and rising crime were only temporary setbacks. 
Residents would be rewarded with a stronger economy if they were able to remain patient 
and prepare themselves for a higher-price environment. Thus, this chapter determined 
that resiliency was successful both because it appealed to founding myths that resonated 
in a traditional state and because it helped to soothe anxieties about the permanence of 
oil and gas during a period when many residents were skeptical of its long-term validity. 
 Overall, the key findings from Chapter 4 can be summarized as follows. First, Oil 
and gas elites combined pro-oil rhetoric with existing ideologies and discourses that 
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support capitalism and patriotism and discourage activism against government and the 
business sector. Second, attempts to create the Homo Dakoticus functioned through 
appeals to North Dakotan individual importance in protecting the oil industry (and by 
extension American national security), thus providing a personal connection between 
residents and the oil and gas industry. Third, pro-oil discourses depicted fracking-led 
development as a natural extension of North Dakotans productivist economic tradition, 
thus providing the impression for North Dakotans that support for the industry is rational 
whereas opposition is both irrational and contrary to established tradition. The discourses 
underpinning the Homo Dakoticus subject position were used as a baseline to evaluate 
further discourses used by editorial writers (Chapter 5) and by Minot’s longer-term 
residents.   
7.2.2 Bakken newspaper editorial analysis 
  Chapter 5 built on previous studies that examined newspaper coverage of fracking 
and related development. Despite providing a foundation for discourse-based studies of 
fracking, these studies have largely ignored editorial coverage and have not addressed 
the Bakken. Therefore, this chapter sought to contribute to this literature by focusing on 
editorials and letters-to-the editor written in five North Dakota newspapers, 4 of which are 
published in communities in the Bakken. Following a purposive sampling procedure (see 
3.6.2), this chapter focused on two highly-contested topics highly relevant to the Bakken’s 
oil and gas industry: 1.) Measure 5 (M5), a defeated 2014 state-wide ballot measure that 
would have allowed to oil production tax revenue to be spent on conservation projects; 
and 2.) The Keystone XL pipeline (KXL) and its role in both the Bakken and the United 
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States as a whole.  (The KXL route does not include North Dakota, but existing portions 
of the Keystone system pass through Eastern North Dakota). The articles were separated 
into two categories: pro-industry positions (M5 opposition and KXL support) and anti-
industry positions (M5 support and KXL opposition). 
 This chapter found that both M5-supportive and M5-oppositional writers framed 
their arguments in terms of the effects the amendment would have on North Dakota’s 
rural and outdoor heritage, private property rights, and agricultural economy. M5 
opponents aggressively opposed the measure, relying on emotionally-charged 
arguments to make their case. They argued that allowing M5 would disadvantage rural 
landowners and recreational users by placing needless and expensive restrictions on how 
land could be used and by whom. Writers felt that such restrictions would go against the 
state’s longstanding tradition of property-owner decision making and would allow well-
funded, out-of-state environmentalist groups to purchase large tracts of land that would 
then be taken out of productivist use.  
In contrast, M5 supporters avoided emotional appeals, employing fact-based 
arguments that emphasized the minimal disruption the measure would cause. M5 
supporters argued that the measure would, in fact, improve outdoor heritage, property 
rights, and farming by allowing landowners a greater number of options for land 
management in collaboration with state agencies. Contrary to M5 opponents, supporters 
argued that the conservationist ethic behind the measure was fully in line with the state’s 
land-management traditions and would help to honor the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt, 
a cherished political icon within North Dakota. This chapter concluded that M5 opponents 
were ultimately unsuccessful in their strategy as they expended more energy on 
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attempting to refute opponents’ arguments than in crafting an effective narrative of their 
own. 
Whereas both supporters and opponents of M5 developed the same themes in 
their arguments, supporters and .opponents of KXL emphasized different issues in 
arguing their cases. Supporters sought to frame the pipeline as a rational, economically 
sound decision with little inherent risk, whereas opponents argued against the pipeline on 
social and environmental justice grounds. KXL supporters (pro-industry position) framed 
KXL as a logical necessity for a nation seeking to build on the prosperity that increased 
North American oil and gas production has created. They argued that not only were there 
few environmental or economic risks associated with the pipeline, but that the pipeline 
was critical for improving national security by strengthening an American alliance with 
Canada (a friendly exporter of fossil fuels, unlike Russia or OPEC nations). Additionally, 
supporters leaned strongly on the notion that KXL would carry Bakken crude alongside 
the tar sands (something not guaranteed), thus making the pipeline another vehicle for 
economic growth within the state. 
KXL opponents, however, sought to emphasize the inherent dangers that the 
pipeline presented for property rights, national security and environmental contamination. 
Writers were particularly concerned about KXL more than other pipelines, as it would 
carry heaver, more toxic oil sands, rather than conventional oil, which they argued made 
the pipeline more likely to cause widespread contamination in the event of an accident. 
Additionally, writers felt that the pipeline was a net negative for national security as it 
would largely carry Canadian (and not Bakken) oil, much of which, they argued, would be 
destined for eventual export, thus robbing American consumers of any benefits. Other 
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writers were animated by property rights issues, arguing that rural landowners were being 
treated unfairly in eminent domain cases and that the pipeline represented a significant 
challenge to tribal sovereignty. Finally, KXL opponents sought to argue that politicians 
supporting the pipeline were fully aware of the aforementioned risks, but were supporting 
the pipeline due to either campaign contributions from oil and gas interests or were 
concerned that voting against the pipeline would cost them re-election. 
In summary, three key discoveries were made about the ways in which editorial 
writers approached these two issues. First, writers taking pro-industry positions were 
more likely than those taking anti-industry positions to frame their arguments in terms of 
economic gains and losses that would result from M5 of KXL. Second, anti-industry 
writers were far more concerned than pro-industry writers about social and environmental 
impacts of the two proposals. Finally, those taking pro-industry positions were far more 
likely to adopt an aggressive, argumentative tone in their editorials than were anti-industry 
writers who expended effort on trying to debunk conservative talking points and to 
demonstrate the factual merits of their proposal. This style often led to editorials that were 
straightforward, factual presentations when compared with those of pro-industry writers 
who sought to place their arguments within a personal, narrative framework that sought 
to connect these issues to deeply held cultural traditions. Although it cannot be 
determined what effect editorials had on influencing public opinion, the nearly 4-to-1 
defeat of M5 during the 2014 election suggests that the pro-industry arguments were at 
least somewhat persuasive. 
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7.2.3 Minot residents’ views on the oil boom 
 Chapter 6 employed interviews and focus groups conducted with longer-term (five 
or more year) residents of Minot, the financial and transportation hub of the Bakken. This 
chapter argued that discourses used by respondents to discuss the current oil boom 
mirror those used in previous industrial agricultural booms throughout Minot’s 140 year 
history. This chapter served as a counterpoint to activist-focused case studies of fracking 
by focusing on residents who are neither directly involved with or directly harmed or 
enriched by the oil industry. One discovery was that respondents did not directly blame 
the oil and gas industry for negative externalities that have occurred during the oil boom, 
choosing instead to cast emerging issues as outgrowths of longstanding cultural and 
economic issues that predate the boom. The three most prominent “outward discourses” 
that residents emphasized were: 1.) the relationship between boom-related population 
growth and its strains on the housing market, especially in the wake of the devastating 
2011 Souris River Flood; 2.) the decline of moral values and increase in crime during the 
boom; and 3.) ruminations on Minot’s future after oil and gas is no longer the city’s primary 
economic driver. These outward discourses were viewed as emblematic of unspoken 
“inward discourses” that underlie much of respondents’ openly expressed grievances. 
These inward discourses were: 1.) the privilege that the oil boom affords longer-term 
residents and older, more established residents with secure employment and lifestyles; 
2.) who or what deserves blame for negative boom externalities; 3.) the role of oil-derived 
revenue in creating a post-oil future; and 4.) the specific political culture of Minot and 
North Dakota that discourages contentious debates and supports community cohesion. 
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 This chapter discovered that respondents viewed flood recovery as the most 
important issue facing Minot more than 4 years after the fact (interviews were conducted 
between August 2015 and August 2016). Respondents argued that the aftermath of the 
flood, which destroyed a third of the city’s housing stock, was made worse due to housing 
competition from the oil and gas industry, which made rental costs unaffordable for Minot 
residents without high-paying oil industry jobs. While some critics blamed unscrupulous 
landlords – whom they argued used oil industry wages as cover for price gouging - for the 
city’s housing and flood recovery woes, the majority of respondents argued that were it 
not for the influx of money and the demand for new businesses and construction that 
accompanied the oil boom, Minot would not have been able to make any significant 
recovery. Critics in this camp argued that it was, in fact, the city government that was to 
blame for the city’s housing shortage and incomplete recovery due to its overzealous 
efforts to cater to the oil and gas industry, which resulted in the needs of Minot’s existing 
population being ignored. Thus, the outward housing and flood troubles discourse leaned 
heavily on the inward blame discourse, seeking to assign responsibility not to the oil and 
gas industry, but to landlords and the city government who sought to prioritize the needs 
of the oil industry over those of longer-term residents in order to maximize profit. 
 Respondents argued that while the oil boom had coincided with a rise in crime, it 
was individual criminals and their lack of morals that were responsible rather than the oil 
and gas industry or its actions. This chapter found that respondents were suspicious of 
in-migrants from outside of North Dakota, whom respondents believed did not share their 
culture or their moral values. In particular, it was found that outsiders were viewed as 
being unfriendly and not interested in helping their fellow community members, unwilling 
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to work hard and as possessing permissive, “big city” attitudes towards sex and drugs. 
Respondents argued that it was this incompatibility with Minot’s existing conservative, 
community-minded culture – as well as unwillingness to embrace North Dakota’s slower-
paced, simpler lifestyle – that caused respondents to engage in reckless and/or criminal 
behavior. Additionally, respondents felt that in-migrants, many of whom conspicuously 
flaunted their oil employment wealth, were a negative influence on Minot’s under-30 
population, whom respondents argued were unwilling to work hard or focus on the 
education necessary to get jobs outside of the oil industry, which was seen as prone to 
hirings and firings due to changes in oil prices. Thus, while the crime and morality outward 
discourse was, like housing and the flood, animated by the inward blame discourse, the 
privilege discourse also played a major role as older, more economically secure 
respondents cast themselves as guardians of morality and right thinking. 
 However, much of this sanctimony disappeared when respondents addressed 
Minot’s potential post-oil future. Respondents argued that the city would need to use tax 
revenue collected from the economic boom in order to invest in the infrastructure needed 
to make Minot comparable to its peer cities such as Fargo and Minneapolis, both of which 
have been successful in transitioning from industrial/agricultural to knowledge 
economies. The most important aspects of this transition, respondents argued, would be 
investments from the city government to improve the city’s schools and aggressive 
lobbying to attract businesses outside of the oil industry, military and service sectors, 
which were seen as crucial to providing a future for young people in Minot. Respondents 
felt that this would require a fundamental shift away from Minot’s low-tax, spending-
averse culture (on the part of both city government and conservative voters alike), which 
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they argued was the reason for Minot’s 50-year economic stagnation that preceded the 
Bakken boom. Thus, not only was the oil industry considered blameless, but it was viewed 
as the vehicle through which improvements for the post-oil future could be funded. 
 In summary, chapter 6 identified outward discourses, none of which sought to 
blame oil directly, and underlying discourses, which show context in which lack of 
denunciations of the oil industry can be situated. In addition to the privilege, blame and 
post-oil discourses, North Dakota’s political culture of consensus-based politics and 
community cohesion encouraged residents to avoid denouncing the oil industry directly 
or to advocate for radical political change. Indeed, the harshest political criticisms of the 
city government – which has always been Republican dominated – were from self-
identified conservatives, who argued that politicians had become addicted to oil industry 
money and had lost sight of Minot’s “real” priorities. Thus, this chapter found that fracking-
led development in Minot did not inspire activism, due to both strong political and cultural 
traditions discouraging such behavior and the view that economic outcomes of the boom 
were desirable. 
7.3 Connections between key findings and existing literature 
 This dissertation is situated broadly within three bodies of literature: geographies 
of resources and energy, social science studies of fracking and environmental 
subjectivities in extractive landscapes. The three key gaps that this study sought to 
remedy were: 1.) The paucity of case studies of fossil fuels in geographies of resources 
and energy; 2.) The lack of effective connection between local extractive outcomes and 
broader-scale discourses and economic processes; 3.) The lack of engagement with 
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subjectivities theory in fracking case studies and related over-reliance on the boomtown 
sociology framework. This subsection examines how this dissertation’s three substantive 
chapters addressed these gaps and how these findings contribute to these three bodies 
of literature. 
7.3.1 Geographies of fossil fuels 
 Within geographies of energy, the majority of case study research has been 
focused on either non-energy extractive landscapes or on renewable-energy landscapes. 
This work has provided a framework for examining how local cultural and political 
economic conditions impact on-the-ground outcomes of development across spaces and 
scales, but with few exceptions researchers have not applied this same vigor to 
landscapes of fossil fuels. Studies of fracking landscapes are especially scarce. This 
dissertation has partially remedied this issue by examining the localized outcomes of 
fracking in the Bakken Shale. Building on work by scholars working in renewable energy 
landscapes such as Fast et al. (2016), Armstrong and Bulkeley (2014) and Devine-Wright 
(2009), this dissertation has found that the cultural milieu of Minot and North Dakota – in 
this case the ideology of the North Dakota Way – has a profound effect on how residents 
approach and interpret the effects of the Bakken oil boom in their daily lives. Indeed, 
resident’s attitudes to oil development are strongly tied to residents’ connection to their 
community and the perceived violation that extractive development and its externalities 
represent. This finding supports those of Fast et al. (2016) and Armstrong and Bulkeley 
(2014). However, where this study’s findings differed from renewables studies was in its 
discovery that the externalities were a challenge not only to landscape values or 
 294 
 
perceived economic changes, but also to residents strongly held moral framework. Boom-
related growth not only created new points of conflict, but also exacerbated many 
festering community issues that were seen as deeply connected to both moral and 
political economic issues. Thus, these findings have more in common with research on 
non-energy extractive landscapes through new economic logics (LeClerc & Keeling, 
2015; Foley, Mather & Neis, 2015), which have found that re-invigorating depleted 
landscapes (with Minot serving as a strong example due to its post-1960 economic 
stagnation) is as much about changes to values systems as it is about introducing new 
economic mechanisms. 
 This dissertation also makes contributions to literature in geographies of energy 
focused on neo-extractivism. While research in this subcategory has traditionally focused 
on the Latin American context, this dissertation has discovered similarities in the Bakken 
context that connect with themes from the literature. First, this dissertation found that the 
state plays a significant role in creating ideology with the goal of convincing local 
populations of the economic, political and even moral imperative behind extraction, similar 
to reports of Valdivia (2015) and Obeng-Odoom (2014). Second, many of the neo-
extractive discourses regarding extraction as a method for overcoming large-scale 
economic and political problems, described by Davidov (2013) and van Teijlingen (2016) 
are also present in the Bakken. Scholars have reported that in Latin America extraction 
is seen as a way to resist the negative aspects of globalization, American imperialism and 
the financial crises seen as inherent to neoliberalism (Ruckert, McDonald, & Proulx, 
2017); in North Dakota, elites and ordinary respondents frame extraction as the blessing 
that allowed North Dakota to beat the Great Recession and as a vehicle for the creation 
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of future diverse in economies in rural areas that have undergone decades of decline. 
This dissertation suggests the usefulness of applying neo-extractivism to first world 
contexts, much as McCarthy (2002) and others have done for political ecology more 
broadly. 
 Building specifically on the work done in Matthew Huber’s Lifeblood (2013) this 
dissertation contextualizes oil-related development in North Dakota within broader 
political and ideological questions such as the role of oil in maintaining/destabilizing 
national security, the need for fossil fuels to maintain the lifestyles of North Dakotans and 
the prosperity of the state’s economy. Such themes can be seen in the dissertation’s 
analysis of the Homo Dakoticus subjectivity and accompanying ideology the North Dakota 
Way (chapter 4), which place a premium on upholding the stereotypical American values 
of freedom, patriotism and private property identified by Huber as necessary for 
maintaining the high-consumption status quo under post-WWII carbon capitalism. Indeed, 
North Dakota’s present political culture, which is guided by the ethos of avoiding 
contentious debates, confirms Huber’s notion of suburban and rural portions of the United 
States located away from the East and West Coasts as laboratories for, “the construction 
of a kind neopeasantry where politics often becomes constrained within “narrow limits” 
focused on the family, private property, and anticollectivist sentiments” (p. 79). However, 
this dissertation differs from Huber’s analysis by moving beyond a general American 
notion of the role of oil as lifeblood by examining the role of oil in structuring life in a 
specific site presently experiencing the effects of oil extraction. Such an approach moves 
beyond examining the purportedly widespread attitudes of a nebulous “American” public 
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to examining the specific subjectivities produced by the re-organization of life in Minot in 
order to capitalize on the benefits of the oil industry’s expanding presence in North 
Dakota. While this study validates many of Huber’s core findings, it also seeks to test how 
the broader processes that Huber and other geographers of energy have elucidated, with 
the results of this testing summarized in the following subsection (7.3.2). 
7.3.2 Connecting Local outcomes to extra-local processes 
 Within each of the three bodies of literature, most studies either focus on 
examining geopolitical issues or public opinion at the macro scale or on localized effects 
of extraction. However, the two approaches are seldom combined and insights from one 
approach are often not applied to the other. This dissertation addresses this issue by 
examining the role of ideology and both elite and formal discourses in informing debates 
about fracking in the Bakken, as well as in informing experiences with and opinions about 
development at the local level in Minot. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, while 
local case studies in both geographies of energy and in social studies of extraction more 
broadly often do well in exploring the relationships between development outcomes and 
local cultures, these studies often do not explain how the culture has evolved over time 
or the ways in which contemporary processes and events have altered a culture that is 
often assumed to be static.   
This study specifically demonstrates the ways in which discourses introduced in 
chapters 4 and 5 have influenced the fracking debate in Minot and led to changes in 
Minot’s local culture (chapter 6). Additionally, this dissertation has found that while local 
outcomes cannot be cast as mere variations of one-size-fits-all policy making and 
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application of economic logics, broader political economic trends were seen as the major 
causal factor as to the development of the Bakken from 2007-present. Indeed, 
respondents often cited how important they believed the Bakken to be in global 
geopolitics and how the Bakken downturn was largely the result not of local conditions, 
but of downturn’s in the global oil market. Thus, this dissertation demonstrates the gains 
that can be made from integrating data gleaned from geopolitical studies of fracking with 
on the ground case studies, a model which several authors working in Australia (Mercer, 
de Rijke, & Dressler, 2014) and the Bakken  (Caraher and Conway, 2016) have already 
attempted. 
7.3.3 Connecting theory to fracking case studies 
 A model for integrating environmental subjectivities theories within ethnographic 
studies of energy and natural resources can be found in research on renewable energies 
(Jepson, Brannstrom, & Persons, 2012; Singh, 2013), traditional extractive industries 
(Abrahamson & Somerville, 2007; Quist & Rinne, 2017) and in neo-extractive contexts 
(Davidov, 2013; Holterman, 2014). However, with the exception of notable studies from 
the Marcellus Shale (Hudgins, 2013; Filteau, 2015) and Australia (Mercer, de Rijke, & 
Dressler, 2014), case studies of fracking have largely not engaged with literature on 
subjectivities. Many fracking studies are overly reliant on the boomtown sociology 
framework to the exclusion of other bodies of theory. 
 Much of the work in the boomtown sociology framework seeks to gauge how the 
existing cultural and economic milieus in new fracking landscapes is disrupted through 
the introduction of fracking and its attendant externalities. However, the major flaws of 
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studies employing this model are twofold: 1.) the specific cultures and livelihoods that are 
being disrupted are often not fully interrogated or explained by study authors; 2.) the same 
patterns of disruption are found in far different cultural and political contexts; and 3.) 
disruption is often not explicitly defined, thus it becomes a subjective judgment made by 
both researcher and respondent as to what it constitutes. Indeed, as mentioned in 2.3, 
the boomtown sociology framework appears to have a limiting effect on the type of 
questions that researchers are willing to ask, as they appear focused on trying to keep 
their studies within the boundaries of the framework, which was originally devised for 
examining traditional resource booms during the 1970s.  
To remedy these issues, this dissertation specifically sought to critically examine 
and explain the particular cultural and economic cultures of Minot and to explain how 
disruption have been conditioned by that very culture, rather than viewing disruption as a 
type of endogenous shock to an unwitting community unprepared for negative 
externalities.44 This study found that respondents were highly aware of the relationship 
between political and economic institutions in North Dakota and various Bakken cities. 
Respondents were able to easily articulate how the situation in Minot was different than 
that of neighboring Williston – or more broadly between the Bakken and other shale plays 
– and were able to connect these changes to specific cultural and policy differences 
between these locales. Thus, while research for this dissertation was not specifically 
designed to refute the conclusions of the boomtown sociology approach, data collected 
                                                 
44 This type of argument is well represented by Schafft et al.’s (2014) study on the Marcellus and Theodori 
and Ellis’ (2017) recent study on the Eagle Ford Shale, which both depicted rural political elites as 
unprepared for and overwhelmed by a host of entirely predictable externalities such as infrastructure, 
budgeting and crime that have been identified as hallmarks of boomtown development. 
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showed that the traditional boomtown model of coherent disruptions to a static community 
largely does not apply in Minot. 
 However, it is not just boomtown sociology studies that suffer from a lack of 
engagement with subjectivity theory. Many studies examining anti-fracking activism seek 
to define what specific grievances activists have with fracking and their motivations for 
becoming involved in activism (Kinchy, 2017; Haggerty & McBride, 2016). While authors 
often argue that such motivations are based on the supposed violation of individuals’ 
safety and security, they do not make significant efforts to understand why specific 
individuals feel violated and how these feelings of violation differ from person-to-person, 
an area in which subjectivity theory could be a useful interpretive tool.45 This issue is 
remedied by fracking case studies framed around trauma experienced by respondents 
(Perry, 2012; Davidson, 2017, among many others), which have used various theories of 
trauma from disciplines as varied as sociology and management studies in order to study 
the mental and emotional tolls of development. This dissertation builds on the models 
employed by these studies and extends them to the Bakken, finding that respondents’ 
grievances are often a deeply personal matter related to their individual encounters and 
experiences with fracking-related development. Additionally, this dissertation has found 
that trauma for Minot respondents has been solely of the emotional kind, especially in 
relation to older respondents’ views about the supposed collapse of Minot’s traditional 
values system. Thus, this dissertation contributes to case studies of subjectivity in 
                                                 
45 A notable exception to this is Willow and Keefer’s (2015) study of activist women in Ohio, which is 
specifically informed by feminist conceptions of the subject. 
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fracking landscapes by moving beyond both the limiting boomtown sociology framework 
as well as building on existing studies focusing on trauma. This dissertation specifically 
integrates questions about moral values alongside traditional notions of disruption, a 
model which is already prevalent in case studies of renewable that specifically take 
subjectivity into consideration (Singh, 2013; Newberry, 2013). 
7.4 Policy implications of research findings 
 In addition to the academic implications of this dissertation’s findings, these 
findings also have the potential to influence policy decisions on the part of three separate 
stakeholder groups: 1.) Oil and gas elites (discussed in detail in Chapter 4); 2.) Ordinary, 
non-involved residents (discussed in detail in Chapter 6); and 3.) Residents engaged in 
activism against the oil and gas industry (a group only briefly discussed in section 3.6.1). 
 This research would be of interest to oil and gas elites due to the dissertation’s 
findings about the validity of elite discursive strategies in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Specifically, 
these findings demonstrate the effectiveness of invoking the North Dakota Way in order 
to engender pro-oil sentiments among the North Dakota populace. This effectiveness can 
be seen in chapters 5 and 6, in which industry-specific talking points form the basis of 
much discussion and debate regarding the role of fracking and the industry in North 
Dakota. A specific example of the effectiveness of this elite rhetorical strategy can be 
found in chapter 6, in which residents are loathe to directly criticize the oil industry for 
negative externalities that have resulted from fracking-led development. Thus, such 
results would provide confirmation for elites that their strategy has proved successful. 
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 Additionally, several elite interviewees expressed interest in seeing the results of 
this dissertation due to their desire to better understand the opinions of non-elite residents 
regarding the oil and gas industry. The findings of this dissertation (specifically those from 
chapter 6) provide a particular window into the mindset of such a group of residents in 
Minot, a key city for Bakken administration. Therefore, elites could use these findings in 
order to devise a new strategy to specifically appeal to these residents’ concerns. This 
could be of particular benefit to local policy makers in Minot, due to the very specific 
grievances residents expressed regarding the ineffectiveness of the city government. 
 Dissertation findings will be of interest to ordinary residents (such as those 
interviewed for chapter 6) due to their providing a baseline of knowledge about the oil and 
gas boom and its relationship to the broader history of North Dakota and Minot 
specifically. These findings are one of the few existing resources which will allow readers 
to survey the opinions of a broad cross-section of local Bakken residents not directly 
involved in either the oil industry, regulation or government. Specifically, this compilation 
of findings will allow residents to gauge the opinions of their friends and neighbors 
regarding fracking-led development, with these findings being contextualized within the 
dissertation’s broader findings regarding industry-led attempts to influence fracking 
discourse in North Dakota. 
 Additionally, these findings are useful to residents as they provide specific insight 
about how the oil and gas boom has directly impacted Minot, a city often left out of media 
coverage or discussions about the Bakken boom in favor of broader political coverage or 
coverage of cities more directly impacted by extraction such as Williston. Indeed, a 
common complaint among respondents was that they felt both local and national news 
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were not providing adequate coverage of the boom’s impacts. This dissertation 
specifically catalogs discrete grievances that residents have with city government, thus 
these findings could be used by residents to appeal to the city government to implement 
positive changes. 
 Findings will be of interest to anti-fracking activist groups due to this dissertation 
having explored the rhetorical strategies employed by industry supporters and the effects 
that such approaches have had on influencing public opinion regarding fracking and the 
industry. In particular, the finding that elite-employed strategies have largely been 
successful (and conversely, that activist, anti-fracking discourses have largely been 
absent from debate) could provide activists with the motivation to create new strategies 
that work within the specific cultural framework present in North Dakota. Specifically, 
these dissertation findings demonstrate the hostility that many North Dakotans have 
towards environmentalist rhetoric, with fracking debates being chiefly focused on issues 
of private property and economic impacts. 
7.5 Future research directions 
 While this study has contributed to studies of ideology and subjectivity, 
newspapers analysis and case studies of fracking landscapes, field research and data 
analysis has uncovered several unexpected directions that are worthy of future research. 
The three main areas where this future research could be concentrated are: 1.) case 
studies of knowledge and institutions in the Bakken; 2.) a stronger, more integrated use 
of theory to describe social ecological transformations in the Bakken and North Dakota at 
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large; 3.) an exploration of the gender dimensions of the oil boom; and 4.) the integration 
of GIS and large-n surveys alongside case study approaches. 
 This study sought to examine how discourses, ideologies and subjectivities are 
produced at the elite level and how these are employed by individuals of varying 
backgrounds and how they structure debates and experiences of the Bakken oil boom. 
However, a deeper understanding of the laws and institutions that underpin many of these 
debates would be an important step forward toward creating a fully-fledged analysis of 
the role of the state in governing knowledge production and dissemination. Building on 
emerging work on the role of elite knowledge in oil industry governance (Asdal, 2014; 
Smith & Smith, 2018; Cumbers, Mackinnon, & Chapman, 2003) and emerging legal 
geographies of shale gas (Turton, 2015a, b; Andrews & McCarthy, 2014), future work 
could examine legal and policy documents related to energy and natural resource 
governance at the state, county and municipal levels. This study would also uncover the 
overlapping network of think tanks, research centers and oil and gas media outlets that 
produced much of the elite-level information about fracking. Additionally, as a 
counterpoint to elite knowledge production, future research in this vein would seek to 
examine how residents opposed to the oil and gas industry – especially the Native 
American community that has been most directly impacted by production – gather, 
interpret and produce knowledge and how this knowledge is used to inform protest. This 
research, then, would also contribute directly to the activist framing (Simonelli, 2014; 
Pearson, 2013) that this dissertation explicitly neglected. 
 Despite attempting to explicitly examine subjectivity production and its relationship 
to understanding of localized extraction, this dissertation did not engage directly with 
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foundational work in environmental subjectivity (Luke, 1995; Agrawal, 2005; Robbins, 
2007) or with the work of subjectivity theorists such as Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and 
Louis Althusser. Thus, future research on subjectivities in the Bakken would explicitly 
seek to apply existing theories of the subject in order to determine how they can be 
affirmed or challenged in the “real world.”  A model for such research can already be 
found in work on the role of the state and private sector in attempting to inculcate pro-
environmental behavior on the part of citizens, which has posited that the public pursuit 
of socially-progressive goals is used as a pretext for furthering government authority and 
control (Dilley, 2015; Jones, Pykett & Whitehead, 2013; Paterson & Stripple, 2010). 
Building on these findings, this research would seek to examine the explicit policy goals 
of fostering environmental behavior change (which in the Bakken can be viewed as 
largely anti-environmental), moving beyond this dissertation’s objective of solely 
determining how such ideology operates. This nexus of policy and ideology could also be 
further extended to determine the overall goals of the Bakken project beyond mere 
accumulation, such as its role as a broader-based strategy for rural development in North 
Dakota and its contribution to the purported revival of rural America (7.2.1), providing a 
connection with an emerging body of literature on rural metabolism (Serrano-Tovar & 
Giampietro, 2014; Ravera, et al., 2014). 
 Although this study examined North Dakota’s history of engagement with the 
extractive industries, it did not engage in significant detail with the gender aspects of these 
phenomena. A gender analysis of ideology and subject formation in the Bakken could 
analyze the ways in which extraction is framed as a stereotypically masculine endeavor 
and the ways in which women and others viewed as feminine are marginalized by existing 
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discourse. Specifically, an analysis of the expected behavior of women under the North 
Dakota Way (and in North Dakota culture more broadly) could help to uncover how the 
oil and gas boom serves to reinforce (or less likely, subvert) gender roles in North Dakota 
society. A masculinist analysis of the North Dakota Way could also examine the role of 
the prairie toughness mythology in normalizing exploitation of women, the state’s Native 
American population and manual laborers in pursuit of stability, consensus-based politics 
and economic growth, themes which would overlap with existing neo-extractivist 
literatures (Svampa, 2015; van Teijlingen, 2016) and literatures on the role of male and 
female bodies in extractive labor (Abrahamson and Somerville, 2007; Austin, 2018). 
 Finally, while this study was entirely qualitative, the application of mixed-methods 
to studies of fracking in the Bakken could help to uncover data that cannot be gleaned 
solely through ethnographic methods alone. A specific method to be employed would be 
a large-n telephone, internet and/or mail survey to gauge Bakken residents’ opinions 
about and understandings of fracking and development. Although this dissertation has 
been critical of such studies conducted in other shale plays (Theodori, 2013; Jacquet, 
2012) due to the limited nature of researchers’ aims and possible issues with response 
bias, a carefully crafted survey attentive to place-specificity would be extraordinarily 
useful in gauging a baseline of opinion that could then be used to inform case study 
research. Additionally, using GIS analysis to uncover hidden economic and environmental 
spatial patterns related to fracking – an approach already employed by Meng (2017), 
Juliusson and Doherty (2017) and Murphy, Brannstrom and Fry (2017) – would be a 
helpful supplement to existing ethnographic methodologies and could also be used to 
help facilitate GIS-aided focus groups (Cope, McLafferty & Rhodes, 2011). 
 306 
 
 
7.6 Summary 
 The US shale energy boom of the late 2000s and 2010s has brought both 
economic growth and negative externalities to communities undergoing extraction. While 
much literature in the social sciences has been devoted to fracking landscapes in areas 
such as Pennsylvania, Texas and the UK, North Dakota’s Bakken Formation (the third 
largest shale play in the nation) has received comparatively little attention. Building on 
previous research on fracking landscapes – as well as geographies of energy and natural 
resources and case studies of environmental subjectivity in extractive zones – this 
dissertation has examined the discourses and ideology used to support and oppose 
fracking-led development in North Dakota. Employing a series of key actor interviews and 
focus groups, participant observation and qualitative newspaper analysis, this 
dissertation has found that fracking in North Dakota is framed as an extension of the 
state’s traditional extractive and agro-industrial economies. Moreover, the arguments 
used to argue for and against fracking are largely derived from existing value systems 
which emphasize self-reliance, obedience to authority and self-sacrifice for the 
community good. Thus, the key finding from this dissertation is that respondents have 
viewed fracking more through its effect on society and culture, than through the more 
typical framings of economy and environment emphasized in existing case studies. 
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